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ABSTRACT PAGE 
Web browsing has become an integral part of our lives, and we use browsers to perform 
many important activities almost everyday and everywhere. However, due to the 
vulnerabilities in Web browsers and Web applications and also due to Web users' lack of 
security knowledge, browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused 
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Enhancing Web browsing 
security is therefore of great need and importance. 
This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through exploring 
and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have 
systematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie 
management, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public 
computers. We have proposed new approaches to address these problems, and built 
unique systems to validate our approaches. 
To manage HTTP cookies, we have proposed an approach to automatically validate the 
usefulness of HTTP cookies at the client-side on behalf of users. By automatically 
removing useless cookies, our approach helps a user to strike an appropriate balance 
between maximizing usability and minimizing security risks. To protect against phishing 
attacks, we have proposed an approach to transparently feed a relatively large number of 
bogus credentials into a suspected phishing site. Using those bogus credentials, our 
approach conceals victims' real credentials and enables a legitimate website to identify 
stolen credentials in a timely manner. To identify insecure JavaScript practices, we have 
proposed an execution-based measurement approach and performed a large-scale 
measurement study. Our work sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and 
especially reveals the severity and nature of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic 
generation practices on the Web. To achieve secure and convenient Web browsing on 
untrusted public computers, we have proposed a simple approach that enables an 
extended browser on a mobile device and a regular browser on a public computer to 
collaboratively support a Web session. A user can securely perform sensitive interactions 
on the mobile device and conveniently perform other browsing interactions on the public 
computer. 
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Enhancing Web Browsing Security 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Web-centric computing is a significant trend in computing, and Web browsing has be-
come an integral part of our lives. People use browsers to perform many important activities 
such as banking, shopping, and bill-paying; they also use browsers to search, communicate, 
and collaborate, as well as to teach, learn, and entertain. Meanwhile, Web browsers have 
evolved dramatically since the invention of the first Web client in 1990 [186]. Web browsers 
are no longer simple HTML document renderers; they have increasingly become the dom-
inant platform for both current and future end-user applications. This fascinating trend 
manifests the need and importance of providing modern Web browsers with higher security 
assurance and better functionality. 
1.1 Motivation and Concentration 
Traditionally, attackers mainly focused on directly breaking into Web servers to acquire 
sensitive information or damage the systems. However, in recent years, Web browsers have 
2 
3 
gained increasing popularity as new attack vectors for launching various severe attacks such 
as drive-by download, cross-site scripting, phishing, privacy, and even large-scale denial 
of service attacks. Browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused 
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Meanwhile, Internet security 
threat trends [159] show that malicious activities have increasingly become Web-based, 
attackers are more and more targeting end users, the online underground economy has 
matured, and attackers are able to rapidly adapt their attacking techniques. Enhancing 
Web browsing security is therefore of great need and importance, and it has also become 
much more challenging than before. 
This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through explor-
ing and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have sys-
tematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie man-
agement, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public comput-
ers. These problems are real-world important problems that are closely related to a few top 
cyber security threats. For example, all the four problems are tightly related to the threat 
of online identity theft, which is the greatest fear for Internet users [159, 174]. For another 
example, the problem of insecure JavaScript practices is also tightly related to cross-site 
scripting, which is the number one Web application vulnerability of all time [33, 190, 193]. 
In studying these four Web browsing security problems, we have carefully surveyed 
state-of-art solutions in literature and also carefully experimented with state-of-practice 
security features in modern Web browsers. We have made important observations and 
proposed novel approaches to address these problems. We have also built unique browser-
based software systems to validate our approaches. In the next section, we briefly introduce 
4 
these four Web browsing security problems and our contributions. We detail the motivation, 
design, implementation, and evaluation of each work in the following four Chapters 2, 3, 4, 
and 5, respectively. 
1.2 Contributions 
The contributions of this dissertation include an automatic HTTP cookie management 
system, a transparent phishing protection system, a large-scale measurement of insecure 
JavaScript practices on the Web, and a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk 
browsing. 
1.2.1 Automatic HTTP Cookie Management 
HTTP cookies are designed and widely used to provide many beneficial features such as 
maintaining session state and enabling web page personalization. However, despite their 
importance and usefulness, HTTP cookies have raised significant user privacy and security 
concerns. This is because HTTP cookies can be used to monitor users' browsing habits, and 
possibly to associate what you have looked at with who you are. Moreover, stolen cookies 
may also incur severe security problems; for example, they can be used to impersonate other 
users and to gain access to session-protected services and resources. 
Through a systematic study of HTTP cookie management on modern Web browsers 
and a large-scale measurement of cookie usage on over five thousand websites, we made the 
observation that handling first-party persistent cookies is .the most challenging problem in 
HTTP cookie management. First-party persistent cookies are stored on the hard disk of a 
user's computer until they expire or are deleted by a user. Websites often set a long lifetime 
5 
for first-party persistent cookies, thus leaving plenty of room for attackers to manipulate or 
steal those cookies. Unfortunately, modern Web browsers only provide very limited cookie 
management support, and often require users to manually define policies. 
To address this problem, we designed CookiePicker [126, 127], a system that can au-
tomatically verify the usefulness of first-party persistent cookies at the client-side. Cook-
iePicker identifies those cookies that can cause perceivable changes on a webpage as useful, 
while simply classifying the rest as useless. Useless cookies will be finally removed from the 
browser to reduce potential security and privacy risks. CookiePicker therefore helps users 
achieve the maximum benefit brought by cookies, while minimizing the potential risks. We 
implemented CookiePicker as an extension to the Firefox Web browser, and evaluated its 
efficacy and overhead through live experiments. The experimental results indicate that 
CookiePicker can automatically make high-accuracy cookie usage decisions with very low 
running overhead. We detail this work in Chapter 2. 
1.2.2 Transparent Phishing Protection 
Phishing is one of the most common Internet frauds, and it has caused serious damages 
to Internet users ranging from denied account access to substantial financial loss. While it 
seems that phishing is so simple, it is a very challenging problem because it is a third-wave 
semantic attack that targets the way humans assign meaning to content [182]. It is also 
important to note that phishing is not far away from us. For example, according to the 
IT Administration of our university, phishing targets William and Mary online accounts 
as well. Individuals on our campus frequently became the victims of phishing attacks, 
and serious consequences have occurred. Many anti-phishing mechanisms focus on helping 
6 
users verify whether a website is genuine. They endeavor to prevent users from being 
tricked into revealing their credentials to phishing sites. Nevertheless, prevention-based 
approaches alone are insufficient to shield vulnerable users from "biting the bait" and defeat 
phishers because human users are the weakest link in the security chain. The ever-increasing 
prevalence and severity of phishing attacks clearly indicate that anti-phishing is still a 
daunting challenge. 
Two observations motivated us to explore a quite different approach. First, currently, 
it is trivial for phishers to verify their collected credentials. The majority of credentials 
collected by a phishing site are victims' real credentials. Meanwhile, when phishers go to a 
legitimate site to verify their collected credentials, it is very hard for the legitimate site to 
differentiate phishers' credential verification activities from users' regular login activities. 
Therefore, we had such a question: can we make it harder for phishers to verify their col-
lected credentials? Second, browsers warn instead of block users' connections to suspected 
phishing sites. Although remarkable advances in automatic phishing detection have been 
achieved, false positives may still happen. Therefore, giving warnings and expecting users 
to leave suspected phishing sites have become the most common actions taken by modern 
browsers. However, usability studies have demonstrated that many users still ignore the 
strong phishing warnings. Therefore, we had another question: can we leverage the power 
of automatic phishing detection and can we effectively transform this power into the power 
of automatic fraud protection? 
With these observations and questions, we explored a quite different approach to protect 
against phishing attacks with "bogus bites." We developed BogusBiter [122, 125], a unique 
client-side anti-phishing tool, which transparently feeds a relatively large number of bogus 
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credentials into a suspected phishing site. BogusBiter conceals a victim's real credential 
among bogus credentials, and moreover, it enables a legitimate website to identify stolen 
credentials in a timely manner. BogusBiter leverages the power of client-side automatic 
phishing detection techniques, and it is complementary to existing preventive anti-phishing 
approaches. Seamlessly integrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in 
modern Web browsers, BogusBiter is transparent to users. We implemented BogusBiter as 
an extension to the Firefox Web browser, and evaluated its efficacy through real experiments 
on both phishing and legitimate websites. Our experimental results indicate that it is 
promising to use BogusBiter to transparently protect against phishing attacks. We detail 
this work in Chapter 3. 
1.2.3 Characterizing Insecure JavaScript Practices on the Web 
JavaScript is an interpreted programming language widely used for client-side scripting. 
JavaScript code embedded or included in webpages runs locally in a user's Web browser, and 
it is mainly used by websites to enhance the interactivity and functionality of their webpages. 
However, because JavaScript is equipped with a powerful and diverse set of capabilities in 
modern Web browsers, it has also become the weapon of choice for attackers. Many severe 
attacks such as drive-by-download, cross-site scripting, as well as the aforementioned cookie 
stealing and phishing, are closely related to JavaScript. To a very large extent, JavaScript 
has become a central battle ground of the Web security. 
A great deal of attention has been paid to the JavaScript-related vulnerabilities that 
could directly lead to security breaches. However, little attention has been given to the inse-
cure practices of using JavaScript on legitimate websites. Similar to other insecure practices 
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on legitimate websites such as using customers' social security numbers as their login IDs, 
insecure JavaScript practices may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but they 
could definitely cultivate the creation of new attack vectors and greatly increase the risks 
of browser-based attacks. 
This observation motivated us to identify insecure JavaScript practices on legitimate 
websites, to analyze their severity, and to highlight their risks. To achieve this goal, we 
devised an execution-based measurement approach [123]. The key idea of this approach is 
to first use an instrumented Web browser to non-intrusively obtain JavaScript execution 
information on different websites, and then use an offline analysis toolkit to sufficiently 
analyze the collected trace information. Using our instrumentation framework and analysis 
toolkit, we performed the first large-scale measurement study of the insecure JavaScript 
practices on the Web. Our focus is on the insecure practices of JavaScript inclusion and 
dynamic generation, and we examined their severity and nature on 6,805 unique websites. 
Our measurement results reveal that insecure JavaScript practices are common at vari-
ous websites: (1) at least 66.4% of the measured websites manifest the insecure practices 
of including JavaScript files from external domains into the top-level documents of their 
webpages; (2) over 44.4% of the measured websites use the dangerous eval() function to 
dynamically generate and execute JavaScript code on their webpages; and (3) in JavaScript 
dynamic generation, using the document.write() method and the innerHTML property is 
much more popular than using the relatively secure technique of creating script elements 
via DOM (Document Object Model) [191] methods. Our in-depth analysis indicates that 
safe alternatives to those insecure JavaScript practices exist in common cases and ought to 
be adopted by website developers and administrators for reducing potential security risks. 
9 
We detail this work in Chapter 4. 
1.2.4 Secure and Convenient Kiosk Browsing 
Many kiosk environments such as airport lounges and hotel business centers provide people 
with Internet-connected public computers to facilitate ubiquitous Web access. Those public 
computers often have high-speed network connections. They are also convenient to use 
because they normally have full-size keyboards and large displays. People who do not own 
a computer or carry a laptop with them frequently use those public computers to browse the 
Web. Unfortunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own 
computers. Public computers are used by many people to run different applications and visit 
various websites; therefore, it is very ,likely for them to be infected with malware. Simply 
searching "public computer security" online, we can find numerous articles suggesting that 
people should not use public computers to perform sensitive activities. 
To secure kiosk computing environments, researchers have proposed a number of solu-
tions. Many of those solutions focus on specific objectives such as securing application and 
data access, securing user authentication and input, or verifying software integrity. How-
ever, those solutions cannot be easily adopted to secure an entire kiosk browsing session. A 
few solutions do have the objective of securing an entire kiosk browsing session, but they 
are very complex, not very secure, and not practical. They are very complex and not very 
secure because they all use the browser on the untrusted public computer to directly access 
remote Web servers. They are not practical because they often require support from extra 
proxies or extra authentication and key-exchange processes. 
We proposed SessionMagnifier [124], a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk 
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browsing. The key idea of SessionMagnifier is to enable an extended browser on a mobile 
device and a regular browser on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session. 
This approach simply requires a SessionMagnifier browser extension to be installed on a 
trusted mobile device. No third-party proxy is needed, no Web server modification is needed, 
and no installation or configuration on the untrusted public computer is needed. A user 
can securely perform sensitive interactions on the mobile device and conveniently perform 
other browsing interactions on the public computer. We implemented SessionMagnifier for 
Mozilla's Fennec mobile browser and evaluated it on a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet. The 
evaluation and analysis demonstrate that SessionMagnifier is simple, secure, and usable. 
We detail this work in Chapter 5. During the process of developing SessionMagnifier, we 
realized that the technique we invented to solve this specific kiosk browsing problem could 
be extended to build a simple and practical framework for real-time collaborative browsing. 
Therefore, we made the decision to immediately build our RCB (Real-time Collaborative 
Browsing) framework [121]. I do not include the RCB work [121] in this dissertation just 
because it is not directly related to enhancing Web browsing security. 
1.3 Organization 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the details of 
our work on automatic HTTP cookie management. We describe a measurement study of 
HTTP cookie usage on the Web, and then fully present our CookiePicker system. Chapter 3 
presents the details of our work on transparent phishing protection. We present the design 
and implementation of our BogusBiter system, and we also discuss its deployment and lim-
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itations. Chapter 4 presents the details of our work on characterizing insecure JavaScript 
practices on the Web. We introduce our JavaScript measurement framework and analy-
sis toolkit, and then completely present and analyze a large-scale measurement study of 
insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web. Chapter 5 
presents the details of our work on secure and convenient kiosk browsing. We present our 
SessionMagnifier system and analyze its security and usability advantages in supporting 
kiosk browsing. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the dissertation and presents future work. 
Chapter 2 
Automatic HTTP Cookie 
Management 
In this chapter, we present our work on automatic HTTP cookie management. We 
advocate that useless first-party persistent cookies should be removed from a user's browser, 
so that potential security and privacy risks can be reduced. We present a pure client-side 
solution that can automatically verify the usefulness of first-party persistent cookies on 
behalf of a user. By removing those useless cookies, our solution can help a user achieve the 
maximum benefit brought by HTTP cookies while minimizing the potential security and 
privacy risks. 
2.1 Motivation 
HTTP Cookies, also known as Web cookies or just cookies, are small parcels of text sent by 
a server to a Web browser and then sent back unchanged by the browser if it accesses that 
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server again [155]. Cookies are originally designed to carry information between servers and 
browsers so that a stateful session can be maintained within the stateless HTTP protocol. 
For example, online shopping websites use cookies to keep track of a user's shopping basket. 
Cookies make Web applications much easier to write, and thereby have gained a wide range 
of usage since debut in 1995. In addition to maintaining session states, cookies have also 
been widely used for personalizing, authenticating, and tracking user behaviors. 
Despite their importance and usefulness, cookies have been of major concern for privacy. 
As pointed out by Kristol in [63], the ability to monitor browsing habits, and possibly to 
associate what you have looked at with who you are, is the heart of the privacy concern that 
cookies raise. For example, a lawsuit alleged that DoubleClick Inc. used cookies to collect 
Web users' personal information without their consent [14]. Moreover, vulnerabilities of 
Web applications or Web browsers can be exploited by attackers to steal cookies directly, 
leading to severe security and privacy problems [34, 47, 106, 107]. 
As the general public has become more aware of cookie privacy issues, a few privacy 
options have been introduced into Web browsers to allow users to define detailed policies for 
cookie usage either before or during visiting a website. However, these privacy options are 
far from enough for users to fully utilize the convenience brought by cookies while limiting 
the possible privacy and security risks. What makes it even worse is that most users do not 
have a good understanding of cookies and often misuse or ignore these privacy options [39]. 
Using cookies can be both beneficial and harmful. The ideal cookie-usage decision for 
a user is to enable and store useful cookies, but disable and delete harmful cookies. It has 
long been a challenge to design effective cookie management schemes that can help users 
make the ideal cookie-usage decision. On one hand, determining whether some cookies 
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are harmful is almost impossible, because very few websites inform users how they use 
cookies. Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P) [177] enables websites to express 
their privacy practices but its usage is too low to be a practical solution. On the other 
hand, determining whether some cookies are useful is possible, because a user can perceive 
inconvenience or webpage differences if some useful cookies are disabled. For instance, if 
some cookies are disabled, online shopping may be blocked or preference setting cannot take 
into effect. However, current Web browsers only provide a method, which asks questions 
and prompts options to users, for making decision on each incoming cookie. Such a method 
is costly [74] and very inconvenient to users. 
In this work, we first conduct a large-scale cookie measurement for investigating the 
current cookie usage on various websites. Our major measurement findings show that the 
pervasive usage of persistent cookies and their very long lifetimes clearly highlight the 
demand for removing useless persistent cookies to reduce the potential privacy and security 
risks. Then we present CookiePicker, a system that automatically makes cookie usage 
decisions on behalf o£ a Web user. CookiePicker enhances the cookie management for a 
website by using two processes: a training process to mark cookie usefulness and a tuning 
process to recover possible errors. CookiePicker uses two complementary algorithms to 
effectively detect HTML page difference online, and we believe that these two algorithms 
have the potential to be used by other online tools and applications. Based on the two 
HTML page difference detection algorithms, CookiePicker identifies those cookies that cause 
perceivable changes on a webpage as useful, while simply classifying the rest as useless. 
Subsequently, CookiePicker enables useful cookies but disables useless cookies. All the 
tasks are performed without user involvement or even notice. 
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Although it is debatable whether defining useful cookies as those that lead to perceivable 
changes in webpages retrieved is the best choice, so far this definition is the most reasonable 
measure at the browser side and it is also used in [97]. The reasons mainly lie in that very 
few websites tell users the intention of their cookie usage, P3P usage is still very low, and 
many websites use cookies indiscriminately [9]. 
We implemented CookiePicker as a Firefox Web browser extension, and validated its ef-
ficacy through live experiments over a variety of websites. Our experimental results demon-
strate the distinct features of CookiePicker, including (1) fully automatic decision making, 
(2) high accuracy on decision making, and (3) very low running overhead. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the back-
ground of cookies. Section 2.3 shows our cookie measurement results. Section 2.4 describes 
the design of CookiePicker. Section 2.5 details the two HTML page difference detection 
algorithms used by CookiePicker. Section 2.6 presents the implementation of CookiePicker 
and its performance evaluation. Section 2. 7 discusses the potential evasions against Cook-
iePicker as well as some concerns about using CookiePicker. Section 2.8 reviews related 
work, and finally, Section 2.9 summarizes this work. 
2.2 Background 
HTTP cookies allow an HTTP-based service to create stateful sessions that persist across 
multiple HTTP transactions [76]. When a server receives an HTTP request from a client, 
the server may include one or more Set-Cookie headers in its response to the client. The 
client interprets the Set-Cookie response headers and accepts those cookies that do not 
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violate its privacy and security rules. Later on, when the client sends a new request to the 
original server, it will use the Cookie header to carry the cookies with the request [61]. 
In the Set-Cookie response header, each cookie begins with a NAME=VALUE pair, followed 
by zero or more semi-colon-separated attribute-value pairs. The NAME=VALUE pair contains 
the state information that a server attempts to store at the client side. The optional 
attributes Domain and Path specify the destination domain and the targeted URL path for 
a cookie. The optional attribute Max-Age determines the lifetime of a cookie and a client 
should discard the cookie after its lifetime expires. 
In general, there are two different ways to classify cookies. Based on the origin and 
destination, cookies can be classified into first-party cookies, which are created by the 
website we are currently visiting; and third-party cookies, which are created by a website 
other than the one we are currently visiting. Based on lifetime, cookies can be classified 
into session cookies, which have zero lifetime and are stored in memory and deleted after 
the close of the Web browser; and persistent cookies, which have non-zero lifetime and 
are stored on a hard disk until they expire or are deleted by a user. A recent extensive 
investigation of the use of first-party, third-party, session, and persistent cookies was carried 
out by Tappenden and Miller [103]. 
Third-party cookies bring almost no benefit to Web users and have long been recognized 
as a major threat to user privacy since 1996 [63]. Therefore, almost all the popular Web 
browsers, such as Microsoft Internet Explorer and Mozilla Firefox, provide users with the 
privacy options to disable third-party cookies. Although disabling third-party cookies is 
a very good start to address privacy concerns, it only limits the profiling of users from 
third-party cookies [63], but cannot prevent the profiling of users from first-party cookies. 
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First-party cookies can be either session cookies or persistent cookies. First-party session 
cookies are widely used for maintaining session states, and pose relatively low privacy or 
security threats to users due to their short lifetime. Therefore, it is quite reasonable for a 
user to enable first-party session cookies. 
First-party persistent cookies, however, are double-edged swords. As we will show in 
Section 2.3, first-party persistent cookies could stay on a user's disk for a few years if not 
been removed. Some cookies perform useful roles such as setting preferences. Some cookies, 
however, provide no benefit but pose serious privacy and security risks to users. For instance, 
first-party persistent cookies can be used to track the user activity over time by the original 
website, proxies, or even third-party services. Moreover, first-party persistent cookies could 
be stolen or manipulated by three kinds of long-standing attacks: (1) cross-site scripting 
(XSS) attacks that exploit Web applications' vulnerabilities [58, 106, 193], (2) attacks that 
exploit Web browser vulnerabilities [15, 88, 107], and (3) attacks that could directly steal 
and control cookies launched by various malware and browser hijackers such as malicious 
browser extensions [57, 67, 94]. These attacks can easily bypass the same origin policy [180] 
of modern Web browsers, which protects cookies stored by one origin from accessing by 
a different origin. As an example, recently cookie-stolen related XSS vulnerabilities were 
even found in Google's hosting services [195, 197]; and the flaws in Internet Explorer 7 and 
Firefox could enable attackers to steal and manipulate cookies stored on a PC's hard drive 
[196]. 
Disabling third-party cookies (both session and persistent) and enabling first-party ses-
sion cookies have been supported by most Web browsers. The hardest problem in cookie 
management is how to handle first-party persistent cookies. Currently Web browsers only 
{{ You can choose how cookies are handled in the lntemet 
~ zone. This overrides automatic cookie handling. 
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Figure 2.1: Internet Explorer 7 advanced privacy settings. 
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have very limited functions such as automatically accepting or blocking all first-party per-
sistent cookies, or prompting each of them to let users manually make decisions. Figure 2.1 
shows the advanced privacy settings of Internet Explorer 7, in which the functions pro-
vided to control first-party persistent cookies are very cumbersome and impractical to use. 
Therefore, the focus of this work is on first-party persistent cookies, that is, how to auto-
matically manage the usage of first-party persistent cookies on behalf of a user 1. Instead 
of directly addressing XSS and various Web browser vulnerabilities, CookiePicker reduces 
cookie privacy and security risks by removing useless first-party cookies from a user's hard 
disk. Here we assume that the hosting website is legitimate, since it is worthless to protect 
the cookies of a malicious site. 
1The design of CookiePicker and its decision algorithms can be easily applied to other kinds of cookies 
as well if needed. 
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2.3 HTTP Cookie Measurement 
To comprehensively understand the usage of HTTP cookies over the Internet, we conducted 
a large-scale measurement study in December 2009. We chose over five thousand websites 
from directory.google.com, an online website directory containing millions of websites cate-
gorized by topic. Then, we used a customized webpage retrieval tool wget [150] to identify 
those websites that set cookies at client side. We only consider first-party cookies, including 
both session cookies and persistent cookies, in this measurement study. 
2.3.1 Website Selection and Crawling 
Since there are numerous websites on the Internet, we select the websites for measurement 
study based on the following two requirements: diversity and representativeness. As with 
[79], the selection pool we use is directory.google.com, in which websites are organized into 
hierarchical categories and listed in Google page-rank order indicating the relevance to the 
classified category. There are fifteen top-level categories in directory.google.com. Our se-
lection covers thirteen of them, except categories "world" and "regional". These two are 
avoided due to the existence of many non-English websites. Since a top-level category has 
multiple sub-categories which also have further sub-categories, each top-level category may 
consist of hundreds of thousands of websites. Thus, we only choose the websites listed 
in the top-level categories and their immediate sub-categories. To select representative 
websites, we filter out those websites with page-rank less than 0.252 • There may exist du-
plicate websites inside a category or between two categories. We first remove the duplicate 
2 Page-rank value is between 0 and 1. The bigger, the more relevant. 
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intra-category websites and then move all the duplicate inter-category websites into a new 
category-"Multi-category". After filtering and removing, the total number of unique web-
sites chosen for our study is 5,393. The number of websites in each category is listed in 
Table 2.1, where the second column lists the total number of websites in the corresponding 
category and the third column shows the number and percentage of the websites that set 
cookies at client side. The fourth, fifth, and sixth columns of Table 2.1 show the number 
of the websites that set only session cookies, only persistent cookies, and both session and 
persistent cookies, respectively. 
We instruct the customized wget to crawl the selected websites and save the correspond-
ing cookies carried in the HTTP response headers. To simulate a user surfing the Web, we 
turn on the recursive option in wget so that wget can recursively retrieve webpages. The 
maximum depth of recursion level is set to two. We instruct wget to only save first-party 
cookies. To avoid crawling being blocked or running too long, we use a random wait time 
varied from zero to two seconds between consecutive retrievals, and limit the crawling time 
on a single website within six minutes. 
2.3.2 Measurement Results 
After Web crawling, we found that 2,341 (43%) websites in total have set at least one first-
party cookie at client side. The average number of retrieved unique URLs per website for 
these 2,341 websites is 538. The percentage of websites setting cookies in each category 
varies from 33% to 63%, as shown in Table 2.1. These numbers are conservative since wget 
cannot obtain the cookies set by the webpages that require a user login or carried by the 
client-side JavaScript. Even so, the results clearly show the pervasive cookie usage among 
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Category Web Cookies Session Persistent Both 
Sites Only Only 
Arts 342 113 (33%) 55 21 37 
Business 602 265 (44%) 181 28 56 
Computers 512 190 (37%) 108 33 49 
Games· 151 51 (34%) 19 12 20 
Health 303 148 (49%) 82 17 49 
Home 324 157 (48%) 83 23 51 
News 483 176 (36%) 86 51 39 
Recreation 351 173 (49%) 86 36 51 
Reference 308 134 (44%) 69 17 48 
Science 537 215 (40%) 118 48 49 
Shopping 461 290 (63%) 93 67 130 
Society 214 78 (36%) 35 17 26 
Sports 673 287 (43%) 152 51 84 
Multi-category 132 64 (48%) 23 24 17 
Total 5,393 2,341 (43%) 1,190 445 706 
Table 2.1: Statistics of the selected websites and their usage of HTTP cookies. 
various types of websites. 
For those websites that use cookies, we compute the CDFs (Cumulative Distribution 
Functions) of the number of cookies, the number of session cookies, and the number of 
persistent cookies per website, respectively, and draw them in Figure 2.2. Note that the 
X-axis is in logarithmic scale. We are interested in these numbers because Web browsers 
usually set limits on the total number of cookies and the number of cookies per domain, 
in order to save memory and disk space on a user's computer. For example, the maximum 
default number of cookies per domain and maximum number of total cookies are set to 
50 and 1,000 respectively in Firefox. From Figure 2.2, we can see that about 99% of the 
websites set less than 10 cookies at client side and none of them sets more than 40 cookies. 
This indicates that all websites under study follow the basic rule that a website should not 
set too many cookies to a client. 
Web browsers usually also set limit on the size of a cookie, which is mainly determined 
by the length of cookie value. For example, Firefox limits the length of a cookie NAME/VALUE 
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Figure 2.2: CDFs of the number of all cookies, the number of session cookies, the number of 
persistent cookies per website, respectively. 
pair up to 4,096 bytes. Figure 2.3 depicts the CDFs of cookie size in bytes for all cookies, 
session cookies, and persistent cookies, respectively. Around 94% of cookies are less than 
100 bytes and none of them is greater than 4,096 bytes. 
If cookie is enabled during browsing a website, the path of URL will determine what 
cookies to be transmitted together with the HTTP request to server. If the Path attribute 
of a cookie matches the prefix of the URL path, the cookie previously set will be sent 
back. We examine the Path depth for cookies, session cookies, and persistent cookies, 
respectively, and draw their CDFs in Figure 2.4. Surprisingly, near 90% of cookies have 
root "/" as their Path attribute values, which implies that these cookies will be sent back 
to the original websites for any URL requests to those sites. Although some cookies may 
need to be sent back to the Web servers for any URL on the servers, the abnormally high 
percentage suggests that the Path attributes of many cookies may not be appropriately 
set. As a consequence of this inappropriate setting, many requests carry cookies that are 
functionally unnecessary: the cookies neither affect responses nor make difference to server 
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Figure 2.3: CDFs of cookie size in bytes for all cookies, session cookies, and persistent cookies, 
respectively. 
states. Wide-spread indiscriminate usage of cookies not only impedes many optimizations 
such as content delivery optimizations studied in [9], but also increases the risk of cookie 
stealing. 
We are especially interested in the lifetime of persistent cookies, which can be calculated 
from the cookie attribute Max-Age specified in the Set-Cookie HTTP response header. We 
compute the lifetime for all persistent cookies and draw its CDF in Figure 2.5 (The X-axis 
is log-scaled). There are a few hikes in the curve, among which the lifetimes corresponding 
to one year (365 days) and 30 years are most evident. Clearly, over 60% of persistent 
cookies are set to expire after one year or longer. We also found that seven websites set 
their cookies to expire in year 9999, nearly eight thousand years from now! The mean and 
median lifetimes of persistent cookies are 38 years and one year, respectively. 
In summary, our major measurement findings show that cookie has been widely used by 
websites. Although the simple cookie collection tool we used cannot retrieve the webpages 
that require login and cannot acquire the cookies set by JavaScript, we still found that about 
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Figure 2.4: CDFs of cookie PATH depth for all cookies, session cookies, and persistent cookies, 
respectively. 
43% of the total selected websites use either session cookies, persistent cookies, or both. 
Moreover, around 21% of the total selected websites use persistent cookies and the majority 
of persistent cookies have their lifetimes longer than one year. Therefore, the pervasive 
usage of persistent cookies and their very long lifetimes clearly highlight the demand for 
removing those useless persistent cookies to reduce potential privacy risks. 
We did a similar measurement study in December 2006 [126]. The procedure and tool 
for selecting and crawling websites used in that study are the same as our current study. 
Although we cannot. directly compare the results of two studies due to the differences of 
websites and crawling paths, we found that the findings mentioned above hold in the 2006 
study. For example, in the 2006 study, about 37% of the total (5,211) selected websites use 
cookies and about 18% of the total selected websites use persistent cookies. Similarly, more 
than 60% of persistent cookies have lifetimes longer than one year in the 2006 study. 
Recently Tappenden and Miller [103] did an extensive study on cookie deployment and 
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Figure 2.5: CDF of persistent cookie lifetime. 
usage. Some of their study results have the similar implications as ours. For example, their 
study shows that 67.4% (66,031) of the 98,006 websites use cookies and 83.8% (55,130) of 
those 66,031 sites use first-party cookies. In addition, they observed that approximately 
50.4% of all persistent cookies surveyed are set to live for over one year. The discrepancy in 
numbers between their study and ours can be attributed to the differences in the sample set 
and study methods. For example, they chose websites from Alexa while we chose websites 
from Coogle directory; they instrumented Firefox browser while we instrumented wget. 
2.4 CookiePicker Design 
The design goal of CookiePicker is to effectively identify the useful cookies of a website, 
and then disable the return of those useless cookies back to the website in the subsequent 
requests and finally remove them. A webpage is automatically retrieved twice by enabling 
and disabling some cookies. If there are obvious differences between the two retrieved 
results, we classify the cookies as useful; otherwise, we classify them as useless. CookiePicker 
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Figure 2.6: HTTP requests/responses in a single webpage view. 
enhances the cookie management for a website by two processes: forward cookie usefulness 
marking and backward error recovery. We define these two processes and detail the design 
of CookiePicker in the following. 
Definition 1. FORward Cookie Usefulness Marking (FORCUM) is a training process, in 
which CookiePicker determines cookie usefulness and marks certain cookies as useful for a 
website. 
Definition 2. Backward error recovery is a tuning process, in which wrong decisions made 
by CookiePicker in the FORCUM process may be adjusted automatically or manually for a 
website. 
2.4.1 Regular and Hidden Requests 
A typical webpage consists of a container page that is an HTML text file, and a set of 
associated objects such as stylesheets, embedded images, scripts, and so on. When a user 
browses a webpage, the HTTP request for the container page is first sent to the Web server. 
Then, after receiving the corresponding HTTP response for the container page, the Web 
browser analyzes the container page and issues a series of HTTP requests to the Web server 
for downloading the objects associated with the container page. The HTTP requests and 
responses associated with a single webpage view are depicted by the solid lines (1) and (2) 
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Figure 2. 7: Data flow inside Gecko. 
in Figure 2.6, respectively. 
Webpage contents coming with the HTTP responses are passed into the Web browser 
layout engine for processing. Figure 2. 7 depicts the data flow inside of Gecko [143], one 
of the most popular Web browser layout engines used in all Mozilla-branded software and 
its derivatives. When a webpage comes into Gecko, its container page is first parsed and 
built into a tree. The structure of the tree follows the W3C Document Object Model 
(DOM) [191], thus the tree is known as DOM tree. Next, the data from the DOM tree 
are put into abstract boxes called frames by combining the information from stylesheets. 
Finally, these frames and the associated Web objects are rendered and displayed on a user's 
screen. 
In order to identify the cookie usefulness for a webpage, CookiePicker compares two 
versions of the same webpage: the first version is retrieved with cookies enabled and the 
second version is retrieved with cookies disabled. The first version is readily available to 
CookiePicker in the user's regular Web browsing window. CookiePicker only needs to re-
trieve the second version of the container page. Similar to Doppelganger [97], CookiePicker 
utilizes the ever increasing client side spare bandwidth and computing power to run the 
second version. However, unlike Doppelganger, CookiePicker neither maintains a fork win-
dow nor mirrors the whole user session. CookiePicker only retrieves the second version of 
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the container page by sending a single hidden HTTP request. As shown in Figure 2.6, line 
(3) is the extra hidden HTTP request sent by CookiePicker for the second version of the 
container page, and line ( 4) represents the corresponding HTTP response. In the remainder 
of the chapter, we simply refer the requests and responses, represented by the solid lines 
(1) and (2) of Figure 2.6, as regular requests and responses; and refer the extra request and 
response, represented by the dashed lines (3) and (4) of Figure 2.6, as the hidden request 
and response. 
2.4.2 Forward Cookie Usefulness Marking 
As shown in Figure 2.8, the FORCUM process consists of five steps: regular request record-
ing, hidden request sending, DOM tree extraction, cookie usefulness identification, and 
cookie record marking. 
When visiting a webpage, a user issues regular requests and then receives regular re-
sponses. At the first step, CookiePicker identifies the regular request for the container page 
and saves a copy of its URI and header information. CookiePicker needs to filter out the 
temporary redirection or replacement pages and locate the real initial container document 
page. 
At the second step, CookiePicker takes advantage of user's think time [69] to retrieve the 
second copy of the container page, without causing any delay to the user's regular browsing. 
Specifically, right after all the regular responses are received and the webpage is rendered 
on the screen for display, CookiePicker issues the single hidden request for the second copy 
of the container page. In the hidden request, CookiePicker uses the same URI as the saved 
in the first step. It only modifies the "Cookie" field of the request header by removing a 
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Figure 2.8: The five-step FORCUM process. 
group of cookies, whose usefulness will be tested. The hidden request can be transmitted 
in an asynchronous mode so that it will not block any regular browsing functions. Then, 
upon the arrival of the hidden response, an event handler will be triggered to process it. 
Note that the hidden request is only used to retrieve the container page, and the received 
hidden response will not trigger any further requests for downloading the associated objects. 
Retrieving the container page only induces very low overhead to CookiePicker. 
At the third step, CookiePicker extracts the two DOM trees from the two versions of the 
container page: one for the regular response and the other for the hidden response. We call 
these two DOM trees the regular DOM tree and the hidden DOM tree, respectively. The 
regular DOM tree has already been parsed by Web browser layout engine and is ready for 
use by CookiePicker. The hidden DOM tree, however, needs to be built by CookiePicker; 
and CookiePicker should build the hidden DOM tree using the same HTML parser of the 
Web browser. This is because in practice HTML pages are often malformed. Using the 
same HTML parser guarantees that the malformed HTML pages are treated as same as 
before, while the DOM tree is being constructed. 
At the fourth step, CookiePicker identifies cookie usefulness by comparing the differences 
between the two versions of the container page, whose information is well represented in 
the two DOM trees. To make a right cookie usefulness decision, CookiePicker uses two 
complementary algorithms by considering both the internal structural difference and the 
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external visual content difference between the two versions. Only when obvious structural 
difference and visual content difference are detected, will CookiePicker decide that the 
corresponding cookies that are disabled in the hidden request are useful. The two algorithms 
will be detailed in Section 2.5. 
At the fifth step, CookiePicker will mark the cookies that are classified as useful in the 
Web browser's cookie jar. An extra field "useful" is introduced to each cookie record. At 
the beginning of the FORCUM process, a false value is assigned to the "useful" field of 
each cookie. In addition, any newly-emerged cookies set by a website are also assigned false 
values to their "useful" fields. During the FORCUM process, the value of the field "useful" 
can only be changed in one direction, that is, from "false" to "true" if some cookies are 
classified as useful. Later on, when the values of the "useful" field for the existing cookies are 
relatively stable for the website, those cookies that still have "false" values in their "useful" 
fields will be treated as useless and will no longer be transmitted to the corresponding 
website. Then, the FORCUM process can be turned off for a while; and it will be turned 
on automatically if CookiePicker finds new cookies appeared in the HTTP responses or 
manually by a user if the user wants to continue the training process. 
2.4.3 Backward Error Recovery 
In general, CookiePicker could make two kinds of errors in the FORCUM process. The first 
kind of error is that useless cookies are misclassified as useful, thereby being continuously 
sent out to a website. The second kind of error is that useful cookies are never identified 
by CookiePicker during the training process, thereby being blocked from a website. 
The first kind of error is solely due to the inaccuracy of CookiePicker in usefulness 
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identification. Such an error will not cause any immediate trouble to a user, but leave 
useless cookies increasing privacy risks. CookiePicker is required to make such errors as few 
as possible so that a user's privacy risk is lowered. CookiePicker meets this requirement via 
accurate decision algorithms. 
The second kind of error is caused by either a wrong usefulness decision or the fact that 
some cookies are only useful to certain webpages but have not yet been visited during the 
FORCUM process. This kind of error will cause inconvenience to a user and must be fixed 
by marking the corresponding cookies as useful. CookiePicker attempts to achieve a very 
low rate on this kind of error, so that it does not cause any inconvenience to users. This 
requirement is achieved by two means. On one hand, for those visited pages, the decision 
algorithms of CookiePicker attempt to make sure that each useful persistent cookie can be 
identified and marked as useful. On the other hand, since CookiePicker is designed with 
very low running cost, a longer running period (or periodically running) of the FORCUM 
process is affordable, thus training accuracy can be further improved. 
CookiePicker provides a simple recovery button for backward error recovery in the tuning 
process. In case a user notices some malfunctions or some strange behaviors on a webpage, 
the cookies disabled by CookiePicker in this particular webpage view can be re-marked as 
useful via a simple button click. Note that once the cookie set of a website becomes stable 
after the training and tuning processes, those disabled useless cookies will be removed from 
the Web browser's cookie jar. CookiePicker also provides an user interface, allowing a 
user to view those useless cookies and confirm the deletion action. We will introduce this 
interface in Section 2.6. 
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2.5 HTML Page Difference Detection 
In this section, we present two complementary mechanisms for online detecting the HTML 
web page differences between the enabled and disabled cookie usages. In the first mechanism, 
we propose a restricted version of Simple Tree Matching algorithm [117] to detect the HTML 
document structure difference. In the second mechanism, we propose a context-aware visual 
content extraction algorithm to detect the HTML page visual content difference. We call 
these two mechanisms as Restricted Simple Tree Matching (RSTM) and Context-aware 
Visual Content Extraction (CVCE), respectively. Intuitively, RSTM focuses on detecting 
the internal HTML document structure difference, while CVCE focuses on detecting the 
external visual content difference perceived by a user. In the following, we present these 
two mechanisms and explain how they are complementarily used. 
2.5.1 Restricted Simple Tree Matching 
As mentioned in Section 2.4, in a user's Web browser, the content of an HTML webpage is 
naturally parsed into a DOM tree before it is rendered on the screen for display. Therefore, 
we resort to the classical measure of tree edit distance introduced by Tai [101] to quantify 
the difference between two HTML webpages. Since the DOM tree parsed from the HTML 
webpage is rooted (document node is the only root), labeled (each node has node name), 
and ordered (the left-to-right order of sibling nodes is significant), we only consider rooted 
labeled ordered tree. In the following, we will first review the tree edit distance problem; 
then we will explain why we choose top-down distance and detail the RSTM algorithm; 
and finally we will use Jaccard similarity coefficient to define the similarity metric of a 
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normalized DOM tree. 
2.5.1.1 Tree Edit Distance 
For two rooted labeled ordered trees T and T', let ITI and IT'I denote the numbers of 
nodes in trees T and T', and let T[i] and T'[j] denote the ith and jth preorder traversal 
nodes in trees T and T', respectively. Tree edit distance is defined as the minimum cost 
sequence of edit operations to transform T into T' [101]. The three edit operations used 
in transformation include: inserting a node into a tree, deleting a node from a tree, and 
changing one node of a tree into another node. Disregarding the order of the edit operations 
being applied, the transformation from T to T' can be described by a mapping. The formal 
definition of a mapping [101] is as follows: 
Definition 3. A mapping from T toT' is defined by a triple (M, T, T'), where M is any 
set of pairs of integers ( i, j) satisfying: 
(1}1 ~ i ~ ITI, 1 ~ j ~ IT'I 
(2}For any two pairs (i1,]I) and (i2,j2) in M, 
(a}i1 =i2 iffjl =j2; 
(b }il < i2 iff )I < )2,· 
(c)T[ii] is an ancestor (descendant) ofT[i2] iff 
T'[jl] is an ancestor (descendant) ofT'[j2]· 
Intuitively, condition (2a) ensures that each node of both trees appears at most once in 
the mapping, and condition (2b) and (2c) ensure that the structural order is preserved in 
the mapping. 
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The algorithm presented by Tai [101] solves the tree edit distance problem in time 
O(ITI·IT'I·IDI2 ·ID'I 2), where IDI and ID'I are the maximum depths, respectively, ofT and 
T'. Zhang et al. [130] further improved the result via a simple fast dynamic programming 
algorithm in time O(ITI · IT'I · min{IDI, ILl} · min{ID'I, IL'I} ), where ILl and 1£'1 are the 
numbers of leaves in T and T', respectively. 
Since the solution of the generic tree edit distance problem has high time complexity, 
researchers have investigated the constrained versions of the problem. By imposing condi-
tions on the three edit operations mentioned above, a few different tree distance measures 
have been proposed and studied in the literature: alignment distance [50], isolated subtree 
distance [102], top-down distance [96, 117], and bottom-up distance [105]. The description 
and comparison of these algorithms can be found in [10] and [105]. 
2.5.1.2 Top-Down Distance 
Because RSTM belongs to the top-down distance approach, we review the definition of 
top-down distance and explain why we choose this measure for our study. 
Definition 4. A mapping (M, T, T') from T to T', is top-down if it satisfies the con-
dition that for all i,j such that T[i] and T'[j] are not the roots, respectively, ofT and 
T': 
if pair (i,j) EM then (parent(i),parent(j)) EM. 
The top-down distance problem was introduced by Selkow [96]. In [117], Yang presented 
a O(ITI·IT'I) time-complexity top-down dynamic programming algorithm, which is named 
as the Simple Tree Matching (STM) algorithm. As we mentioned earlier, our goal is to 
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Algorithm: RSTM(A, B, level) 
1. if the roots of tree A and tree B contain different symbols then 
2. return(O); 
3. endif 
4. currentLevel =level+ 1; 
5. if A and B are leaf or non-visible nodes or 
6. currentLevel > maxLevel then 
7. return(O); 
8. endif 
9. m = the number of first-level subtrees of A; 
10. n = the number of first-level subtrees of B; 
11. Initialization, M[i, OJ = 0 for i = 0, ... , m; 
12. M[O, j] = 0 for j = 0, ... , n; 
13. for i = 1 to m do 
14. for j = 1 to n do 
15. M[i, j] = max(M[i, j - 1], M[i- 1, j], 
M[i- 1,j- 1] + W[i,j]); 
16. where W[i,j] = RSTM(A;,Bj,currentLevel) 
17. where A; and Bj are the ith and jth 
first-level subtrees of A and B, respectively 
18. endfor 
19. endfor 
20. return (M[m, n] + 1); 
Figure 2.9: The restricted simple tree matching algorithm. 
effectively detect noticeable HTML webpage difference between the enabled and disabled 
cookie usages. The measure of top-down distance captures the key structure difference 
between DOM trees in an accurate and efficient manner, and fits well to our requirement. 
In fact, top-down distance has been successfully used in a few Web-related projects. For 
example, Zhai and Liu [128] used it for extracting structured data from webpages; and Reis 
et al. [89] applied it for automatic Web news extraction. In contrast, bottom-up distance 
[105], although can be more efficient in time complexity (O(ITI + IT'I)), falls short of being 
an accurate metric [104] and may produce a far from optimal result [4] for HTML DOM 
tree comparison, in which most of the differences come from the leaf nodes. 
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Figure 2.10: (a) Tree A, (b) Tree B. 
2.5.1.3 Restricted Simple Tree Matching 
Based on the original STM algorithm [117], Figure 2.9 illustrates RSTM, our restricted 
version of STM algorithm. Other than lines 4 to 8 and one new parameter level, our RSTM 
algorithm is similar to the original STM algorithm. Like the original STM algorithm, we 
first compare the roots of two trees A and B. If their roots contain different symbols, 
then A and B do not match at all. If their roots contain same symbols, we use dynamic 
programming to recursively compute the number of pairs in a maximum matching between 
trees A and B. Figure 2.10 gives two trees, in which each node is represented as a circle 
with a single letter inside. According to the preorder traversal, the fourteen nodes in tree 
A are named from Nl to N14, and the eight nodes in tree Bare named from N15 to N22. 
The final result returned by STM algorithm or RSTM algorithm is the number of matching 
pairs for a maximum matching. For example, STM algorithm will return "7" for the two 
trees in Figure 2.10, and the seven matching pairs are {Nl,Nl5}, {N2,N16}, {N6,Nl8}, 
{N7,N19}, {N5,N17}, {Nll,N20}, and {N12,N22}. 
There are two reasons why a new parameter level is introduced in RSTM. First, some 
webpages are very dynamic. From the same website, even if a webpage is retrieved twice 
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in a short time, there may exist some differences between the retrieved contents. For 
example, if we refresh Yahoo home page twice in a short time, we can often see some different 
advertisements. For CookiePicker, such dynamics on a web page are just noises and should be 
differentiated from the webpage changes caused by the enabled and disabled cookie usages. 
The advertisement replacements on a webpage use different data items (e.g., images or texts) 
but they often stay at the same location of a webpage's DOM tree. Data items are mainly 
represented by lower level nodes of a DOM tree [129]. In contrast, the webpage changes 
caused by enabling/disabling cookies may introduce structural dissimilarities at the upper 
level of a DOM tree, especially when the theme of the page is changed. By using the new 
parameter level, the RSTM algorithm restricts the top-down comparison between the two 
trees to a certain maximum level. Therefore, equipped with the parameter level, RSTM not 
only captures the key structure dissimilarity between DOM trees, but also reduces leaf-level 
noises. 
The second reason of introducing the new parameter level is that the O(ITI · IT' I) time 
complexity of STM is still too expensive to use online. Even with C++ implementation, 
STM will spend more than one second in difference detection for some large webpages. 
However, as shown in Section 2.6, the cost of the RSTM algorithm is low enough for online 
detection. 
The newly-added conditions at line 5 of the RSTM algorithm restrict that the mapping 
counts only if the compared nodes are not leaves and have visual effects. More specifically, 
all the comment nodes are excluded in that they have no visual effect on the displayed 
webpage. Script nodes are also ignored because normally they do not contain any visual 
elements either. Text content nodes, although very important, are also excluded due to 
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the fact that they are leaf nodes (i.e., having no more structural information). Instead, 
text content will be analyzed in our Context-aware Visual Content Extraction (CVCE) 
mechanism. 
2.5.1.4 Normalized Top-Down Distance Metric 
Since the return result of RSTM (or STM) is the number of matching pairs for a maximum 
matching, based on the Jaccard similarity coefficient that is given in Formula 2.1, we define 
the normalized DOM tree similarity metric in Formula 2.2. 
J(A B)= IAnBI 
' IAUBI (2.1) 
. RSTM(A,B,l) NTreeS~m(A,B,l) = N(A,l) +N(B,l)- RSTM(A,B,l) (2.2) 
The Jaccard similarity coefficient J(A, B) is defined as the ratio between the size of 
the intersection and the size of the union of two sets. In the definition of our normalized 
DOM tree similarity metric NTreeSim(A,B,l), RSTM(A,B,l) is the returned number of 
matched pairs by calling RSTM on trees A and B for upper llevels. N(A, l) and N(B, l) 
are the numbers of non-leaf visible nodes at upper l levels of trees A and B, respectively. 
Actually N(A, l) = RSTM(A,A, l) and N(B,l) = RSTM(B, B, l), but N(A, l) and N(B,l) 
can be computed in O(n) time by simply preorder traversing the upper llevels of trees A 
and B, respectively. 
2.5.2 Context-aware Visual Content Extraction 
The visual contents on a webpage can be generally classified into two groups: text contents 
and image contents. Text contents are often displayed as headings, paragraphs, lists, table 
items, links, and so on. Image contents are often embedded in a webpage in the form 
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of icons, buttons, backgrounds, flashes, video clips, and so on. Our second mechanism 
mainly uses text contents, instead of image contents, to detect the visual content difference 
perceived by users. Two reasons motivate us to use text contents rather than image contents. 
First, text contents provide the most important information on webpages. This is because 
HTML mainly describes the structure of text-based information in a document, while image 
contents often serve as supplements to text contents [154]. In practice, users can block the 
loading of various images and browse webpages in text mode only. Second, the similarity 
between images cannot be trivially compared, while text contents can be extracted and 
compared easily as shown below. 
On a webpage, each text content exists in a special context. Corresponding to the DOM 
tree, the text content is a leaf node and its context is the path from the root to this leaf 
node. For two webpages, by extracting and comparing their context-aware text contents 
that are essential to users, we can effectively detect the noticeable HTML webpage difference 
between the enabled and disabled cookie usages. Figure 2.11 depicts the recursive algorithm 
to extract the text content. 
The contentExtract algorithm traverses the whole DOM tree in preorder in time O(n). 
During the preorder traversal, each non-noise text node is associated with its context, 
resulting in a context-content string; and then the context-content string is added into set 
S. The final return result is set S, which includes all the context-content strings. Note 
that in lines 2 to 4, only those non-noise text nodes are qualified for the addition to set 
S. Similar to [38], scripts, styles, obvious advertisement text, date and time strings, and 
option text in dropdown lists (such as country list or language list) are regarded as noises. 
Text nodes that contain no alphanumeric characters are also treated as noises. All these 
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Algorithm: contentExtract(T, context) 
1. Initialization, S = 0; node= T.root; , 
2. if node is a non-noise text node then 
3. cText = context+SEPARATOR+node.value; 
4. S = S U {cText}; 
5. else if node is an element node then 
6. currentContext = context+":"+node.name; 
7. n = the number of first-level subtrees ofT; 
8. for j = 1 to n do 
9. S = SUcontentExtract(Ti, currentContext); 
where Ti is the ith first-level subtrees ofT; 
10. endfor 
11. endif 
12. return (S); 
Figure 2.11: The text content extraction algorithm. 
checkings guarantee that we can extract a relatively concise context-content string set from 
the DOM tree. 
Assume S1 and S2 are two context-content string sets extracted from two DOM trees 
A and B, respectively. To compare the difference between S1 and S2, again based on the 
Jaccard similarity coefficient, we define the normalized context-content string set similarity 
metric in Formula 2.3: 
(2.3) 
Formula 2.3 is a variation [52] of the original Jaccard similarity coefficient. The extra 
added s on the numerator stands for the number of those context-content strings that 
are not exactly same, while having the same context prefix, in S1 and S2 . Intuitively, 
between two sets S1 and S2, Formula 2.3 disregards the difference caused by text content 
replacement occurred in the same context, it only considers the difference caused by text 
content appeared in each set's unique context. This minor modification is especially helpful 
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in reducing the noises caused by advertisement text content and other dynamically changing 
text contents. 
2.5.3 Making Decision 
As discussed above, to accurately identify useful cookies, CookiePicker has to differentiate 
the HTML webpage differences caused by webpage dynamics from those caused by disabling 
cookies. Assume that tree A is parsed from a webpage retrieved with cookies enabled and 
tree B is parsed from the same webpage with cookies disabled. CookiePicker examines 
these two trees by using both algorithms presented above. If the return results of NTreeSim 
and NTextSim are less than two tunable thresholds, Threshl and Thresh2, respectively, 
CookiePicker will make a decision that the difference is due to cookie usage. Figure 2.12 
depicts the final decision algorithm. 
Note that these two thresholds are internal to CookiePicker, so a regular user does not 
need to know them. In our experiments (Section 2.6), we set the values of both thresholds to 
0.85, and we found that no backward error recover is needed. We would like to recommend 
this as a reference value for CookiePicker. However, it is possible to further tune these two 
thresholds. For example, one approach is to self-adaptively adjust the thresholds based on 
the number or frequency of a user's backward error recover actions. The bottom line is 
that backward error recovery should not cause too much inconvenience to a user. Another 
approach is to use site-specific thresholds so that the granularity of accuracy can be refined 
to the site-level. In addition, it is also possible to allow users to share fine-tuned site-specific 
thresholds. 
Algorithm: decision( A, B, l) 
1. if NTreeSim(A, B, l) :S Thresh! and 
2. NTextSim(S1, S2 ) :S Thresh2 then 
3. return the difference is caused by cookies; 
4. else 
5. return the difference is caused by noises; 
6. endif 
Figure 2.12: CookiePicker decision algorithm. 
2.6 System Evaluation 
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In this section, we first briefly describe the implementation of CookiePicker, and then we 
validate its efficacy through two sets of live experiments. 
2.6.1 Implementation 
We implemented CookiePicker as a Firefox extension. Being one of the most popular 
Web browsers, Firefox is very extensible and allows programmers to add new features or 
modify existing features. Our CookiePicker extension is implemented in about 200 lines of 
XML user interface definition code, 1,600 lines of JavaScript code, and 600 lines of C++ 
code. JavaScript code is used for HTTP request/response monitoring and processing, as 
well as cookies record management. The HTML page difference detection algorithms are 
implemented in C++, because JavaScript version runs very slow. C++ code is compiled 
into a shared library in the form of an XPCOM (Cross-Platform Component Object Mode) 
component, which is accessible to JavaScript code. CookiePicker is a pure Firefox extension 
and it does not make any change to the Firefox's source code. 
We omit other details and only describe two key interfaces in CookiePicker's imple-
mentation: the interface to user and the XPCOM component interface. Figure 2.13 shows 
Information about the selected Cookie 
Nama: lucky9 
Content: 315:173 
Domain: .ebay.com 
Path: I 
s~nd For: Any type of connectton 
Expi,.,s: 08ft.l712()1212:00:26 PM 
Figure 2.13: CookiePicker user interface. 
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CookiePicker's main user interface. We port the code of a popular Firefox extension Cookie 
Culler [140] and merge them into CookiePicker. Cookie Culler allows a user to access cookie 
records and manually delete those cookies the user does not need to keep. By integrating 
this interface, CookiePicker provides a user with the capability to easily view the decisions 
made by CookiePicker and double check those useless cookies before they are finally re-
moved from a browser's cookie jar. As shown in Figure 2.13, if a user wants, the user can 
know that these three first-party persistent cookies from ebay.com have been automatically 
marked as useless and will be deleted by CookiePicker. The user can also make corrections 
to this result if necessary. 
In the XPCOM component interface, two functions are defined as follows and they cor-
respond to CookiePicker's two HTML page difference detection algorithms, respectively: 
interface /CookiePickerComponent : ns/Supports { 
float nTreeSim{in nsJDOMNode rNode, in nsiDOMNode hNode, in long l}; 
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float nTextSim{in nsiDOMNode rNode, in nsiDOMNode hNode}; 
} 
These two functions are implemented in C++, and can be accessed by JavaScript code 
via the ICookiePickerComponent component. For nTreeSim, its three input parameters 
match exactly with those in Figure 2.12. For nTextSim, its definition here is a little bit 
different from that in Figure 2.12, because the DOM trees are directly passed in and the 
corresponding context-content string sets are extracted internally. 
2.6.2 Evaluation 
We installed CookiePicker on a Firefox version 1.5.0.8 Web browser3 and designed two sets 
of experi~ents to validate the effectiveness of CookiePicker in identifying the useful first-
party persistent cookies. The first set of experiments is to measure the overall effectiveness 
of CookiePicker and its running time in a generic environment; while the second set of 
experiments focuses on the websites whose persistent cookies are useful only, and examines 
the identification accuracy of CookiePicker upon useful persistent cookies. For all the 
experiments, the regular browsing window enables the use of persistent cookies, while the 
hidden request disables the use of persistent cookies by filtering them out from HTTP 
request header. The two thresholds used in CookiePicker decision algorithm are both set 
to 0.85, i.e., Threshl= Thresh2=0.85. The parameter l for NTreeSim algorithm is set to 5, 
i.e., the top five level of DOM tree starting from the body HTML node will be compared by 
3 Porting CookiePicker to recent Firefox versions is quite feasible because CookiePicker uses the standard 
XPCOM mechanism of Firefox. 
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NTreeSim algorithm. 
2.6.2.1 First Set of Experiments 
From each of the 15 categories listed in Table 2.1, we randomly choose two websites that 
use persistent cookies. Thus, in total there are 30 websites in the first set of experiments. 
As listed in the first column of Table 2.2, these 30 websites are represented as 81 to 830 for 
privacy concerns. 
Inside each website, we first visit over 25 webpages to stabilize its persistent cookies 
and the "useful" values of the persistence cookies, i.e, no more persistent cookies of the 
website are marked as "useful" by CookiePicker afterwards. Then, we count the number 
of persistent cookies set by the website and the number of persistent cookies marked as 
useful by CookiePicker. These two numbers are shown in the second and third columns 
of Table 2.2, respectively. Among the total 30 websites, the persistent cookies from five 
websites (81,86,810,816,827) are marked as "useful" by CookiePicker, and the persistent 
cookies from the rest of 30 websites are identified as "useless". In other words, CookiePicker 
indicates that we can disable the persistent cookies in about 83.3% (25 out of 30) of testing 
websites. To further validate the testing result above, we check the uselessness of the 
persistent cookies for those 25 websites through careful manual verification. We find that 
blocking the persistent cookies of those 25 websites does not cause any problem to a user. 
Therefore, none of the classified "useless" persistent cookies is useful, and no backward error 
recovery is needed. 
For those five websites that have some persistent cookies marked as "useful", we verify 
the real usefulness of these cookies by blocking the use of them and then comparing the 
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Website Persistent Marked Real Detection CookiePicker 
Useful Useful Time(ms) Duration (ms) 
81 2 2 0 8.3 1,821.6 
82 4 0 0 9.3 5,020.2 
83 5 0 0 14.8 1,427.5 
84 4 0 0 36.1 9,066.2 
85 4 0 0 5.4 698.9 
86 2 2 2 5.7 1,437.5 
87 1 0 0 17.0 3,373.2 
88 3 0 0 7.4 2,624.4 
89 1 0 0 13.2 1,415.4 
810 1 1 0 5.7 1,141.2 
811 2 0 0 2.7 941.3 
812 4 0 0 21.7 2,309.9 
813 1 0 0 8.0 614.9 
814 9 0 0 11.9 1,122.4 
815 2 0 0 8.5 948.0 
816 25 1 1 5.8 455.9 
817 4 0 0 7.5 11,426.3 
818 1 0 0 23.1 4,056.9 
819 3 0 0 18.0 3,860.5 
820 6 0 0 8.9 3,841.6 
821 3 0 0 14.4 936.1 
822 1 0 0 13.1 993.3 
823 4 0 0 28.8 2,430.1 
824 1 0 0 23.6 2,381.1 
825 3 0 0 30.7 550.1 
826 1 0 0 5.03 611.6 
827 1 1 0 8.7 597.5 
828 1 0 0 10.7 10,104.1 
829 2 0 0 7.7 1,387.1 
830 2 0 0 57.6 2,905.6 
Total 103 7 3 - -
Average - - - 14.6 2,683.3 
Table 2.2: Online testing results for thirty websites (Sl to 830). 
disabled version with a regular browsing window over 25 webpages in each website. The 
result is shown in the fourth column of Table 2.2. We observe that three cookies from two 
websites (86,816) are indeed useful. However, for the other three websites (81,810,827), 
their persistent cookies are useless but are wrongly marked as "useful" by CookiePicker. 
This is mainly due to the conservative threshold setting. Currently the values of both 
thresholds are set to 0.85, i.e., Threshl= Thresh2=0.85. The rationale behind the conser-
vative threshold setting is that we prefer to have all useful persistent cookies be correctly 
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identified, even at the cost of some useless cookies being misclassified as "useful". Thus, 
the number of backward error recovery is minimized. 
In Table 2.2, the fifth and sixth columns show the average running time of the detection 
algorithms and the entire duration of CookiePicker, respectively. It is clear that the running 
time of the page difference detection is very short with an average of 14.6 ms over the 30 
websites. This detection time is roughly the extra CPU computation time introduced by 
running the CookiePicker browser extension. The extra memory resource consumption 
is also negligible because CookiePicker does not have a large memory requirement. The 
average identification duration is 2,683.3 ms, which is reasonable short considering the fact 
that the average think time of a user is about 10 seconds [69]. Note that websites 84, 817, 
and 828 have abnormally high identification duration at about 10 seconds, which is mainly 
caused by the slow responses from these websites. 
2.6.2.2 Second Set of Experiments 
Since only two websites in the first set of experiments have useful persistent cookies, we 
attempt to further examine if CookiePicker can correctly identify each useful persistent 
cookie in the second set of experiments. Because the list of websites whose persistent 
cookies are really useful to users does not exist, we have to locate such websites manually. 
Again, we randomly choose 200 websites that use persistent cookies from the 15 categories 
listed in Table 2.1. Note that the 30 websites chosen in the first set of experiments are not 
included in these 200 websites. We manually scrutinize these 200 websites, and finally find 
six websites whose persistent cookies are really useful to users, i.e., without cookies, users 
would encounter some problems. Because the manual scrutiny is tedious, we cannot afford 
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more effort to locate more such websites. The six websites are listed in the first column of 
Table 2.3 and represented as Pl to P6 for privacy concerns. 
In Table 2.3, the second column shows the number of the cookies marked as "useful" by 
CookiePicker and the third column shows the number of the real useful cookies via manual 
verification. We observe that for the six websites, all of their useful persistent cookies are 
marked as "useful" by CookiePicker. This result indicates that CookiePicker seldom misses 
the identification of a real useful cookie. On the other hand, for websites P5 and P6, some 
useless persistent cookies are also marked as "useful" because they are sent out in the same 
regular request with the real useful cookies. The fourth and fifth columns show the similarity 
score computed by NTreeSim(A, B, 5) and NTextSim(S1, S2), respectively, on the web pages 
that persistent cookies are useful. These similarity scores are far below 0.85, which is the 
current value used for the two thresholds Threshl and Thresh2 in Figure 2.12. The usage 
of these useful persistent cookies on each website is given at the sixth column. Websites 
Pl, P4, and P6 use persistent cookies for user's preference setting. Websites P3 and P5 use 
persistent cookies to properly create and sign up a new user. Website P2 uses persistent 
cookie in a very unique way. Each user's persistent cookie corresponds to a specific sub-
directory on the Web server, and the sub-directory stores the user's recent query results. 
Thus, if the user visits the website again with the persistent cookie, recent query results 
can be reused to improve query performance. 
In summary, the above two sets of experiments show that by conservatively setting 
Threshl and Thresh2 to 0.85, CookiePicker can safely disable and remove persistent cook-
ies from about 83.3% of websites (25 out of the 30 websites that we intensively tested). 
Meanwhile, all the useful persistent cookies are correctly identified by CookiePicker and no 
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Website Marked Real NTreeSim NTextSim Usage 
Useful Useful (A,B,5) (S1,S2) 
P1 1 1 0.311 0.609 Preference 
P2 1 1 0.459 0.765 Performance 
P3 1 1 0.667 0.623 Sign Up 
P4 1 1 0.250 0.158 Preference 
P5 9 1 0.226 0.253 Sign Up 
P6 5 2 0.593 0.719 Preference 
Average - - 0.418 0.521 -
Table 2.3: Online testing results for 6 websites (Pl to P6) that have useful persistent cookies. 
backward error recovery is needed for all the 8 websites (S6,S16,Pl,P2,P3,P4,P5,P6) that 
have useful persistent cookies. Misclassification happens only in 10% websites (3 out of 30), 
on which useless persistent cookies are wrongly identified as useful. 
2. 7 Discussions 
In CookiePicker, useful cookies are defined as those that can cause perceivable changes 
on a webpage, and as we discussed before this definition is probably the most reasonable 
measure right now at the browser side. We assume that this measure is known to anyone who 
wants to evade CookiePicker. In this section, we first identify possible evasion techniques, 
and then we analyze potential evasion sources and explain why those evasion techniques 
are not a serious concern to CookiePicker. Finally, we discuss some concerns about using 
CookiePicker. 
2.7.1 Possible Evasion Techniques 
Since CookiePicker makes its decision based on HTML page difference detection, we identify 
the following four possible techniques that could be used to evade CookiePicker: 
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• random advertising: A website can serve more random advertisements to different 
retrieves of a webpage in order to reduce the accuracy of CookiePicker's difference 
detection algorithms. 
• dynamic content rewriting: A website can identify CookiePicker's hidden request and 
use JavaScript to dynamically rewrite webpage contents at the browser side. 
• dramatic structure changing: A website can identify CookiePicker's hidden request 
and intentionally generate structurally different response pages (even if with very 
similar visual content). 
• cookie root path abusing: A website can set attribute values of all its cookies as root 
"/" to let all its cookies, no matter useful or useless, return back for every Web request. 
For the random advertising evasion technique, indeed as shown in previous experimen-
tal results, CookiePicker's two difference detection algorithms can filter out the effects of 
advertisements and webpage dynamics very well. Moreover, other advertisement removing 
techniques such as those used in [178] can be integrated into CookiePicker to further im-
prove the detection accuracy. The other three kinds of evasion techniques can be employed 
by a website operator. However, as we discuss below, they will not pose a serious threat to 
the usage of CookiePicker. 
2.7.2 Evasion Sources 
The evasion of CookiePicker will most likely come from two sources: website operators 
who want to track user activities, and attackers who want to steal cookies. As stated in 
Section 2.2, we assume that the hosting website is legitimate, since it is pointless to provide 
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cookie security and privacy services for a malicious website. For legitimate websites, if 
some operators strongly insist to use first-party persistent cookies for tracking long-term 
user behaviors, they can evade CookiePicker by detecting the hidden HTTP request and 
m~nipulating the hidden HTTP response using the evasion techniques mentioned above. 
However, we argue that many website operators will not pay the effort and time to do 
so, either because of the lack of interest to track long-term user behaviors in the first 
place, or because of inaccuracy in cookie-based user behavior tracking, which has long been 
recognized [194]. These website operators are either not aware of the possible privacy and 
security risks of stolen first-party persistent cookies, or simply not willing to pay the cost 
to renovate their systems. Our CookiePicker is a pure client-side solution that especially 
aims to protect the users of these websites. 
For third-party attackers, unless they compromise a legitimate website, it is very difficult 
for them to use any of the above evasion techniques to manipulate the web pages sending back 
to a user's browser and circumvent CookiePicker. Therefore, CookiePicker can effectively 
identify and remove useless cookies stored by most legitimate websites on a user's hard 
disk, and prevent them from being stolen by malicious attacks such as cross-site scripting 
attacks. 
2.7.3 Concerns about Using CookiePicker 
One concern is that CookiePicker might reject third-party cookies in the case of HTTP 
redirection (see Section 5.1.2 of [103]). However, this concern is invalid because CookiePicker 
does not block (or even touch) third-party cookies by itself- decision regarding third-party 
cookies is made completely by the Web browser based on users' preference setting. Similarly, 
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whether a cookie is a first-party cookie of a website is also decided by the Web browser, 
and CookiePicker makes its decision based on the browser's decision. Therefore, it does not 
matter whether a website is using CDN (Content Delivery Network) or not. 
Another concern is that CookiePicker may not work well on webpages that use Ajax 
(Asynchronous JavaScript and XML). This concern is reasonable because Ajax requests 
may use cookies and may also change webpage contents. Currently, CookiePicker only 
sends hidden requests to retrieve container pages, as described in Section 2.4. But it is 
possible to extend CookiePicker to evaluate the impact of cookies on Ajax requests, for 
example, by asking CookiePicker to send out two Ajax requests (one with cookies and the 
other without cookies) at the same time and then compare the response messages. 
2.8 Related Work 
RFC 2109 [61] specifies the way of using cookies to create a stateful session with HTTP 
requests and responses. It is also the first document that raises the general public's aware-
ness of cookie privacy problems. RFC 2965 [62] follows RFC 2109 by introducing two new 
headers, Cookie2 request header and Set-Cookie2 response header. However, these two 
new headers are not supported by the popular Web browsers such as Internet Explorer and 
Firefox. RFC 2964 [76] focuses on the privacy and security of using HTTP cookies, and 
identifies the specific usages of cookies that are either not recommended by the IETF or be-
lieved to be harmful. Fu's study [34] suggests that setting authenticators in cookies should 
be very careful and especially persistent cookies should not be used to store authenticators. 
Cookies not only can be retrieved and stored by the headers of HTTP requests and 
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responses, but also can be read and written by client-side JavaScript. The same origin 
policy [180] introduced in Netscape Navigator 2.0 prevents cookies and JavaScript in differ-
ent domains from interfering with each other. The successful fulfillment of the same origin 
policy on cookies and JavaScript further invokes the enforcement of this policy on browser 
cache and visited links [44]. Recently, in order to mitigate cross-site scripting attacks, Inter-
net Explore also allows a cookie to be marked as "HttpOnly" in the Set-Cookie response 
header, indicating that a cookie is "non-scriptable" and should not be revealed to client 
applications [170]. 
Modern Web browsers have provided users with refined cookie privacy options. A user 
can define detailed cookie policies for websites either before or during visiting these sites. 
Commercial cookie management software such as Cookie Crusher [139] and CookiePal [141] 
mainly rely on pop-ups to notify incoming cookies. However, the studies in [39] show that 
such cookie privacy options and cookie management policies fail to be used in practice, due 
mainly to the following two reasons: (1) these options are very confusing and cumbersome, 
and (2) most users have no good understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of using 
cookies. A few Firefox extensions such as Cookie Culler [140] and Permit Cookies [175], 
although convenient to use, are just very simple add-ons for user to easily access privacy 
preference settings or view cookies. Acumen system [37] can inform a user how many other 
users accept certain cookies. However, the system does not protect the privacy of the user 
itself. Moreover, many users' decisions could be wrong, resulting in negative reference. 
Another interesting system is Privoxy [178] Web proxy. It provides advanced filtering 
capabilities for protecting privacy, modifying webpage data, managing cookies, controlling 
access, and removing advertisement, banners, pop-ups and other obnoxious Internet junk. 
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However, Privoxy is more useful for those sophisticated users who have the ability to fine-
tune their installation. 
Recently, the most noticeable research work in cookie management is Doppelganger 
[97]. Doppelganger is a system for creating and enforcing fine-grained privacy-preserving 
cookie policies. Doppelganger leverages client-side parallelism and uses a twin window to 
mirror a user's Web session. If any difference is detected, Doppelganger will ask the user to 
compare the main window and the fork window, and then, make a cookie policy decision. 
Although taking a big step towards automatic cookie management, Doppelganger still has 
a few obvious drawbacks. First, Doppelganger still heavily relies on the user's comparison 
between the main window and the fork window to make a decision. Second, the cost of 
its parallel mirroring mechanism is very high. This is because not only every user action 
needs to be mirrored, but every HTTP request also needs to be duplicately sent back to 
the Web server. Third, due to the high cost, a user may not be patient enough to have 
a long training period, thus the policy decision accuracy cannot be guaranteed. Last but 
not the least, Doppelganger only achieves website level cookie policy making. In contrast, 
our CookiePicker works fully automatically without user involvement or even notice. It has 
very low overhead, and hence, can be trained for a long period on a user's Web browser to 
achieve high accuracy. CookiePicker achieves cookie-group level policy making, implying 
that usefulness is identified for a group of cookies used in a webpage view. 
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2.9 Summary 
In this work, we conducted a large-scale cookie measurement, which highlights the demand 
for effective cookie management. Then, we presented a system, called CookiePicker, to 
automatically managing cookie usage setting on behalf of a user. Only one additional HTTP 
request for the container page of a website, the hidden request, is generated for CookiePicker 
to identify the usefulness of a cookie set. CookiePicker uses two complementary algorithms 
to accurately detect the HTML page differences caused by enabling and disabling cookies. 
CookiePicker classifies those cookies that cause perceivable changes on a webpage as useful, 
and disable the rest as useless. We implemented CookiePicker as an extension to Firefox 
and evaluated its efficacy through live experiments over various websites. By automatically 
managing the usage of cookies, CookiePicker helps a user to strike an appropriate balance 
between maximizing usability and minimizing security risks. 
Chapter 3 
Transparent Phishing Protection 
In this chapter, we present our work on transparent phishing protection. Modern Web 
browsers are often equipped with automatic phishing detection and warning mechanisms. 
However, usability studies have demonstrated that many users still ignore the strong phish-
ing warnings given by browsers and become victims. We present an approach that uses 
bogus usernamefpassword credentials to protect against phishing attacks. Seamlessly in-
tegrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in modern Web browsers, 
our approach properly leverages existing anti-phishing efforts and is capable of providing a 
transparent protection to those most vulnerable users who still ignore the strong phishing 
warnings. 
3.1 Motivation 
A phishing attack is typically carried out using an email or an instant message, in an at-
tempt to lure recipients to a fake website to disclose personal credentials. Phishing attacks 
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have seriously afflicted Internet users and financial institutions with identity thefts and 
brand reputation damage. According to recent Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) 
reports [137] and Gartner surveys [149], the number of phishing sites, the number of phish-
ing victims, and the amount of financial losses stemming from phishing attacks have all 
increased over the past few years. 
To defend against phishing attacks, a number of countermeasures have been proposed 
and developed. Server-side defenses employ SSL certificates, user-selected site images, and 
other security indicators to help users verify the legitimacy of websites. Client-side defenses 
equip Web browsers with automatic phishing detection features or add-ons to warn users 
away from suspected phishing sites. However, recent usability studies have demonstrated 
that neither server-side security indicators nor client-side toolbars and warnings are suc-
cessful in preventing vulnerable users from being deceived [21, 20, 95, 111, 114, 23]. This is 
mainly because (1) phishers can convincingly imitate the appearance of legitimate websites, 
(2) users tend to ignore security indicators or warnings, and (3) users do not necessarily 
interpret security cues appropriately. Educational defenses teach users to understand and 
avoid phishing attacks [45, 64, 100]. However they cannot completely foil phishing attacks. 
Takedown defenses exploit spams and suspicious URLs to discover and shut down newly 
emerged phishing sites. However, the efficacy of this approach is limited, due to the ease of 
setting up and the short online time of phishing sites, as well as the application of takedown 
evasion methods by phishers [46, 77, 137, 165]. 
These different approaches are all preventive by nature. They endeavor to prevent users 
from being tricked into revealing their credentials to phishing sites. Nevertheless, these 
prevention-based approaches alone are insufficient to shield vulnerable users from "biting 
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the bait" and defeat phishers, as human users are the weakest link in the security chain. 
The ever-increasing prevalence and severity of phishing attacks clearly indicate that anti-
phishing is still a daunting challenge. 
In response to this challenge, we have made two observations with respect to the acqui-
sition of credentials by phishers and the automatic detection of phishing attacks on Web 
browsers. First, currently the majority of those who have "bitten the bait" and fallen victim 
to phishing attacks are real victims; thus, it is trivial for a phisher to verify the acquired 
credentials and trade them for money. However, if we can supply phishing sites with a large 
number of bogus credentials, we might be able to hide victims' real credentials among bogus 
credentials and make it harder for phishers to succeed. 
Second, although remarkable advances in client-side automatic phishing detection have 
empowered Web browsers to identify the majority of phishing sites [17, 35, 68, 132, 148, 169], 
the possible false positives (legitimate websites misclassified as phishing sites) make it hard 
for Web browsers to directly block users' connections to suspected phishing sites. Thus, 
issuing warnings and expecting users to leave a suspected phishing site have become the 
most common actions employed by modern Web browsers. However, instead of just wishing 
vulnerable users could make correct decisions, if we can effectively transform the power of 
automatic phishing detection into the power of automatic fraud protection, we will take a 
big step forward towards winning the battle against phishing. 
In this work, we propose a new approach to protect against phishing attacks with "bogus 
bites" on the basis of the two observations we have mentioned. The key feature of this 
approach is to transparently feed a relatively large number of bogus credentials into a 
suspected phishing site, rather than attempt to prevent vulnerable users from "biting the 
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bait." These "bogus bites" conceal victims' real credentials among bogus credentials, and 
enable legitimate websites to identify stolen credentials in a timely manner. Based on 
the concept of "bogus bites," we design and develop BogusBiter, a unique client-side anti-
phishing tool that is complementary to existing prevention-based mechanisms. Seamlessly 
integrated with the phishing detection and warning mechanisms in modern Web browsers, 
BogusBiter is transparent to users. 
At a user's Web browser, BogusBiter is turned on once a login webpage is classified as 
a phishing page by a Web browser's built-in phishing detection component or a third-party 
detection toolbar. For a victim who is beguiled into divulging a real credential, BogusBiter 
hides the real credential among a set of automatically generated bogus credentials, and then 
submits these credentials one by one to the phishing site. For a security-conscious user who 
does not reveal a real credential, BogusBiter also generates a set of bogus credentials, and 
then submits them to the phishing site in the same way as it does for a victim. 
At the phishing site, a phisher will thus receive a much larger number of credentials than 
before, but the overwhelming majority are bogus credentials fed by BogusBiter. Elaborating 
bogus credential generation and submission mechanisms, BogusBiter makes it difficult for a 
phisher to distinguish who are real victims and which are real credentials. The only effective 
way for a phisher to sift out bogus credentials is to visit the legitimate website and verify 
whatever credentials have been collected from the phishing site. 
At the legitimate website, if the phisher assumes the burden of verifying all the collected 
credentials to single out the real credentials, the unique design of bogus credential generation 
will enable the legitimate site to identify victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner and 
make it harder for a phisher to succeed. In other words, the bogus credential filtering 
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process becomes the trigger for detecting stolen credentials at the legitimate website, and 
hence, ironically, the phisher's attempt to bypass BogusBiter helps us to achieve automatic 
fraud protection. 
While leveraging the power of widely used client-side automatic phishing detection tech-
niques, BogusBiter is not bound to any specific phishing detection scheme. Thus, Bogus-
Biter can utilize the latest advances in phishing detection techniques such as blacklists and 
heuristics to protect against a wide range of phishing attacks. Moreover, BogusBiter is in-
crementally deployable over the Internet, and the fraud protection enabled at a legitimate 
website is independent of the deployment scale of BogusBiter. We implemented BogusBiter 
as a Firefox Web browser extension and evaluated its efficacy through real experiments 
over both phishing and legitimate websites. Our experimental results indicate that it is 
promising to use BogusBiter to transparently protect against phishing attacks. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 introduces the back-
ground of phishing attacks and the automatic phishing detection and warning mechanisms 
in modern Web browsers. Section 3.3 details the design of BogusBiter. Section 3.4 describes 
the implementation of BogusBiter. Section 3.5 evaluates the capability and performance 
of BogusBiter. Section 3.6 discusses the deployment of BogusBiter and potential evasions 
against BogusBiter. Section 3.7 reviews the related client-side anti-phishing research work, 
and finally, Section 3.8 summarizes this work. 
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Figure 3.1: (a) A phishing site designed to attack eBay users, (b) Firefox 2 phishing warning 
mechanism. 
3.2 Background 
Figure 3.1(a) illustrates a phishing site designed to attack eBay users. In a typical scenario, 
a user receives a spoofed email that appears to be sent from the real eBay, luring the user to 
log into the phishing site. Once the user believes this site is the genuine eBay website and 
logs in, the user's username/password credential is stolen. Passwords have increasingly been 
targeted by harvesting attacks, as they protect online accounts with valuable assets [31]. 
While some phishing attacks may steal other types of credentials such as credit card num-
bers and social security numbers, the most common type of phishing attack attempts to 
steal account numbers and passwords used for online banking [48]. Therefore, protecting a 
user's username/password credential is the primary focus of many client-side anti-phishing 
research work such as SpoofGuard [17], Dynamic Security Skins [19], AntiPhish [56], Pwd-
Hash [91], Web Wallet [115], and Passpet [119]. Our work also focuses on protecting a 
user's username/password credential. In the remainder of this chapter, we use the terms 
credential and username/password pair interchangeably. 
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The potential threat of phishing or Web spoofing attacks was first uncovered by Felten 
et al. [25]. Today, phishing is not merely about website forgery and email spoofing, it has 
become a carefully planned and well structured multiphase effort to steal money. The life 
cycle of a phishing attack consists of six phases: planning, setup, attack, collection, fraud & 
abuse, and post attack, as defined by the Financial Services Technology Consortium [188]. 
Various techniques can be applied in these six phases to combat phishing. However, since 
phishing sites can be easily set up and money laundering is still a difficult problem to curtail, 
current research and industry efforts focus mainly on the attack phase, with the objective 
of preventing users from submitting their credentials to phishing sites. 
In contrast, the BogusBiter's protection against phishing attacks ranges from the attack 
phase to the collection phase, and then to the fraud & abuse phase, covering the flow 
of credentials. Specifically, BogusBiter retaliates against phishers with a large number of 
bogus credentials in the attack phase, makes it hard for them to identify real credentials in 
the collection phase, and detects their fraudulent activities in the fraud & abuse phase. 
While distinct from preventive anti-phishing mechanisms, BogusBiter complements them 
in a natural way. In particular, BogusBiter leverages the power of client-side automatic 
phishing detection mechanisms and takes advantage of the state-of-practice phishing warn-
ing mechanisms in popular Web browsers to transparently protect vulnerable users. 
Among automatic phishing detection mechanisms, two commonly used techniques are 
blacklists and heuristics. Blacklist-based techniques generate close-to-zero false positives 
and can detect most phishing attacks [68, 131, 146, 151]. For example, Ludl et al. [68] 
demonstrated that blacklists provided by Google (used by Firefox 2) can recognize al-
most 90% of live phishing sites. However, because some phishing sites may not be added 
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into blacklists and the so-called zero-day attacks may occur, researchers have proposed 
various heuristic-based techniques to identify phishing sites in real time [17, 35, 68, 132]. 
These heuristic-based techniques have obtained very encouraging results. For example, 
CANTINA, a content-based detection tool proposed by Zhang et al. [132] can identify 90% 
of phishing pages with only 1% false positives. A URL-based classifier proposed by Gar-
era et a]. [35] is another tool that can catch 95.8% of phishing pages with only 1.2% false 
positives. 
Currently, Firefox 2 primarily employs blacklist-based techniques while Internet Ex-
plorer (IE) 7 uses both kinds of techniques [148, 169]. Because BogusBiter's design is inde-
pendent of any specific detection scheme, it can leverage advances in both blacklist-based 
techniques and heuristic-based techniques to combat the majority of phishing attacks. 
Regarding phishing site warning mechanisms, the state of practice is to make it manda-
tory for a user to respond to the active warning of a suspected phishing site. Figure 3.1 (b) 
illustrates the warning given by Firefox 2 [148] after correctly identifying the example web-
site in Figure 3.1(a) as a phishing site. A user is unable to enter the username and password 
without first interacting with the warning page. If the user clicks the "Get me out of here!" 
link, the user is redirected to a default page and is protected. Otherwise, if the user clicks 
the "Ignore this warning" link, the warning page disappears and the user is exposed to the 
risk of credential theft. A similar warning mechanism is also used in IE 7 [169]. 
Both Firefox 2 and IE 7 might choose such a active warning mechanism because: (1) 
issuing warnings simply through browser-based security indicators such as the address bar, 
the status bar, and various toolbars is ineffective [21, 20, 95, 111, 114, 23], and (2) directly 
blocking users' connections to suspected phishing sites is unacceptable, due to inevitable 
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false positives. Although using an active warning page represents current best practice, a 
recent usability study conducted by Egelman et al. [23] demonstrates that overall about 
21% of participants still ignore the IE 7 and Firefox 2 active phishing warnings and fall 
for phishing attacks. Therefore, a crucial usability gap still exists in today's anti-phishing 
ecosystem, and many users who are most vulnerable to phishing still cannot be protected. 
Phishing attacks are very insidious, and so far there is no single silver bullet for com-
pletely defeating phishers. Comprehensive, multifaceted, and integrated approaches are 
clearly needed in the anti-phishing ecosystem. BogusBiter fits into such an anti-phishing 
ecosystem especially by aiming to fill the aforementioned usability gap. Properly leveraging 
existing anti-phishing efforts, BogusBiter is capable of providing a transparent protection 
to those most vulnerable users. 
3.3 Design 
In this section, we first give an overview on the design of BogusBiter, including the basic 
working mechanism, the main design assumption, and the two key design objectives. We 
then detail the offensive line and defensive line of BogusBiter. 
3.3.1 Design Overview 
BogusBiter is designed as either a new component or an extension to popular Web browsers 
such as Firefox 2 or IE 7. It integrates seamlessly with phishing detection and warning 
mechanisms of current Web browsers to protect vulnerable users against phishing attacks. 
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Figure 3.2: Anti-phishing with BogusBiter. 
3.3.1.1 How It Works 
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In the scenario without BogusBiter, when a phishing site is visited by users, only real 
credentials are submitted by vulnerable users, and a phisher can easily verify the collected 
credentials and trade them for money. 
The basic idea of BogusBiter is very simple, as illustrated in Figure 3.2. When a 
login page is classified as a phishing page by a browser's built-in detection component or 
a third-party detection toolbar, BogusBiter is triggered. At this point, BogusBiter will 
perform differently based on a user's response to the browser's phishing warning page. For 
a vulnerable user who clicks the "Ignore this warning" link and submits a real credential, 
BogusBiter will intercept the victim's real credential, hide it among a set of S -1 generated 
bogus credentials, and then submit the S credentials one by one to the phishing site within 
a few milliseconds. For a security-conscious user who clicks the "Get me out of here!" link 
on the warning page, BogusBiter will generate a set of S bogus credentials, and then feed 
them one by one into the phishing site in the same way as it does for a vulnerable user. 
These actions are completely transparent to both vulnerable and security-conscious users. 
66 
The BogusBiter extensions installed on users' browsers make up the offensive line. Later 
on, when a phisher verifies the collected credentials at the legitimate site, the defensive line 
enabled by BogusBiter will help a legitimate site to detect victims' stolen credentials in a 
timely manner. 
3.3.1.2 Design Assumption 
We assume that a phisher does not have a complete list of valid usernames for a targeted 
legitimate website, and cannot directly query a targeted legitimate website for the validity of 
a specific username. Although this assumption may not be strictly correct for email service 
websites and community websites, it is generally true for financial institutions, which are 
the main targets of phishing attacks. Financial institutions seldom have valid username 
lists publicly accessible. Meanwhile, for a failed login attempt, websites often try to hide 
whether the failure is due to an incorrect username or due to an incorrect password by 
returning the same error message [12, 32], making it very hard to test the validity of a given 
username. 
Indeed, preventing the leakage of username validity information is necessary for pro-
tecting user privacy, guarding users from invasive advertising and phishing, and defending 
against password guessing attacks. To enhance such a protection, the recent work by Bortz 
et al. [12] recommends that the response time of HTTP requests should be carefully con-
trolled by some websites to remove timing vulnerabilities. Florencio et al. [32] further 
suggest that increasing username strength could be more beneficial than merely increasing 
password strength. 
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3.3.1.3 Design Objectives 
To be effective, BogusBiter has two key design objectives: 
• offensive objective: BogusBiter should inject as many bogus credentials as possible 
into a phishing site, thus well hiding victims' real credentials among bogus credentials. 
• defensive objective: Given that a phisher is aware of BogusBiter and is willing to 
assume the heavy burden of sifting out bogus credentials, BogusBiter should enable 
a legitimate website to exploit the filtering process initiated by the phisher to detect 
victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner. 
3.3.2 Offensive Line 
To achieve its offensive objective, BogusBiter should strive to meet the following three 
requirements. 
• Massiveness: The number of bogus credentials fed into a phishing site should be 
large so that the overwhelming majority of credentials received by a phisher are bogus. 
• Indiscernibility: Without the credential verification at the legitimate website, it 
is extremely difficult for a phisher to deterministically discern, either at credential 
submission time or afterwards, who are real victims and what are real credentials. 
• Usability: The usage of BogusBiter at the client-side should not incur undue over-
head or unwanted side effects, nor should it produce any security or privacy concerns. 
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3.3.2.1 Massiveness 
We use the real-to-all ratio-the ratio between the number of real credentials being col-
lected and the total number of credentials being collected-to estimate how many bogus 
credentials should be fed into a phishing site to hide victims' real credentials. In the sce-
nario without BogusBiter, most or perhaps all credentials collected by a phisher are real 
credentials submitted by victims, thus the real-to-all ratio is close to one. A phisher can 
easily verify these credentials at the legitimate website, assess their values, and ultimately 
use them to obtain money. 
In the scenario of anti-phishing with BogusBiter (Figure 3.2), a phishing site receives 
both real credentials and bogus credentials. Real credentials came from cheated users, 
that is, users who visited the phishing site and meanwhile became victims by revealing 
their credentials. The ratio between the number of cheated users and the total number of 
phishing site visitors can be denoted as cheat-to-visit. This ratio is often used by researchers 
to estimate the severity of phishing attacks. So if the total number of phishing site visitors 
is N, the number of real credentials being collected at the phishing site becomes "N * cheat-
to-visit." Meanwhile, because BogusBiter submits a set of S credentials in each phishing 
site visit (either by a cheated user or by a security-conscious user as explained in the design 
overview), the total number of credentials being collected at the phishing site becomes 
"N * S." Therefore, in the scenario of anti-phishing with BogusBiter, the real-to-all ratio 
can be computed as: cheat-~o-visit. 
If all the phishing site visitors become victims, the cheat-to-visit ratio equals one. There-
fore, the upper bound of the real-to-all ratio is ~· However, the experiments conducted 
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by Jakobsson and Ratkiewicz [47] demonstrate that even with the effects of modern anti-
phishing efforts, about 11 ± 3% of users will read a spoofed email, visit the phishing site, and 
enter their login credentials. In addition, Garera et al. [35] found that on average, 8.24% 
of users become victims after visiting phishing sites. If we use 10% as a realistic value for 
the cheat-to-visit ratio, the real-to-all ratio becomes rds. Thus, if the value of the set size 
Sis 10, a real credential will be hidden among 100 bogus credentials. Moreover, it is plau-
sible to assume that the cheat-to-visit ratio will decrease in the long run due to technical 
advances and educational efforts - a trend that favors BogusBiter. Assuming that the 
indiscernibility requirement is achievable, we now analyze the probability and the expected 
number of tries for a phisher to single out a certain number of real credentials by verifying 
them at the legitimate website. Since each set of S credentials is submitted by BogusBiter 
from a user's browser within a few milliseconds, a phisher can easily group the collected 
credentials by sets and verify them. If a set of S credentials is submitted from a victim's 
browser, the real credential will be singled out by a phisher with an expected number of 
8t 1 tries. However, because a phisher cannot discern which set includes a real credential, 
the phisher has to verify all sets of the collected credentials in order to single out as many 
real credentials as possible. Considering the very low cheat-to-visit ratio, without loss of 
generality, we simplify our analysis by mixing together all sets of the collected credentials. 
Let n be the total number of credentials collected at a phishing site, and m be the number 
of real credentials revealed by victims. Let Xk be the discrete random variable representing 
the number of tries performed by the phisher to single out k real credentials. Let Pr(Xk = i) 
be the probability of "Xk = i" and E[Xk] be the expectation of Xk. Intuitively, Pr(Xk = i) 
is the probability that a phisher identifies the kth real credential until the ith try. That is, 
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in the first i - 1 tries, the phisher has identified k - 1 real credentials; meanwhile, at the 
ith try, the phisher also identifies a real credential. Therefore, based on the definition of 
the binomial coefficient, we can calculate Pr(Xk = i) and E[Xk] using Formula (3.1) and 
Formula (3.2), respectively, where L.~;;;+k Pr(Xk = i) = 1 and k = 1, 2, ... , m. 
(~__=-km)(k-1) m- (k- 1) 
(i'_1) . n-(i-1) (3.1) 
n-m+k L i · Pr(Xk = i) (3.2) 
i=k 
n-m+k (n-m)(m ) ( ) L i . i-k k-1 . m - k - 1 
i=k (f-1) n- (i- 1) 
With the cheat-to-visit ratio set to 10%, Figure 3.3(a) illustrates the expected number 
of tries for a phisher to single out one real credential, that is, E[X1]. The four curves 
correspond to four different values of set size S. For example, if there are 6 real credentials 
hidden among all the collected credentials, to single out one real credential, the expected 
number of tries are 69 and 103, for set sizes 8 and 12, respectively. Figure 3.3(b) illustrates 
the expected number of tries for a phisher to single out all real credentials. Similarly, 
if there are 6 real credentials hidden among all the collected credentials, to single out 
these 6 real credentials, the expected number of tries are 412 and 618, for set sizes 8 and 
12, respectively. From this example, we can see that a set size of 8 can already allow 
BogusBiter to feed a relatively large number of bogus credentials into a phishing site and 
well hide victims' real credentials among bogus credentials. However, we should note that 
such a hiding effect will never be enough to frustrate greedy phishers who intend to verify 
all the collected credentials. Therefore, a defensive line enabled by BogusBiter is highly 
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Figure 3.3: Expected number of tries for a phisher to single out: (a) one real credential, (b) all 
real credentials. 
desirable (see Section 3.3.3). 
3.3.2.2 Indiscernibility 
The indiscernibility requirement is essential for BogusBiter to work. It has two implications: 
(1) the submission actions initiated from victims' browsers should be very difficult to be 
differentiated from the submission actions initiated from security-conscious users' browsers, 
and (2) victims' real credentials should be very difficult to be differentiated from bogus 
credentials generated by BogusBiter. 
For a victim who ignores a browser's phishing warning, BogusBiter first intercepts the 
credential submission HTTP request before it is sent out. Next, BogusBiter creates S- 1 
bogus credentials based on the victim's real credential and spawns S -1 new HTTP requests 
based on the original HTTP request. Each of the S- 1 spawned requests is exactly the 
same as the original request, except for carrying a bogus credential instead of a real one. 
Then, BogusBiter inserts the original HTTP request into the S - 1 spawned requests and 
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sends out all the S requests within a few milliseconds. Finally, BogusBiter interprets and 
properly processes the returned HTTP responses so that a phishing site cannot identify the 
differences between the S submissions. 
For a security-conscious user who accepts a browser's phishing warning, BogusBiter 
first imitates a victim's behavior by entering a generated bogus credential into the phishing 
page and submitting it. Next, similar to the above case for a real victim, BogusBiter 
intercepts this original HTTP request, spawns S- 1 new HTTP requests, and generates the 
corresponding S - 1 bogus credentials as well. Finally, BogusBiter sends out the S requests 
and processes the returned responses in the same way as it does for a victim, thereby making 
it hard for a phisher to distinguish these submissions from those initiated from a victim's 
browser. 
As for bogus credential generation, BogusBiter uses the original credential as the tem-
plate to generate the S - 1 bogus credentials. For a victim, the original credential is the 
victim's real credential and thus is ready to use. For a security-conscious user, the auto-
matically generated original credential should be similar to a human's real credential. In 
current design, BogusBiter randomly generates a usernamefpassword pair as the original 
credential. For the remaining S - 1 bogus credentials, a specific rule should be followed 
to generate them so that neither a human nor a computer can easily discern which is the 
original credential and which are the rest. We will present the rule used by BogusBiter in 
Section 3.3.3. 
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3.3.2.3 Usability 
In terms of usability, the major advantage of BogusBiter is its transparency to users. Com-
plementary to existing preventive anti-phishing approaches, BogusBiter automatically de-
fends against phishing attacks without user involvement. Meanwhile, because BogusBiter 
only needs to submit some extra bogus credentials to a suspected phishing site and does 
not contact any third-party service, it will not cause any security or privacy problems. 
The main usability concerns come from the scenario of a false positive (i.e., a legitimate 
website is wrongly classified as a phishing site). While the occurrence of false positives is rare 
for Firefox 2, IE 7, and recent detection techniques as mentioned in Section 3.2, BogusBiter 
should eliminate or reduce the possible side effects on users' access to misclassified legitimate 
websites. 
The first side effect is that submitting a set of S login requests and waiting for responses 
will induce an additional delay to users. To reduce the delay, BogusBiter sends out all the 
S requests within a few milliseconds, so that the round-trip times of the S submissions 
can be overlapped as much as possible. Accordingly, as long as the set size S is not too 
large, the additional delay incurred by BogusBiter should be minimal and unobtrusive. Our 
experimental results in Section 3.5 confirm that the additional delays are negligible. 
The second side effect is that a user's real account may be locked because multiple 
login requests are submitted from the user's browser to a legitimate website within a few 
milliseconds. To defend against password guessing attacks, some websites may lock a user's 
account for a period of time after several failed login attempts. However, because all the 
usernames are different for the S login requests sent out by BogusBiter, the "account with 
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many failed login attempts" alarm will not be triggered as discussed in [85]. Our experiments 
on 20 legitimate websites confirm that account locking is not a concern for BogusBiter. 
The third side effect is that a user may be asked to complete a CAPTCHA [3] test, for 
the same reason that multiple login requests are submitted from the user's browser within a 
few milliseconds. Some websites may resort to this mechanism to counter password guessing 
attacks or denial of service attacks. However, in our legitimate site experiments where false 
positives are assumed to occur, no CAPTCHA test is triggered if the set size S is not greater 
than 10, and only two of the 20 websites ask a user to do a CAPTCHA test if the set size 
Sis greater than 10. 
3.3.3 Defensive Line 
Simply requiring BogusBiter to meet the offensive objective is not sufficient. This is because 
even if victims' real credentials are well hidden among bogus credentials, a phisher can still 
visit the legitimate website to verify each of the collected credentials. Therefore, a defensive 
line is highly desirable, and BogusBiter should enable a legitimate website to exploit the 
verification process initiated (either manually or automatically) by the phisher to detect 
victims' stolen credentials in a timely manner. 
3.3.3.1 Working Mechanism 
BogusBiter makes such a defensive line feasible by imposing a correlation requirement 
upon the generation of the S - 1 bogus credentials. It is important that this correlation 
requirement should not violate the indiscernibility requirement of credential generation, 
that is, victims' real credentials should be very difficult to be differentiated from bogus 
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credentials generated by BogusBiter. 
• Correlation Requirement: Based on the original credential, a specific rule is ap-
plied to generate the S - 1 bogus credentials. This rule must guarantee that the S 
credentials in a set are correlated: given any one of them, we can reversely derive a 
small superset that includes all the S credentials. 
BogusBiter attempts to meet both the correlation and indiscernibility requirements on 
credential generation by using a simple substitution rule. While there are other ways to 
meet the two requirements, we choose the substitution rule because of its simplicity and 
efficiency for verification. Due to our empirical experience that if the set size S is not greater 
than 10, no usability problem occurs and the delay overhead is small (see Section 3.5), the 
substitution rule is tailored to have S < 10. Note that the exact value of S should be 
publicly known. 
To generate the S- 1 bogus usernamejpassword pairs, BogusBiter first computes an 
integer position i between 1 and S inclusively. This integer position determines which 
set of S - 1 bogus credentials will be generated, and it also determines in which order 
the S credentials will be sent out to a phishing site. BogusBiter uses Formula (3.3) to 
deterministically compute this integer position i: 
PRF(k, original_username) mod S + 1, (3.3) 
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where k is a master secret that is randomly chosen when a BogusBiter is installed or 
configured, and P RF is a secure pseudorandom function. The master secret k is securely 
stored and used by BogusBiter. A user does not need to memorize the master secret, but 
is allowed to export and use the same master secret on different computers. From a given 
original credential, the same S - 1 bogus credentials will always be generated, and the S 
credentials will always be submitted to a phishing site in the same order. Therefore, even 
if a phisher can attack a victim multiple times, the phisher cannot find the real credential 
by observing which credential over time appears most often. Meanwhile, since this formula 
only securely hashes the original username, it is applicable both to websites that ask a user 
to submit username/password pair at the same time, and to websites that require a user to 
first submit a username and then submit a password. 
Next, BogusBiter identifies the first digit in the original username as the username 
replacement character, denoted as username-rc; if the original username does not contain a 
digit, the first letter (upper or lower case) is identified as the username-rc. Using the same 
method, BogusBiter identifies the password replacement character in the original password, 
denoted as password-rc. 
Then, for each integer position j from 1 to S inclusively where j =1- i, BogusBiter 
generates a bogus usernamejpassword pair by substituting both the username-rc character 
and the password-rc character in the original usernamejpassword pair using one of the 
following two replacement methods: 
(1) For the case of j - i > 0: if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a letter, this 
lower (or upper) case letter is replaced by another lower (or upper) case letter j- i 
places further down the alphabet, wrapped around if needed, i.e., 'z' is followed by 
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'a' (or 'Z' is followed by 'A'); if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a digit, this 
digit is replaced by another digit j - i places further down the single digit sequence 
"0123456789", wrapped around if needed, i.e., '9' is followed by '0'. 
(2) For the case of j - i < 0: if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a letter, this lower 
(or upper) case letter is replaced by another lower (or upper) case letter i- j places 
further up the alphabet, wrapped around if needed, i.e., 'a' is followed by 'z' (or 'A' is 
followed by 'Z'); if username-rc (also for password-rc) is a digit, this digit is replaced by 
another digit i- j places further up the single digit sequence "0123456789", wrapped 
around if needed, i.e., '0' is followed by '9'. 
Position Username/Password 
j=l (kcsmith/Fuzzycat95) 
j=2 (lcsmith/Fuzzycat05) 
--->i=3 ( mcsmith/Fuzzycat 15) 
j=4 (ncsmith/Fuzzycat25) 
Table 3.1: Substitution from the original user-
name/password pair (mcsmith/ Fuzzycatl5). 
Username/Password 
(icsmith/Fuzzycat75) 
(jcsmith/Fuzzycat85) 
(kcsmith/Fuzzycat95) 
-+ (lcsmith/Fuzzycat05) 
(mcsmith/Fuzzycat15) 
( ncsmith/Fuzzycat25) 
( ocsmith/Fuzzycat35) 
Table 3.2: Derivation from the user-
name/password pair (lcsmith/ Fuzzycat05). 
Table 3.1 illustrates an example of applying the substitution rule to the original user-
name/password pair (mcsmith / Fuzzycat15). In this example, the username replacement 
character username-rc is the first 'm' in the original username and the password replace-
ment character password-rc is the digit '1' in the original password. These two alphanumeric 
characters will be replaced to generate S - 1 bogus credentials. If S = 4 and the computed 
integer position i is 3, three bogus usernamejpassword pairs are generated for j=1, 2, and 
4, respectively. 
Algorithm: SCI (f-uname/f-pword) 
1. Initialize the result set as empty : R = 0; 
2. Construct the set: D = {(d-uname/d-pword): (d-uname/d-pword) 
is a credential derived from (f-uname,f-pword) }; 
3. for each (d-uname/d-pword) E D do 
4. if d-uname matches a valid account's username then 
5. if d-pword matches the valid account's password then 
6. R=R U {(d-uname/d-pword)}; 
7. endif 
8. endif 
9. endfor 
10. return the result set R; 
Figure 3.4: The Stolen Credential Identification (SCI) procedure. 
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Finally, BogusBiter submits the S usernamejpassword pairs to a suspected phishing site 
following their corresponding position order. Using Formula (3.3) to compute the integer 
position i and using their position order to send out the S credentials, BogusBiter makes 
it hard for a phisher to narrow down a victim's real credential even if the victim visits a 
phishing site twice from the same browser and enters the real credential twice. However, 
we should note that the overall extent to which the indiscernibility requirement can be met 
still depends on the characteristics (such as meaningfulness) of a victim's real credential. 
We further discuss this limitation in Section 3.6.3.1. 
Clearly the substitution rule above meets the correlation requirement. Given any one of 
the S credentials, we can derive at most 2 * ( S- 1) variations based on the substitution rule, 
in which further down replacement produces S- 1 variations and further up replacement 
produces otherS -1 variations. These 2 * (S- 1) + 1 credentials cover all the S credentials 
submitted to the phishing site. Table 3.2 lists an example derivation from the credential 
(lcsmith / Fuzzycat05). 
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Now let us see how a legitimate website can take advantage of the correlation requirement 
to identify the credentials stolen by phishing attacks. If a phisher is lucky enough (with ~ 
probability) to choose a victim's real credential as the first try to verify at the legitimate 
website, this login attempt will succeed and the legitimate website cannot detect the fact 
that a real credential has been stolen and verified. However, for any failed login attempt, the 
legitimate website will trigger the procedure of Stolen Credential Identification (SCI), which 
is illustrated in Figure 3.4. SCI takes the failed username/password pair (f-uname/f-pword) 
as its input. It constructs the set D of derived credentials (line 2), and seeks a match 
between a derived username/password pair and a valid account's username/password pair. 
Then, it adds any derived username/password pair (d-uname/d-pword) that matches a valid 
account's usernamejpassword pair to the result set R (line 6). SCI finally returns the result 
set R as its output. 
If the failure of a login attempt is caused by a phisher who is verifying any one of the S -1 
bogus credentials generated from a victim's real credential, SCI must report a match since 
the derived credential set D contains the victim's real credential. The matched credential 
is the victim's real credential that has been revealed to the phisher, and is included in 
the result set R. However, if the failure of a login attempt is due to any other reasons, 
even if there is a chance that a derived username d-uname may match a valid account's 
username (line 4), the probability that the correspondingly derived password d-pword also 
happens to match this valid account's password (line 5) is extremely low. This probability 
is equivalent to that of randomly guessing a valid account's password. As an example, if a 
user accidentally mistypes the user's real password (or an attacker launches online password 
guessing attacks against a user), the login attempts will fail but SCI will not report a match. 
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Therefore, if the result set R is not empty, the usernamejpassword pair (the probability 
of having two or more credential pairs in the result set R is also extremely low) contained in 
R must have been stolen by a phisher. The legitimate website can take immediate actions to 
protect the victim even before the phisher figures out the victim's real credential. Because 
SCI is turned on only when a login attempt fails and it only needs a small number of 
verifications (at most 2 * (S- 1) for our substitution rule), the overhead is very small for a 
legitimate website. If necessary, this identification task can even be delegated to a separate 
machine. 
3.3.3.2 Deployment of Defensive Line 
While BogusBiter is installed in a user's Web browser, the defensive line enabled by Bo-
gusBiter needs to be deployed only on those legitimate websites that are really targeted by 
phishers. These phishing-targeted legitimate websites listed in the APWG database [138] 
usually have properly registered domain names and well-designed webpages, and may even 
be whitelisted by some phishing detection tools. None of their login pages will be mis-
classified as phishing pages by popular detection tools. The rare false positives [131, 151] 
produced by phishing detection tools are mainly caused by some legitimate websites that 
are almost never targeted by phishing attacks. We do not need to deploy the defensive line 
of BogusBiter on them. 
Moreover, the deployment work on phishing-targeted legitimate websites is very simple 
because SCI only uses these websites' existing authentication information and does not 
change their authentication mechanisms (no matter plaintext-equivalent mechanisms or 
verifier-based mechanisms). This server-side deployment cost is minimal compared to that 
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of Dynamic Security Skins [19], which changes authentication mechanisms via the SRP 
protocol [116], and to that of BeamAuth [1], which demands an extra secret token for every 
user account. 
3.3.3.3 Scale-Independency Properties 
The defensive line enabled by BogusBiter also has two valuable scale-independency prop-
erties. First, the efficacy of the defensive line does not depend on the cheat-to-visit ratio, 
that is, it does not require a large percentage of users to properly respond to anti-phishing 
warnings. Second, the efficacy does not depend upon a massive installation of BogusBiter in 
users' browsers, i.e., even a single vulnerable user who installs BogusBiter can benefit from 
a deployed defensive line. These two scale-independency properties are not only valuable 
by themselves, they also ensure that BogusBiter cannot be easily evaded by sophisticated 
phishers, as will be discussed in Section 3.6. 
3.4 Implementation 
We have implemented BogusBiter as a Firefox extension in approximately 1700 lines of 
JavaScript code and 100 lines of C++ code. Seamlessly integrated with the built-in phishing 
protection feature of Firefox 2 [148], BogusBiter consists of four main modules: Information 
Extraction, Bogus Credential Generation, Request Submission, and Response Process, as 
illustrated in Figure 5.2. We detail these four modules in the remainder of this section. 
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Figure 3.5: Implementation of BogusBiter as a Firefox 2 browser extension. 
3.4.1 Information Extraction Module 
The information extraction module extracts the username and password pair and its cor-
responding form element on a login page by analyzing Document Object Model (DOM) 
objects. First, all the HTMLinputElement objects within the HTMLDocument object of 
the login page are collected. Next, the password object is located by examining its special 
attribute type= "password." A similar password locating method is also used in [31, 91]. 
Then, the HTMLFormElement object-the submission form object-associated with the 
password object is directly extracted. Finally, based on object attributes, the username ob-
ject is extracted from other HTMLinputElement objects included in the submission form. 
Following this element extraction order combined with the attribute analysis of the visible 
input fields, BogusBiter can accurately identify username, password, and form elements on 
a login page. Note that phishers may use non-standard login pages to disrupt this automatic 
information extraction procedure and evade BogusBiter. We discuss some solutions to this 
kind of evasions in Section 3.6.3.2. 
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The information extraction module also implements a protection mechanism to defend 
against input-stealing attacks that use malicious J avaScript code on a phishing page to di-
rectly steal a victim's credential. Existing works such as AntiPhish [56] and PwdHash [91] 
provide good technical guidance for implementing such a protection mechanism. In Bo-
gusBiter, we adopt the keystroke intercepting technique introduced in PwdHash and create 
protectors on username and password elements. More precisely, username and password 
keystrokes are intercepted by the registered event handlers and are masked to hide from the 
JavaScript on a webpage. Therefore, a victim's real keystrokes are recorded by BogusBiter, 
but are blocked from being received by various JavaScript attacks [91]. We choose the 
keystroke intercepting technique because it is more generic than the temporary deactivating 
technique used in AntiPhish's Firefox version. 
3.4.2 Bogus Credential Generation Module 
The bogus credential generation module generates S - 1 bogus credentials based on an 
original credential. For a victim, the original credential is the victim's real credential. For a 
security-conscious user, in our current implementation, this module will randomly generate 
a username/password pair composed of upper/lower case letters and digits as the original 
credential. Advanced original credential generation methods can also be incorporated into 
BogusBiter, so that a randomly generated original credential will look more like a real user's 
credential. The substitution rule of BogusBiter is implemented in JavaScript. The open 
source HMAC_SHA256_MAC() JavaScript function implemented by Poettering [164] is used 
as the secure pseudo-random function of Formula (3.3). 
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3.4.3 Request Submission Module 
The request submission module is responsible for spawning and submitting multiple HTTP 
requests. Its implementation is guided by both the indiscernibility and usability require-
ments of BogusBiter. Since each HTTP request can only carry one credential, S requests 
are needed to submit a set of S credentials to a phishing site. For a victim, once a credential 
is entered and the submit button is clicked, the first HTTP request is initiated from the 
current browser window. For a security-conscious user, the action of accepting a phishing 
warning triggers BogusBiter to imitate a human's credential entering and button clicking 
actions and initiate the first HTTP request from the current browser window. 
Next, just before the first HTTP request is actually sent out, BogusBiter is notified by 
Firefox's global notification service and intercepts this HTTP request. Then, BogusBiter 
quickly spawns the other S -1 HTTP requests with each of them carrying a bogus credential. 
The main challenge here lies in how to efficiently spawn S - 1 new HTTP requests and 
schedule the submission of all the S requests. A few solutions are available, for example, 
using multiple submission windows, or reusing the submission form on one browser window 
to submit multiple times. However, they suffer from various usability drawbacks such as 
multiple webpage refreshing and long interaction time. 
BogusBiter, instead, creates and uses internal HTTP channels to submit requests behind 
the screen. In order to make our extension code more portable, we choose to use XML-
HttpRequest objects [192] to create internal HTTP channels. XMLHttpRequest objects are 
supported by both Firefox 2 and IE 7, and they allow JavaScript to perform HTTP client 
functionalities such as submitting form data or loading data from a server. The first HTTP 
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request is also associated with an HTTP channel, which is created by the browser. For this 
first HTTP request, all its contents, such as message header and message body [27] can be 
extracted from its HTTP channel. Then, S - 1 XMLHttpRequest objects are created and 
their corresponding HTTP channels are established based on the contents extracted from 
the first HTTP channel. More specifically, BogusBiter executes the following four steps: 
request initialization, message body replacement, header fields setting, and header fields 
reordering: 
(1) Request Initialization: For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the same request 
type and URL as those in the first HTTP request are used. Asynchronous mode is 
used so that request sending is nonblocked and all the corresponding HTTP responses 
can be handled in a specified callback function. Since HTML forms, especially login 
forms, are in general submitted using POST instead of GET type of HTTP requests 
for security reasons, we only consider POST type of HTTP requests in the following 
discussion. Indeed, it is much simpler to process the GET type of HTTP requests. 
(2) Message Body Replacement: For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, BogusBiter 
only needs to make a copy of the message body extracted from the first HTTP 
request, and then replace the original usernamejpassword pair with a bogus user-
name/password pair. Nothing else needs to be changed in the message body. Because 
the bogus usernamejpassword pair and original usernamejpassword pair have the 
same length, the message body length does not change. Meanwhile, since the first 
HTTP request's message body is extracted before its HTTP channel is encrypted, this 
message body replacement also works correctly for secured (HTTPS) connections. 
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(3) Header Fields Setting: For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the "Content-
Type" request header field is set as "applicationjx-www-form-urlencoded" to mimic 
the case of submitting a form on a browser window. The "Content-Length" request 
header field is set to the same value as that of the first HTTP request, because the 
message body length is unchanged. The "Referer" request header field also needs to 
be set as the same value as that of the first HTTP request. The "Cookie" request 
header field is automatically set by the Firefox Web browser because the same URL 
has been specified. For each of the S - 1 XMLHttpRequests, BogusBiter also makes 
sure that "no-cache" is assigned to both the "Pragma" request header field and the 
"Cache-Control" request header field so that the form submissions will not be cached, 
and the "close" is assigned to the "Connection" request header field so that its TCP 
connection will not be persisted and shared with any other requests. The first HTTP 
request also needs to be adjusted to have the same values for these three request 
header fields. 
(4) Header Fields Reordering: For each of the S- 1 XMLHttpRequests, the request 
header fields must be reordered so that the same order used in the first HTTP request 
will be used. Since the order of request header fields is not significant as defined 
in [27], this reordering will not cause any problem. In our implementation, only the 
order of "Content-Type," "Content-Length," "Pragma," "Cache-Control," "Cookie," 
and "Referer" is adjusted by BogusBiter, due to some subtle implementation dif-
ferences between an XMLHttpRequest and a regular HTTP request in Firefox. To 
support this reordering, we actually introduced a new function switchHeaderField-
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sPosition(headerFieldA, headerFieldB) to Firefox's nsiXMLHttpRequest interface and 
nsiHttpChannel interface and implemented this new function in C++. This new 
function may also be useful for other applications that use XMLHttpRequest objects. 
After the completion of these four steps, the S -1 XMLHttpRequests and the first HTTP 
request all have the same request type, URL, header fields, and header field order. Their 
message bodies are all the same except for carrying different username/password pairs. 
As previously described in BogusBiter's substitution rule, the submission order of these S 
requests is decided when the S- 1 bogus credentials are generated. If the ith position (I :::; 
i :::; S) is computed for the original credential, BogusBiter first asynchronously transmits 
i - 1 XMLHttpRequests, which carry the first i - 1 bogus credentials. Then, BogusBiter 
transmits the first initiated HTTP r~quest, which carries the original credential. Finally, 
BogusBiter asynchronously transmits the remaining S - i XMLHttpRequests, which carry 
the last S - i bogus credentials. All the S requests are sent out within a few milliseconds, 
and no timing clue can be observed on a Web server or proxy. 
3.4.4 Response Process Module 
After receiving and interpreting an HTTP request, a website replies with an HTTP response 
message. For a legitimate website, if the credential carried in a request is valid, a successful 
login page is returned in the response message; otherwise, a failed login page is returned 
in the response message. Phishing sites may take different response actions after receiv-
ing credential submission requests (see Section 3.5.2). In every case, BogusBiter parses 
and renders the response message of the first HTTP request on the browser window, and 
processes the response messages of the S - 1 XMLHttpRequests behind the screen using 
88 
a callback function. Therefore, BogusBiter can always correctly match responses to their 
corresponding requests and work transparently to users. 
Many times there are Web objects such as JavaScript and embedded images associated 
with each response message. These objects will be downloaded by the Web browser if the 
response message corresponds to an HTTP request initiated from the browser window, but 
by default will not be downloaded if the response message corresponds to an XMLHttpRe-
quest. Future phishers may want to discern which are XMLHttpRequests by exploiting this 
fact and manipulating response contents. For example, a phisher may return a different 
HTML page to each submission, which includes a slightly different named image. Later 
on, by examining whether an image has ever been downloaded from the phishing site, the 
phisher can identify bogus credentials submitted by XMLHttpRequests. 
To defend against such rendering-based attacks, BogusBiter utilizes a set of hidden DOM 
windows to render these asynchronously returned response pages for XMLHttpRequests, 
thus leaving no clue to phishers. Because the same Web objects cached by a browser 
will be directly used by different DOM windows, bandwidth-overhead incurred by this 
mechanism is negligible, especially for legitimate websites. For a phishing site that returns 
a different HTML page for each of BogusBiter's S submissions, the possible long delay due 
to downloading different Web objects will only annoy a victim and encourage the victim to 
leave the phishing site-a result that actually favors victims' interests. 
89 
3.5 Evaluation 
We conducted three sets of experiments to evaluate BogusBiter. In the first set of ex-
periments, we built a testbed to verify the implementation correctness of BogusBiter with 
respect to indiscernibility. In the second and third sets of experiments, we ran BogusBiter 
against' 50 phishing sites and 20 legitimate websites to validate its efficacy, in terms of 
attacking capability and usability. 
3.5.1 Testbed Experiments 
In the testbed experiments, we set up an Apache 2 Web server in a Linux machine and 
hosted over twenty various phishing webpages on it. We used BogusBiter to send various 
login requests to these phishing webpages either directly or through proxies. By examining 
both request logs and request contents at the Web server, we verified that all the S requests 
in a set are exactly the same, except for the credentials carried in the request bodies. In 
addition, we placed an open-source tool, Tcpmon [185], in between the Web browser and 
Web server to monitor TCP connections. We verified that the S submission requests are 
transmitted over S independent non-persistent TCP connections; therefore, it is hard for a 
phisher to differentiate these requests at the TCP connection level. 
3.5.2 Phishing Site Experiments 
In the phishing site experiments, we ran BogusBiter against 50 verified phishing sites chosen 
from PhishTank [176]. PhishTank is a community based anti-phishing service and its data 
have been widely used for evaluating phishing detection techniques [68, 131, 132, 146]. These 
50 chosen phishing sites are diverse in terms of their locations, design styles, and targeted 
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brand names. For each phishing site, when it was online, we tested BogusBiter with four 
different set sizes of 4, 8, 12, and 16. Our major experiential findings are summarized as 
follows. 
First, BogusBiter is capable of attacking all the 50 phishing sites. Acting as either a 
victim or a security-conscious user, BogusBiter always works correctly: it sends out all the 
S requests within 10 milliseconds, and then processes all the responses properly. In rare 
cases that phishing sites were not correctly detected by Firefox 2, we manually corrected 
the detection results to trigger BogusBiter. 
Second, the delay caused by BogusBiter is minimal when the set size S is 4 or 8. Here 
the delay means the submission interaction time difference between using BogusBiter and 
not using BogusBiter. The submission interaction time is the time elapsed between the 
transmission of the first request and the reception of the last response. Figure 3.6(a) depicts 
the percentage of phishing sites versus the delay caused by BogusBiter under four different 
set sizes. We can see that if the set size S is 4 or 8, for over 85% of phishing sites, the delay 
is less than 4 seconds. This delay measure is common to either a security-conscious user 
or a victim, but the delay effect is different. A security-conscious user is unaware of such 
a delay because the user is actually redirected to a default webpage by Firefox. A victim 
may perceive this delay because the victim is waiting for the response from the phishing 
site. Nevertheless, it is definitely worthwhile adding a small delay on revealing a victim's 
credential, in order to make it less likely for phishers to succeed. 
Third, phishing sites take three different response actions after receiving a user's cre-
dential submission request. Among 50 phishing sites, 38 of them simply redirect a user to 
the invalid login pages of the targeted legitimate websites; 11 of them keep a user at their 
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Figure 3.6: Delay caused by BogusBiter on: (a) phishing sites, (b) legitimate sites, under different 
set sizeS. 
local sites by using more faked webpages; and the last phishing site is very tricky because it 
verifies the received credential in real time at the legitimate website and then sends back a 
response based on the verification result. If a user submits a valid credential, the phishing 
site steals the credential and then redirects the user to the legitimate website; otherwise, 
it lets the user re-login on the phishing site. All three types of response actions attempt 
to continue deceiving a victim and prevent the victim from realizing that an attack has 
happened. But the third type of response action not only obtains and verifies a credential 
in real time, it is also more deceptive to vulnerable users. The defensive line of BogusBiter 
indeed provides an excellent opportunity for a legitimate website to defend against such 
attacks in real time. 
3.5.3 Legitimate Site Experiments 
In the legitimate site experiments, we ran BogusBiter against 20 legitimate websites listed 
in Table 3.3. None of these websites is classified as a phishing site by either Firefox 2 or 
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paypal.com amazon.com gmail.com cox.com myspace.com 
ebay.com buy. com yahoo.com sprint. com walmart.com 
citibank.com ecost.com msn.com geico.com career builder. com 
53.com ubid.com aol.com aaa.com my.wm.edu 
Table 3.3: The 20 legitimate websites. 
IE 7. We intentionally set the detection results as phishing to simulate false positive cases, 
and used real accounts on these legitimate websites to evaluate the usability of BogusBiter. 
We summarize the major experimental results as follows. 
First, as we expected, none of these legitimate websites lock a real account during our 
extensive tests. Second, if the set size S is 4 or 8, none of these legitimate websites require 
CAPTCHA tests. If the set size S is 12 or 16, only two websites ask a user to do a 
CAPTCHA test after receiving S credentials. This test is a burden to a user but will not 
block a user's further interactions with a Web server. Third, the delay caused by BogusBiter 
is very small when the set size S is 4 or 8. Figure 3.6(b) depicts the percentage of legitimate 
sites versus the delay caused by BogusBiter under four different set sizes. We can see that 
if the set size S is 4 or 8, for all the 20 legitimate sites the delay is less than 3 seconds, and 
for over 85% of legitimate sites the delay is less than one second. Therefore, BogusBiter 
only induces a very small delay to users even if false positives really occur. The delay on 
legitimate websites is much smaller than that on phishing sites, since the request processing 
capability of legitimate websites is generally higher than that of phishing sites. 
3.6 Discussions 
In this section, we discuss the deployment scale of BogusBiter, the preparations that may 
be needed for BogusBiter's massive deployment, and the limitations of BogusBiter. 
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3.6.1 Deployment Scale 
As discussed in Section 3.3.3.2, the defensive line (the SCI procedure) enabled by BogusBiter 
needs to be deployed only on those legitimate websites that are really targeted by phishers. 
So, here we only discuss the deployment of the BogusBiter browser extension. Like most 
client-side protection mechanisms, BogusBiter protects only those users who install it. On 
one hand, due to its scale-independency properties, the defensive line enabled by BogusBiter 
can effectively identify the stolen credentials whose owners use BogusBiter, no matter how 
many users install BogusBiter and what percentage of them are real victims. On the 
other hand, the power of BogusBiter's offensive line against a phishing site is scaled to the 
number of users who install BogusBiter. With the increase of BogusBiter users, victims' 
real credentials can be better hidden among bogus credentials. Therefore, in order to 
protect as many users as possible, BogusBiter should be deployed as widely as possible. 
Ideally, if BogusBiter could be integrated into popular Web browsers as a built-in feature, a 
ubiquitous deployment will be easily achieved and the benefits brought by BogusBiter will 
be maximized. 
3.6.2 Massive Deployment Preparation 
When BogusBiter is integrated into popular Web browsers, it can be triggered with high 
confidence for blacklisted phishing login pages; it can also be triggered for suspicious (but 
not blacklisted) phishing login pages hosted on less popular websites. The main concern 
about such a massive deployment of BogusBiter is that if the login page of a legitimate 
site is wrongly flagged as a phishing page, the load on the site's authentication servers 
will increase by a factor of S due to BogusBiter. However, the false positives produced by 
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widely deployed phishing detection mechanisms such as used in IE 7 and Firefox 2 are rare, 
especially for popular websites that have a large number of users. This is because otherwise 
the false positives would have been noticed and corrected by these websites to prevent losing 
users. As reported in [131], both IE 7 and Firefox 2 achieve a zero false positive rate for 516 
representative legitimate websites. Thus, we expect that only few less popular and poorly 
designed legitimate websites need to prepare for a massive deployment of BogusBiter. 
We suggest two simple solutions for these websites to prepare. Let us assume that 
BogusBiter's functionality is integrated into a new version of IE or Firefox Web browser. 
Using the browser, the operator of a legitimate website can easily verify whether the site's 
login page will be incorrectly classified as a phishing page. If a misclassification does occur, 
two simple solutions exist. One solution is to report this misclassification and request the 
Web browser vendor to either remove this legitimate site from the blacklist or add it to the 
whitelist. The other solution is to revise the login page of this site, for example by removing 
suspicious features, so that the page can pass heuristic-based tests [17, 35, 68, 132]. We 
suggest these preparations not merely for the need of BogusBiter's massive deployment. 
Indeed, legitimate websites may lose customers if they do not take active measures to 
reduce their chances of being misclassified. 
3.6.3 Limitations of BogusBiter 
Should BogusBiter become widely deployed, phishers may explore its limitations to circum-
vent it. In general, the potential evasions can be divided into offline evasions and online 
evasions. 
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3.6.3.1 Offline Evasions 
In offiine evasions, phishers analyze their collected credentials by using local username 
filtering techniques, meaningful credential filtering techniques, or statistical filtering tech-
niques. 
(1) Local usemame filtering: In BogusBiter's design, we assume that a phisher does not 
have a complete list of valid usernames for a targeted legitimate website, and cannot directly 
query a targeted legitimate website for the validity of a specific username. Otherwise, a 
phisher can simply conduct local username filtering without doing remote credential verifi-
cation. Currently, this assumption may not be valid for some websites. For example, Bank 
of America's website can tell a user whether a login is valid before a password is entered. For 
these websites, we recommend them to hide their username validity information by using 
some protection methods such as suggested in [12] and [32], thus not just to receive better 
protection from BogusBiter, but also to provide a necessary defense against privacy leaking, 
invasive advertising and phishing, password guessing, and even DoS attacks [12, 32]. 
(2) Meaningful credential filtering: Using current substitution rule, BogusBiter may 
generate meaningless bogus credentials from users' meaningful credentials (e.g., credentials 
containing dictionary words or human names), especially if an original username or original 
password does not contain a digit. Thus, a phisher may only select meaningful credentials 
to verify, while discarding the rest. Although this kind of meaningful credential filtering 
is error-prone because a victim's real credential may be indeed meaningless and thus may 
be directly thrown away by a phisher, it can still be used by phishers to evade BogusBiter. 
Perhaps this is less of a concern for passwords, because the insecurity of low-entropy and 
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guessable passwords has long been recognized [40, 59, 75, 78], and more and more high 
security websites require users to choose passwords that contain at least one letter and one 
number. 
(3) Statistical filtering: A phisher may also analyze the variations of credentials and use 
statistical language models such as bigrams or trigrams to identify victims' real credentials. 
However, we argue that this type of statistical filtering is also error-prone for the same rea-
sons as already mentioned in the meaningful credential filtering. Unfortunately, we cannot 
obtain representative credential datasets to further analyze and support this argument. In 
addition, we need to emphasize that other new rules (in addition to our substitution rule) 
could also be designed to generate bogus credentials from an original credential. Especially, 
if those new rules take into account the statistical characteristics of credentials in repre-
sentative datasets, they could better hide victims' real credentials among generated bogus 
credentials. It is worthy to design and apply such kinds of new rules, even if they may incur 
the cost of increasing the derivable credentials (see Table 3.2). 
3.6.3.2 Online Evasions 
Unlike offline evasions, in online evasions, phishers have to redesign their phishing sites 
and use special techniques to identify, in real time, which are real credentials submitted by 
victims. However, some inherent drawbacks limit the application and effectiveness of online 
evasion techniques. We now examine three representative classes of potential online evasion 
techniques. 
(1) JavaScript attacks: A phisher may use two basic forms of JavaScript attacks to evade 
BogusBiter. One is an input-stealing attack that steals a user's credential using techniques 
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such as keystroke monitoring, and then sends back the results to the phishing site at form 
submission time or in real time. The other is a rendering-based attack that manipulates 
response contents to discern which are bogus credentials submitted by XMLHttpRequests. 
As discussed in Section 3.4.1 and Section 3.4.4, BogusBiter defends against these two basic 
forms of JavaScript attacks by using the keystroke intercepting technique and the hidden 
DOM windows technique, respectively. 
More sophisticated JavaScript attacks can be launched by phishers. For example, a 
phisher can first have the phishing site code pause for a second or two to wait for BogusBiter 
submitting all the S credentials. The phisher can then present all of the S credentials back 
to a user, along with lines of a message "To improve our security process and defend your 
account against automated attacks, please select your usernamefpassword from this list of 
credentials." If a user is fooled by such an attack, the phisher obtains the user's credential. 
However, such attacks contain obvious hallmarks to distinguish themselves as malicious 
attacks that are specially fabricated to evade BogusBiter. Therefore, filtering functionalities 
can be added to BogusBiter to confidently detect and disable malicious JavaScript code. 
Note that detecting and filtering of malicious HTML content and JavaScript code is both 
desirable and feasible, and generic solutions can be found in recent research work such as 
SpyProxy [80] and BrowserShield [88]. 
{2} Nonstandard login page: A phisher may use nonstandard login pages to evade Bo-
gusBiter. A phisher may use a login form without the type= "password" HTML attribute, 
may write the entire phishing page in Flash, and may even display a virtual keyboard to 
users. For legitimate websites, using nonstandard login pages is not popular because it may 
cause some problems. For example, non-HTML login forms may create accessibility and 
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usability problems [112], and virtual keyboards are inconvenient to users and increase the 
risk of shoulder surfing attacks [152, 144]. Meanwhile, for phishing sites, using non-HTML 
login forms is also not popular because it makes a phishing attack more evident to users 
or phishing detection tools if its surface-level or deep-level characteristics become deviated 
from that of the targeted legitimate website. For these reasons, standard HTML pages 
remain the central focus of most anti-phishing research work [17, 56, 91, 115, 132]. 
Indeed, BogusBiter can borrow some solutions proposed by other researchers to defend 
against these attacks. For example, one solution can be borrowed from Dynamic Security 
Skins [19]. More specifically, a customized "trusted window in the browser dedicated to 
username and password entry" [19] can also be used by BogusBiter. A user is required 
to copy the entered username and password from the trusted window and paste them to 
the user recognized username and password fields in a login form. Using this solution, 
BogusBiter can intercept an original credential before filling a phishing login form. Since 
BogusBiter only needs to use a user's paste actions to more accurately determine which are 
username and password fields, it can just paste a replaced bogus credential into a phishing 
login form and then do further replacements and submissions behind the screen. It is 
important to note that for BogusBiter, such a "trusted window" only needs to be triggered 
when a login page is classified as a phishing page and its username and password fields 
cannot be confidently identified. Also in such a case, BogusBiter will not be transparent to 
security-conscious users. After a security-conscious user clicks the "Get me out of here!" 
link on the phishing warning page, the user will be provided with the option to either 
really leave the site, or use the "trusted window" to help battle phishers by filling a bogus 
credential and identifying the username and password fields. The power of BogusBiter's 
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offensive line may be reduced because some users may just choose to leave a phishing site, 
but perhaps some security-conscious users are willing to intentionally do some volunteering 
work to help strike back at the phishers. 
(3} CAPTCHA testing attack: A phisher may use a CAPTCHA [3] test to evade Bogus-
Biter. CAPTCHA tests are mainly used to prevent automated registrations, but are seldom 
used in user authentication processes. As shown in our legitimate site experiments, none of 
the legitimate sites asked a user to do a CAPTCHA test when the set size S is less than 10, 
and we actually assumed that false positives happened on all those websites. Introducing 
CAPTCHA testing attacks may decrease the number of phishing victims because the look 
and feel of the phishing site becomes quite different from that of the targeted legitimate 
website, and perhaps some users are unable or unwilling to solve CAPTCHAs [54, 158]. Ig-
noring these disadvantages, a phisher may still want to invoke a CAPTCHA testing attack 
at either a login page or a login response page. 
These attacks may reduce the power of BogusBiter's offensive line, but will not affect 
the defensive line enabled by BogusBiter. If a phisher invokes the CAPTCHA testing at 
the login page, the S - 1 requests generated by BogusBiter contain the same CAPTCHA 
answer as that of the original request; therefore, it is difficult for a phisher to tell which 
credential is entered by a human. If a phisher invokes the CAPTCHA testing at each of 
the S response pages, we recommend letting BogusBiter to make a replacement so that the 
CAPTCHA image on the first received response page is used on all the response pages. 
Therefore, it is still difficult for a phisher to identify the credential entered by a human. 
If there are legitimate websites that suffer from false positives and meanwhile want to use 
CAPTCHA testing on each of their response pages after seeing a small set of credential 
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submissions from BogusBiter, they can simply send back the same CAPTCHA image on 
each of the S response pages thus will not be affected by this approach. 
3. 7 Related Work 
Basically the various client-side anti-phishing techniques can be classified into three different 
approaches. The first approach focuses on building tools or toolbars to enhance the security 
of a login process. Ye and Smith [118] designed a prototype of "Trusted Path" to convey 
relevant trust signals from a Web browser to a human user. Dhamija and Tygar [19] 
proposed "Dynamic Security Skins" to allow a legitimate website to prove its identity in 
a way that is easy for a user to verify but hard for a phisher to spoof. Ross et al. [91] 
designed PwdHash to transparently produce different passwords for different domains, so 
that passwords stolen at a phishing site are not useful at a legitimate website. Wu et al. [115] 
introduced "Web Wallet" to direct an alternative safe path to a user if the user's intended 
website does not match the current website. Yee and Sitaker [119] developed Passpet 
to combine the advantages of several previously devised techniques including petnames, 
password strengthening, and UI customization. Adida [1] proposed BeamAuth to use a 
secret token in a URL fragment identifier as a second factor for Web-based authentication. 
These tools are very helpful, but users must be well trained to use them and must change 
some of their login habits. Usability is critical to the success of anti-phishing tools [16]. 
The second approach focuses on improving the accuracy of automatic phishing detection 
techniques. Chou et al. [17] built SpoofGuard to compute spoof indexes using heuristics 
and to provide warnings for suspected phishing websites. Recent work by Zhang et al. [132] 
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and Garera et al. [35] demonstrate that heuristic-based techniques can correctly identify 
over 90% of phishing pages with about 1% false positives. Fette et al. [26] demonstrated 
that their machine-learning based techniques can correctly identify over 96% of phishing 
emails while mis-classifying only 0.1% of legitimate emails. Many other automatic phishing 
detection tools or toolbars have been developed, and both Firefox 2 and IE 7 have automatic 
phishing detection as a built-in feature. The evaluation of popular automatic phishing 
detection tools, toolbars, and Web browser features can be found in [68, 131, 146, 151]. 
Researchers have also sought to develop nonpreventive anti-phishing approaches. Flor€mcio 
and Herley [30] proposed a password rescue scheme that relies on client-side reporting and 
server-side aggregation to detect and protect stolen credentials. However, this scheme can 
only statistically make a detection decision after several users become victims, and it also 
raises privacy concerns by using an extra server to collect user activity information. Parno 
et al. [84] proposed a Phoolproof anti-phishing mechanism. Although their mechanism elim-
inates reliance on perfect user behavior, a trusted mobile device must be used to perform 
mutual authentications. Birk et al. [11] introduced an "active phishing tracing" method, 
which injects fingerprinted credentials into phishing sites to trace money laundering. Their 
method can support forensic analyses and enforce judicial prosecutions, but it cannot di-
rectly protect phishing victims. Anti-phishing companies such as Cyota (acquired by RSA 
Security) [179] and Markmonitor [167] have also experimented with injecting special cre-
dentials into a phishing site. However, these solutions are less effective than BogusBiter 
because they neither take the browser integration approach nor enable legitimate websites 
to detect victims' stolen credentials. 
Finally, there is a related work in "spamming the spammers," and IBM actually offered 
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a service to bounce unwanted email back to the computers that sent them [156]. The 
objective of a spammer is to send junk emails, and IBM's approach intends to offend 
spammers by consuming their resources. In contrast, the objective of a phisher is to collect 
real credentials, and our approach intends to make it less likely for phishers to succeed by 
building both an offensive line and a defensive line. 
3.8 Summary 
We introduced BogusBiter, a new client-side anti-phishing tool to automatically protect 
vulnerable users by injecting a relatively large number of bogus credentials into phishing 
sites. These bogus credentials hide victims' real credentials, and force phishers to verify their 
collected credentials at legitimate websites. The credential verification actions initiated by 
phishers, in turn, create opportunities for legitimate websites to detect stolen credentials in 
a timely manner. BogusBiter is transparent to users and can be seamlessly integrated with 
current phishing detection and warning mechanisms on Web browsers. We implemented 
BogusBiter as a Firefox 2 extension and evaluated its effectiveness and usability. 
Phishing is a serious security problem today, and phishers are smart, economically moti-
vated, and adaptable. We must therefore actively pursue different approaches and promote 
the cooperation of different solutions. The effectiveness of BogusBiter depends on many 
factors, as we discussed in Section 3.6. But we believe its unique approach will make a 
useful contribution to the anti-phishing research. 
Chapter 4 
Characterizing Insecure JavaScript 
Practices on the Web 
In this chapter, we present our work on characterizing insecure JavaScript practices. 
Insecure JavaScript practices may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but 
they could definitely cultivate the creation of new attack vectors and greatly increase the 
risks of browser-based attacks. We present an execution-based measurement approach and 
the first large-scale measurement study of the insecure JavaScript practices on the Web. 
Our work sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and especially reveals the severity 
and nature of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web. 
4.1 Motivation 
Security is an important aspect of Web engineering, and it should be taken into serious 
consideration in the development of high quality Web-based systems [13, 55, 73, 81, 86]. In 
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many cases, however, security does not receive sufficient attention due to the complexity 
of Web-based systems, the ad hoc processes of system development, and even the fact that 
many designers or developers lack security knowledge on Web development techniques. It is 
not a surprise therefore, that website security breaches are common [22] and Web applica-
tions are more susceptible to malicious attacks than traditional computer applications [93]. 
Browser-based attacks have posed serious threats to the Web in recent years. Exploiting 
the vulnerabilities in Web browsers [15, 88] or Web applications [41, 53], attackers may 
directly harm a Web browser's host machine and user through various attacks such as drive-
by download [79, 87, 107], cross-site scripting [33, 193], cross-site request forgery [7, 181], 
and Web privacy attacks [12, 44]. Attackers may even use browsers to indirectly launch 
large-scale distributed attacks against Web servers [65] or propagate Internet worms [66]. 
Most of these browser-based attacks are closely tied with JavaScript, which is an in-
terpreted programming language most often used for client-side scripting. JavaScript code 
embedded or included in HTML pages runs locally in a user's Web browser, and it is mainly 
used by websites to enhance the interactivity and functionality of their webpages. How-
ever, because JavaScript is equipped with a powerful and diverse set of capabilities in Web 
browsers [28], it has also become the weapon of choice for attackers. 
Modern Web browsers impose two restrictions to enforce JavaScript security: the sand-
box mechanism and the same-origin policy. The former limits JavaScript to execute only 
in a certain environment without risking damage to the rest of the system, while the latter 
prevents JavaScript in a document of one origin from interacting with another document of 
a different origin [28, 180]. Unfortunately, most JavaScript-related security vulnerabilities 
are still the breaches of either of these two restrictions [160]. Some of these vulnerabilities 
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are due to Web browser flaws, but the majority of them have been attributed to the flaws 
and insecure practices of websites [181, 184]. 
A great deal of attention has been paid to the JavaScript-related security vulnerabilities 
such as cross-site scripting [33, 109, 142, 181, 184] that could directly lead to security 
breaches. However, little attention has been given to websites' insecure practices of using 
JavaScript on their webpages. Similar to websites' other insecure practices such as using 
the customers' social security numbers as their login IDs [24], insecure JavaScript practices 
may not necessarily result in direct security breaches, but they could definitely cultivate 
the creation of new attack vectors. 
In this work, we present the first measurement study on insecure practices of using 
JavaScript at different websites. We mainly focus on two types of insecure practices: in-
secure JavaScript inclusion and insecure JavaScript dynamic generation. We define the 
former as the practices of using the src attribute of a <script> tag to directly or indi-
rectly include a JavaScript file from an external domain into the top-level document of a 
webpage. A top-level document is the document loaded from the URL displayed in a Web 
browser's address bar. By "directly", we mean that the <script> tag belongs to the top-
level document, and by "indirectly", we mean that the <script> tag belongs to a sub-level 
frame or iframe document whose origin is the same as that of the top-level document. We 
define the latter as the practices of using dangerous techniques such as the eval() function 
to dynamically generate new scripts. Both types of insecure practices create new vectors 
for attackers to inject malicious JavaScript code into webpages and launch attacks such as 
cross-site scripting and cross-site request forgery. 
The primary objective of our work is to examine the severity and nature of these two 
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types of insecure JavaScript practices on the Web. To achieve this goal, we devised an 
execution-based measurement approach. More specifically, we instrumented the Mozilla 
Firefox 2 Web browser and visited the homepages of 6,805 popular websites in 15 different 
categories. The instrumented Firefox non-intrusively monitors the JavaScript inclusion 
and dynamic generation activities on those webpages, and it precisely records important 
information for offline analysis. 
Our measurement results reveal that insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic gen-
eration practices are widely prevalent among websites. At least 66.4% of the measured 
websites have the insecure practices of including scripts from external domains into the 
top-level documents of their homepages. Over 74.9% of the measured websites use one or 
more types of JavaScript dynamic generation techniques, and insecure practices are quite 
common. For example, eval() function calls exist at 44.4% of the measured websites. Using 
the document.write() method and the innerHTML property is much more popular than 
using the relatively secure method of creating JavaScript elements via DOM (Document 
Object Model) [191] methods. Our results also show that around 94.9% of the measured 
websites register various event handlers on their homepages, implying that the captured 
insecure JavaScript practices in inclusion and dynamic generation are likely conservative 
estimates. 
The main contribution of our work is threefold. First, we introduce a browser instru-
mentation framework that enables us to capture essential JavaScript execution behavior 
on webpages. Not only can this framework measure the insecure JavaScript practices, it 
can also examine other JavaScript execution characteristics such as function call patterns 
and code (de)obfuscation activities. Second, we present a classification method to analyze 
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and classify different types of dynamically generated JavaScript code. By extracting the 
AST (abstract syntax tree) trees of scripts and performing AST signature creation and 
matching, our classification method can effectively assist us in understanding the structural 
information of the hundreds of thousands of dynamically generated scripts. Third, our 
measurement study sheds light on the insecure JavaScript practices and especially reveals 
the severity of insecure JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation practices on the Web. 
Our in-depth analysis further indicates that safe alternatives to these insecure practices do 
exist in common cases. We therefore suggest website developers and administrators pay 
serious attention to these insecure engineering practices and use safe alternatives to avoid 
them. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 explains why the 
two types of JavaScript practices are insecure. Section 4.3 introduces our measurement 
and analysis methodologies. Section 4.4 describes the data set of this study. Section 4.5 
presents and analyzes our measurement results. Section 4.6 reviews related work, and 
finally, Section 4.7 summarizes this work. 
4.2 Background 
In the same-origin policy, the origin of a document is defined using the protocol, domain 
name, and port of the URL from which the document is loaded. It is important to realize 
that this policy does not limit the origin of a script itself. Although JavaScript code cannot 
access another document loaded from a different origin, it can fully access the document 
in which it is embedded or included even when the code has a different origin than the 
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document [28]. Including scripts from an external domain into the top-level document of a 
webpage is very dangerous because it grants the scripts the maximum permissions allowed 
to control the webpage and the browser window. Therefore, if the author of a script file or 
the administrator of a script hosting site is insincere or irresponsible, insecure JavaScript 
inclusion practices could lead to serious security and privacy breaches. Moreover, script 
hosting sites could become attractive targets of attacks, especially when their JavaScript 
files are included by multiple websites. To lower the potential risks, websites should avoid 
external JavaScript inclusion by using internal JavaScript files from the same sites when 
possible. Otherwise if external inclusion is really inevitable, for example some advertising 
sites or traffic analysis sites may necessitate it [82], external included scripts should be 
retrieved using HTTPS connections and should be restricted within a sub-level HTML 
frame or iframe document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document. 
The eval() function takes a string parameter and evaluates it as JavaScript code. This 
function is dangerous because it executes the passed script code with the privileges of the 
function's caller [145]. Therefore, attackers may endeavor to inject malicious code into the 
evaluated string in order to take advantage of this capability. Meanwhile, since scripts 
are dynamically generated and evaluated, it is very challenging to effectively filter out 
maliciously injected code [51, 88, 120]. Eval() should be avoided 1 if at all possible, and its 
safe alternatives should be used [133, 145]. Other JavaScript dynamic generation techniques 
such as using the document.write() function and the innerHTML property also pose similar 
security risks, as discussed in Section 4.5. 
Once attackers have successfully exploited these insecure practices and injected their 
1 Searching "eval is evil" on the Web for many discussions. 
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malicious JavaScript code, they can easily launch severe attacks such as cross-site script-
ing and cross-site request forgery. These attacks can be used to conduct many malicious 
activities such as account hijacking, user behavior tracking, denial of service attacking, 
and website defacing. Therefore, insecure engineering practices of using JavaScript should 
be thoroughly investigated, their risks should be highlighted to Web developers, and safe 
alternatives should be used to avoid them. 
4.3 Methodology 
We devised an execution-based measurement approach to study the insecure JavaScript 
practices on the Web. Our strategy is to first use an instrumented Web browser to obtain 
actual JavaScript execution trace information on different webpages, and then use offiine 
analysis to characterize and understand various JavaScript practices. An alternative ap-
proach is to simply perform static analysis on web pages. However, this approach suffers 
from the problem of undecidability and is unable to precisely determine which scripts will 
be generated and executed. In contrast, our approach allows us to effectively capture the 
dynamics of webpages and JavaScript code in their real runtime environments. Figure 4.1 
gives an overview of our instrumentation framework and analysis toolkit. 
4.3.1 Instrumentation Framework 
To achieve an accurate and efficient measurement, we employed the source code instrumen-
tation technique and instrumented the most popular open source Web browser-Mozilla 
Firefox. Our instrumentation method is similar to program tracing, which is a well-known 
approach for monitoring program behavior and measuring program performance. We fol-
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the instrumentation framework and analysis toolkit. 
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lowed a few rules suggested in [6] to minimize instrumentation overhead. More specifically, 
we attempted to insert less instrumentation code and place the code only at necessary points 
with low execution frequency. 
We mainly instrumented three modules of Firefox 2 source code: the JavaScript engine, 
the content module, and the DOM module. Firefox uses SpiderMonkey as its JavaScript 
engine [183]. SpiderMonkey JavaScript engine is written in C programming language and 
is a relatively independent module in Firefox. The major interface between SpiderMonkey 
and other modules in Firefox is the SpiderMonkey JSAPI [161]. JSAPI facilitates other 
modules in Firefox to use the core JavaScript data types and functions of SpiderMonkey, 
and it also allows other modules to expose some of their objects and functions to JavaScript 
code. 
Inside the SpiderMonkey, our instrumented code written in C consists of three parts. 
First, eight trace logging functions were integrated into the JSAPI interface. These func-
tions facilitate the trace collection in a consistent manner, recording various information 
such as script text, function calls, and event handler registrations. Second, we added code 
to the byte-code interpreter of SpiderMonkey so that we can record the execution informa-
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tion of any global scripts and function scripts. Third, we instrumented the object system 
implementation of Spider Monkey to monitor the calls to the eval() function and collect both 
the calling context information and the evaluated content information. 
The trace files generated in the above instrumentation points enable us to analyze the 
practices of JavaScript inclusion and the practices of JavaScript dynamic generation using 
eval(). We also needed to monitor the practices of other JavaScript dynamic generation 
techniques. Originally we attempted to fulfill this task by still instrumenting inside the 
SpiderMonkey and monitoring the engine's native callbacks to the content and DOM mod-
ules. However, we found that this approach induces high overhead and could only record 
partial information. Therefore, we decided to directly instrument the content module and 
the DOM module of Firefox. 
In the content module of Firefox, we integrated C++ code to measure the other three 
types of JavaScript dynamic generation techniques. We instrumented the document.write() 
method 2 and the method for setting the innerHTML property of an HTML element to track 
their invocations. Both techniques can be used to add new content to an HTML document, 
and the added content may contain new JavaScript code. We also added code to monitor the 
method for replacing, inserting or appending a new DOM element, which could be created by 
using DOM methods such as document.createElement() and document.createTextNode(). 
Our instrumentation code can identify the script type of elements and record their source 
and text information. Other techniques such as the insertAdjacentHTML() method or the 
outerHTML property are supported in the Internet Explorer Web browser only, and we 
cannot measure them in Firefox. 
2 In this work, it also include.s the document.writeln() method. 
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In the DOM module and the content module, we added C++ code to measure various 
event handler registration techniques supported in Firefox. Event handlers can be triggered 
by user interaction or timer events. We collected event handler registration information 
to show that further JavaScript inclusion and execution could happen and our captured 
insecure practices are likely conservative estimates. Event handler registration and other 
aspects of information described above are written into a set of six different trace files to 
assist our offline analysis. 
Since many internal user interface components of Firefox also heavily use JavaScript, 
special care is needed to ensure that the above instrumentation code only records the 
JavaScript execution activities of a visited webpage. Our code checks the JSPrincipals [163] 
information of an object or script to guarantee this requirement. We also ensured that our 
instrumentation code only monitors and records essential information and does not change 
the execution logic of Firefox and Spider Monkey. 
4.3.2 Analysis Toolkit 
We took an offline analysis approach so that we can sufficiently analyze the trace information 
without interfering with the actual measurement process. We developed an offline analysis 
toolkit that consists of a set of tools written in approximately 5,000 lines of Java code, 200 
lines o£ C code, 500 lines of Linux shell script code, and 300 lines of Matlab script code. 
About half of the tools are used for classifying dynamically generated JavaScript code, and 
the others are used for processing trace records and calculating statistical information. The 
detailed description of the JavaScript code classification tools is as follows. 
The motivation for developing these classification tools is to automate the challenging 
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task of understanding a large number of dynamically generated JavaScript code. To achieve 
this goal, we explored the concepts in software engineering and developed an AST (abstract 
syntax tree)-based classification method. As illustrated in Figure 4.1, the key idea is to first 
extract the AST trees of scripts, then create and match AST signatures, and finally merge 
signatures into different categories. We devised such an AST-based approach in that ASTs 
have been demonstrated effective in program understanding [8, 110]. 
The AST tree extraction tool is a standalone C program that embeds the Spider Monkey 
1.7 [183]. This is the same version of the Spider Monkey as used in our instrumented Firefox 
2 Web browser. Therefore, our extraction tool can create a token stream and parse the 
stream into a syntax tree for a script in the same manner as in the instrumented Firefox. 
The tool finally constructs the essential structure of a syntax tree as an AST tree and writes 
the tree into an X1'4L file to facilitate further comparison. 
We applied top-down tree matching techniques to perform AST signature creation and 
matching, and the high-level procedure is illustrated in Figure 4.2. First, an empty AST 
signature set S is initialized. Next, for each AST tree in the XML files, its top N level 
structure is used to generate an AST signature, denoted as thisSig. Then, top-down tree 
comparisons are made to seek a match between the thisSig and an existing signature in the 
set S. If a match exists, this procedure keeps a record of the related information, otherwise, 
the thisSig is added to the set S as a new AST signature. Finally, this procedure returns 
the signature set S as its output. 
To be accurate and representative, an AST signature keeps the name and type informa-
tion of an operator node, but it only keeps the type information of an operand. Top-down 
tree matching techniques can capture the key structural differences between trees, and they 
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SigCreateMatch (XMLfiles, N) 
1. Initialize an empty AST signature set S; 
2. for each AST tree in the XML files do 
3. thisSig=the top N level structure of the AST tree; 
4. if thisSig matches an existing signature in S then 
5. Record the information of this matching; 
6. else 
7. S = S U {thisSig}; 
8. endif 
9. endfor 
10. return the result set S; 
Figure 4.2: High-level AST signature creation and matching procedure. 
have been used in several Web-related projects [89, 126, 128]. The comparison algorithm 
used in line 4 of this procedure is adapted from the STM (simple tree matching) algorithm 
presented in [117]. STM is an efficient top-down tree distance comparison algorithm, and 
our adaptation is to only compare the top N levels of trees. As shown in Section 4.5, such 
an adaptation is effective in striking a good balance between retaining the accuracy and 
reducing the total number of signatures. 
The AST signature categorization tool was developed to further merge AST signatures 
into different categories. We defined categories according to different types of JavaScript ex-
pressions and statements such as arithmetic expressions and assignment statements. Such 
a categorization can help us to understand the use purposes of JavaScript code from a 
programming language perspective. This tool is especially useful for analyzing dynami-
cally generated scripts, most of which have specific use purposes in terms of programming 
language functionality as revealed in our analysis. 
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Category com org gov net edu cc other Total 
arts 417 16 0 27 1 39 0 500 
business 430 7 10 4 0 49 0 500 
computers 432 29 1 21 1 15 1 500 
games 428 13 0 43 0 14 2 500 
health 277 107 41 8 33 30 4 500 
home 415 28 22 14 2 18 1 500 
news 412 24 6 12 3 43 0 500 
recreation 409 19 12 19 0 40 1 500 
reference 116 17 11 4 192 158 2 500 
regional 292 23 21 6 3 152 3 500 
science 209 96 68 8 47 64 8 500 
shopping 479 2 0 2 0 17 0 500 
society 302 84 34 11 3 58 8 500 
sports 403 13 0 21 0 62 1 500 
world 199 15 1 23 0 262 0 500 
Total 5220 493 227 223 285 1021 31 7500 
Uniq-Total 4727 445 170 212 276 950 25 6805 
Table 4.1: Category breakdown by top-level domain. 
4.4 Data Set 
To obtain a representative data set, we followed a similar method as used in [60] and 
selected top websites listed by Alexa.com [136]. We chose 15 categories and then top 500 
sites from each of these categories. Table 4.1 gives the breakdown of 15 categories by DNS 
top-level domain (TLD). Since some sites appear in multiple categories, the total number 
of unique sites is 6,805 in our study. This number is over five times larger than that in [60], 
and we also only visited the homepages of those sites so that we can have a consistent 
measurement. Meanwhile, measuring the insecure JavaScript practices on homepages is 
sufficient to illustrate the severity of the problem. Table 4.1 shows that the majority of the 
6,805 sites come from the .com TLD and the country code (denoted as the cc) TLD. The 
former contributes 4, 727 unique sites and the latter contributes 950 unique sites. 
The execution of JavaScript on a webpage can be roughly divided into two phases: the 
document loading and parsing phase and the event-driven phase [28]. When the document 
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loading and parsing phase ends, the event-driven phase starts and event handlers can be 
asynchronously executed in response to various user interaction and timer events. In our 
study, we developed a browser extension to automatically visit each of the 6,805 webpages 
using our instrumented Firefox Web browser. On each page, our browser extension waits 
for the end of the document loading and parsing phase and then stays in the event-driven 
phase for 10 seconds. Our browser extension has no intention to trigger the execution of any 
specific event handlers on a page. This is because the event handlers registered on different 
webpages are very diverse, and it is difficult to trigger their executions in a consistent 
manner. Therefore, the JavaScript execution data set collected in our measurement study 
covers the whole document loading and parsing phase and 10 seconds of the event-driven 
phase for each of the 6,805 homepages. The data set was collected in the second week of 
July 2008. 
4.5 Results and Analysis 
We present and analyze our measurement results in this section. We first briefly present 
the results on JavaScript presence. Then, we detail the results on the insecure practices 
of JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Finally, we give a short summary of the 
results on event handler registrations. 
4.5.1 Overall JavaScript Presence 
Table 4.2 lists the results of overall JavaScript presence for the 6,805 measured homepages. 
We use JS to represent any JavaScript code, and we use DJS to represent the JavaScript 
code that is dynamically generated by using one of the four dynamic generation techniques 
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Category/ Pages with any JS Pages with 
TLD embedded JS included JS Total DJS 
arts 484(96.8%) 483(96.6%) 491(98.2%) 437(87.4%) 
business 482(96.4%) 473(94.6%) 492(98.4%) 380(76.0%) 
computers 471(94.2%) 465(93.0%) 484(96.8%) 374(74.8%) 
games 471(94.2%) 473(94.6%) 488(97.6%) 375(75.0%) 
health 467(93.4%) 451(90.2%) 481(96.2%) 330(66.0%) 
home 479(95.8%) 471(94.2%) 487(97.4%) 389(77.8%) 
news 477(95.4%) 475(95.0%) 483(96.6%) 430(86.0%) 
recreation 477(95.4%) 467(93.4%) 487(97.4%) 389(77.8%) 
reference 455(91.0%) 443(88.6%) 476(95.2%) 286(57.2%) 
regional 479(95.8%) 457(91.4%) 492(98.4%) 401(80.2%) 
science 421(84.2%) 405(81.0%) 449(89.8%) 274(54.8%) 
shopping 487(97.4%) 486(97.2%) 493(98.6%) 393(78.6%) 
society 441(88.2%) 435(87.0%) 466(93.2%) 329(65.8%) 
sports 492(98.4%) 482(96.4%) 496(99.2%) 456(91.2%) 
world 481(96.2%) 438(87.6%) 489(97.8%) 377(75.4%) 
com 4551 (96.3%) 4504(95.3%) 4629(97.9%) 3838(81.2%) 
org 401(90.1%) 378(84.9%) 422(94.8%) 247(55.5%) 
gov 150(88.2%) 137(80.6%) 160(94.1%) 75(44.1%) 
net 194{91.5%) 189(89.2%) 204{96.2%) 153(72.2%) 
edu 239{86.6%) 223(80.8%) 250{90.6%) 122{44.2%) 
cc 863(90.8%) 817(86.0%) 902(94.9%) 654(68.8%) 
other 23(92.0%) 22(88.0%) 24{96.0%) 9(36.0%) 
All 6421(94.4%) 6270{92.1%) 6591{96.9%) 5098{74.9%) 
Table 4.2: JavaScript presence by category and top-level domain. 
measured in our instrumented Firefox Web browser. The embedded JS indicates that the 
executed JavaScript code is embedded within an HTML document, and the included JS 
indicates that the executed JavaScript code is included from a separate file. 
Overall, JavaScript execution has been widely observed on 6,591(96.9%) homepages. 
Both the JS embedding and JS inclusion are very common, and they are practiced on 6,421 
and 6,270 pages, respectively. The percentage of webpages containing JavaScript execution 
within a category ranges from 89.8% for science to 99.2% for sports, and the percentage 
of webpages containing JavaScript execution within a TLD ranges from 90.6% for .edu to 
97.9% for .com. JavaScript dynamic generation is also very popular, and there are 5,098 
(74.9%) sites containing DJS on their homepages. For the DJS presence within a category, 
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the lowest percentage is 54.8% for science, and the highest percentage is 91.2% for sports. 
For the DJS presence within a TLD, the highest percentage is 81.2% for .com, and the 
lowest percentage is 36.0% for other domains such as .mil and .info. 
4.5.2 Insecure JavaScript Inclusion 
Among all the 6,270 webpages with the included JS, we identify and analyze insecure prac-
tices of JavaScript inclusion. Note that we defined the insecure JavaScript inclusion as the 
practices of using the src attribute of a <script> tag to directly or indirectly include a 
JavaScript file from an external domain into the top-level document of a webpage. Keep-
ing JavaScript code separate from HTMLmarkups is actually a good engineering practice, 
advocated especially in the unobtrusive JavaScript programming paradigm [28, 189]. There-
fore, there is no need to analyze the good practices of including JavaScript files from the 
same host or domain, and we only focus on the insecure inclusion practices. 
4.5.2.1 Results and Analysis 
To our surprise, insecure JavaScript inclusion is very prevalent. Around 66.4% (4,517 out 
of 6,805) of websites directly or indirectly include JavaScript files from external domains 
into the top-level documents of their homepages. Note that our analysis tool applies a 
conservative standard to compare the domain name of a JavaScript file and that of its 
including homepage. Two domain names are regarded as different only if, after discarding 
their top-level domain names (e.g., .com) and the leading name "www" (if existing), they 
do not have any common sub-domain name3 . Therefore, this 66.4% result is basically an 
3 For example, two domain names www.dlsub2.dlsubl.dltld and d2sub3.d2sub2.d2subl.d2tld are re-
garded as different only if the intersection of the two sets {dlsub2, dlsubl} and {d2sub3, d2sub2, d2subl} 
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Figure 4.3: Cumulative distribution of the 4,517 JavaScript file inclusion domains in terms of their 
outdegree values. 
objective estimate of the severity of insecure JavaScript inclusion practices. 
After further analyzing the domain name relationship between JavaScript file inclusion 
sites and JavaScript file hosting sites, we found that those 4,517 sites include JavaScript files 
from a diverse set of 1,985 external domains. We can use a directed graph to characterize 
the domain name relationship between these sites. Different vertices represent different 
domain names, and a direct edge from vertex A to vertex B means that the homepage in 
domain A includes at least one JavaScript file from domain B. Therefore, 4,517 vertices have 
a greater than zero outdegree value, and 1,985 vertices have a greater than zero indegree 
value. 
Figure 4.3 illustrates the CDF (cumulative distribution function) of the 4,517 JavaScript 
file inclusion domains in terms of their outdegree values. We can see that approximately 
43.6% of the 4,517 sites include JavaScript files from at least three external domains. While 
the mean value of outdegree is 3.1, the maximum value of outdegree reaches 24. These 
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Figure 4.4: Cumulative distribution of the 1,985 JavaScript file hosting domains in terms of their 
indegree values. 
results indicate that not only 66.4% of measured sites are at the risk of having their home-
pages under the control of the included JavaScript code, but many of them also face higher 
risks from multiple sources. 
From a different perspective, Figure 4.4 depicts the CDF of the 1,985 JavaScript file 
hosting domains in terms of their indegree values. We can observe two interesting phe-
nomena. On the one hand, JavaScript files in approximately 60.6% of the hosting domains 
are only included by one of our visited homepages. On the other hand, JavaScript files 
in approximately 7.7% of the hosting domains are included by at least 10 of our visited 
homepages, and JavaScript files in 14 sites are even included by at least 100 of our visited 
homepages. The mean value of indegree is 7.2, but the maximum value of indegree reaches 
a very high value of 2,606. After inspecting those 14 high-profile JavaScript file hosting 
domains and many other low-profile domains, we found that a few of them are popular 
traffic analysis service sites and advertising servers. However, most of them are the kind 
of "hidden" sites that provide nothing on their root URLs but just point to some stored 
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JavaScript files using URL paths. Understanding the properties of those sites is beyond the 
scope of this work, but what we need to emphasize is that external JavaScript file hosting 
sites, especially those high-profile ones, create new vectors for large-scale browser-based 
attacks. Even a single compromised JavaScript file could directly cause security breaches 
on thousands of websites. 
Among the 4,517 sites that include JavaScript files from external domains, we also 
observed that 125 sites only use the HTTPS protocol to retrieve JavaScript files and 138 
sites use both the HTTP protocol and the HTTPS protocol to retrieve different JavaScript 
files. In total, there are 263 sites using HTTPS to include scripts from 72 JavaScript file 
hosting sites. These observations imply that some JavaScript file hosting sites do provide 
the secure transmission service for accessing their hosted JavaScript files, and some of our 
measured sites do use this service. However, this secure JavaScript transmission service is 
not popular. Only 3.6% (72 out of 1,985) of the JavaScript file hosting sites provide the 
service, and only 5.8% (263 out of 4,517) of the JavaScript file inclusion sites use the service. 
Also note that HTTPS protects data in transit, but it does not guarantee that a JavaScript 
file is uncompromised in a hosting site. 
In contrast to these 4,517 sites, we did find that there are 324 other sites, in which 
an external included JavaScript file is always restricted within a sub-level HTML frame 
or iframe document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document. This 
observation implies that some sites do limit the control of external included JavaScript 
code within sub-level documents and provide a protection to the top-level documents of 
their homepages. However, such a relatively secure practice is exclusively followed by only 
324 measured sites, and those 4,517 sites still use a very insecure way to include external 
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JavaScript files. 
4.5.2.2 Safe Alternatives to Insecure Inclusion 
Our results show that insecure JavaScript inclusion is widely practiced by the majority 
( 66.4%) of our measured sites. Our in-depth analysis on the domain name relationship 
between JavaScript file inclusion sites and hosting sites further reveals the severity and 
nature of those insecure practices. Although HTTPS and sub-level documents are used 
by a small portion of sites to enhance the security of external JavaScript file inclusion, we 
believe that the majority of measured JavaScript file inclusion sites and hosting sites have 
not paid sufficient attention to the potential risks of insecure JavaScript inclusion. For 
JavaScript file inclusion sites, we suggest them (1) avoid external JavaScript inclusion by 
using internal JavaScript files from the same sites, if at all possible; (2) restrict the permis-
sion of external included scripts by placing them within a sub-level HTML frame or iframe 
document whose origin is different from that of the top-level document, if external inclusion 
is really inevitable; and (3) retrieve external JavaScript files using HTTPS connections, if 
the HTTPS service is available. The third suggestion needs a hosting site to provide the 
HTTPS service for accessing its JavaScript files, but the first two suggestions can be easily 
adopted by JavaScript file inclusion sites. 
4.5.3 Insecure JavaScript Dynamic Generation 
Since 74.9% of measured sites (5,098 out of 6,805) contain DJS scripts on their homepages, 
we now characterize all the DJS scripts based on their generation techniques and analyze 
insecure practices. 
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Category/ eva!- write- innerHTML- DOM-
TLD generated generated generated generated 
arts 258(51.6%) 403(80.6%) 76(15.2%) 83(16.6%) 
business 253(50.6%) 295(59.0%) 73(14.6%) 56(11.2%) 
computers 205(41.0%) 307(61.4%) 55(11.0%) 55(11.0%) 
games 203(40.6%) 327(65.4%) 58(11.6%) 57(11.4%) 
health 190(38.0%) 276(55.2%) 35(7.0%) 34(6.8%) 
home 240(48.0%) 357(71.4%) 57(11.4%) 73(14.6%) 
news 314(62.8%) 412(82.4%) 161(32.2%) 110(22.0%) 
recreation 229(45.8%) 310(62.0%) 67(13.4%) 57(11.4%) 
reference 144(28.8%) 214(42.8%) 44(8.8%) 22(4.4%) 
regional 258(51.6%) 337(67.4%) 97(19.4%) 58(11.6%) 
science 137(27.4%) 234(46.8%) 39(7.8%) 35(7.0%) 
shopping 245(49.0%) 307(61.4%) 37(7.4%) 38(7.6%) 
society 163(32.6%) 283(56.6%) 42(8.4%) 42(8.4%) 
sports 322(64.4%) 424(84.8%) 114(22.8%) 95(19.0%) 
world 212(42.4%) 341(68.2%) 92(18.4%) 55(11.0%) 
com 2359(49.9%) 3359(71.1%) 724(15.3%) 656(13.9%) 
org 109(24.5%) 195(43.8%) 25(5.6%) 22(4.9%) 
gov 32(18.8%) 50(29.4%) 9(5.3%) 9(5.3%) 
net 77(36.3%) 135(63.7%) 26(12.3%) 21(9.9%) 
edu 50(18.1%) 92(33.3%) 17(6.2%) 7(2.5%) 
cc 393(41.4%) 558(58.7%) 130(13.7%) 79(8.3%) 
other 4(16.0%) 7(28.0%) 3(12.0%) 0(0.0%) 
All 3024(44.4%) 4396(64.6%) 934(13.7%) 794(11.7%) 
Table 4.3: DJS presence by category and top-level domain. 
4.5.3.1 DJS Presence by Category and TLD 
Table 4.3 lists the overall DJS presence by category and TLD for the four different DJS 
generation techniques. We can see that the eval() function and the document. write() method 
are widely used on 44.4% and 64.6% of webpages, respectively. In contrast, the innerHTML 
property and the DOM methods (i.e., replacing, inserting or appending a new created script 
element) are only used on 13.7% and 11.7% of web pages, respectively. It is also interesting 
to notice that the categories with the highest DJS presence values are news and sports for all 
the four generation techniques. The TLDs with the highest DJS presence values are .com, 
.net, and country code domains. These results indicate that JavaScript dynamic generation 
is more likely to be used on those sites that have more dynamic contents. 
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4.5.3.2 DJS Instance Summary 
We now examine the generated DJS instances on each webpage. A DJS instance is identified 
in different ways for different generation techniques. For the eval() function, the whole 
evaluated string content is regarded as a DJS instance. Within the written content of the 
document.write() method and the value of the innerHTML property, a DJS instance can be 
identified from three sources: (1) between a pair of <script> and </script> tags; (2) in an 
event handler specified as the value of an HTML attribute such as onclick or onmouseover; 
and (3) in a URL that uses the special j avascript: protocol specifier [28]. For the DOM 
methods, each new script element is identified as a DJS instance. 
Table 4.4 gives a summary of DJS instances for both the document loading and parsing 
phase, denoted as the pre-onload phase, and the event-driven phase, denoted as the post-
onload phase. The two numbers in each table cell represent the data for the pre-onload 
and post-onload phases, respectively. The data in the second row of the table gives the 
total number of DJS instances identified in the two execution phases for the four different 
techniques. The data in the third row of the table gives the total number of webpages on 
which those DJS instances are identified. The IPP in the last three rows of the table stands 
for the "Instance Per Page". 
It is evident that the eval() function generates the largest number of DJS instances 
in both phases (194,676 in the pre-onload phase and 22,632 in the post-onload phase). 
The mean value of IPP for eval-generated DJS instances is 65.2 in the pre-onload phase 
and 62.3 in the post-onload phase. The maximum value of IPP for eval-generated DJS 
instances reaches 2,543 in the pre-onload phase and 6,350 in the post-onload phase. These 
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Summary eva!- write- innerHTML- DOM-
generated generated generated generated 
total number 1946761 674461 287171 13701 
of DJS instances 22632 519 6626 557 
total number 29861 43851 8441 6801 
of pages 363 63 187 260 
mean value 65.21 15.41 34.01 2.01 
of IPP 62.3 8.2 35.4 2.1 
maximum value 25431 10531 50011 131 
of IPP 6350 160 1403 25 
standard deviation 174.41 41.61 184.31 1.1 I 
of IPP 367.2 20.9 134.1 2.7 
Table 4.4: DJS instance summary for pre-onloadlpost-onload phases. 
numbers indicate that eva!() may be misused or abused. The document.write() method also 
generates a large number of DJS instances in the pre-onload phase, but it only generates 
519 DJS instances on 63 pages in the post-onload phase. Calling document.write() in post-
onload phase is usually not desirable because it will overwrite the current document with 
the written content. In both phases, the innerHTML property also generates a large number 
of DJS instances, while DOM methods generate much fewer DJS instances. 
For the four JavaScript dynamic generation techniques, Figures 4.5(a) to 4.5(d) further 
illustrate the cumulative distribution of the webpages in terms of IPP. In each of these four 
figures, the "o" curve is for the pre-onload phase and the "*" curve is for the post-onload 
phase. Note that the total number of pages is different for the two phases (as shown in the 
third row of Table 4.4), and we present the two curves together for ease of comparison. We 
can see that the indication of misuse or abuse is especially evident for the eval() function. 
While the majority (about 60%) of webpages have 10 or less eval-generated DJS instances, 
nearly 17% and 11% of webpages have 100 or more eval-generated DJS instances for the 
pre-onload phase and the post-onload phase, respectively. 
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(a) eval-generated, (b) write-generated, (c) innerHTML-generated, and (d) DOM-generated DJS 
instances. 
4.5.3.3 Structural Analysis of eval-generated DJS 
The prevalence of DJS on various categories of webpages and the high IPP values motivate 
us to further understand the use purposes of the large number of DJS instances. Using our 
JavaScript code classification tools, we now uncover the use purposes of eval-generated DJS 
instances in terms of programming language functionality. 
From the total 217,308 (both the pre-onload phase and the post-onload phase) eva!-
generated DJS instances, 217,308 AST trees are extracted by our AST tree extraction tool. 
The maximum height of these AST trees is 19. Figure 4.6 shows the cumulative distribution 
0.9 
O.B 
0.7 
* 
;, 0.6 
~ 0 0.5 
c: 
0 ti 0.4 
e 
lL 
0.1 
127 
Figure 4.6: Cumulative distribution of the AST trees in terms of the height of an AST tree. 
of the AST trees in terms of the height of an AST tree. Nearly 90% of AST trees have 
a height less than or equal to 4. Therefore, we selected N = 4 as the input parameter 
(Figure 4.2) and used the top-four level structure of AST trees to create and match AST 
signatures. A total number of 647 AST signatures are created and matched from the 217,308 
AST trees. These 647 AST signatures capture the essential structural information of the 
217,308 AST trees, and they greatly facilitate our further analysis. Using more levels of 
AST tree structure is unnecessary because lower-level AST tree nodes only contain less 
important structural information. 
Finally, AST signatures with the same programming language functionality are merged 
into the same category by using our AST signature categorization tool. For example, two 
AST signatures representing two types of function calls with different number or type of 
parameters are merged into the same function calls category. Table 4.5 lists the final 17 
categories of DJS instances classified from the 647 AST signatures, and in turn from the 
217,308 DJS instances. 
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Category Presence Number of Average 
in Pages DJS instances DJS length 
parse error 20(0.7%) 111(0.05%) 1175.5 
empty content 124(4.1%) 291(0.13%) 0.0 
simple expression 1209(40.0%) 134251(61.8%) 13.9 
arithmetic expression 12(0.4%) 158(0.1%) 67.9 
relational expression 79(2.6%) 3246(1.5%) 31.7 
logical expression 159(5.3%) 3249(1.5%) 75.8 
object/array literal 265(8.8%) 4798(2.2%) 623.0 
other expression 126(4.2%) 5789(2.7%) 18.5 
variable declarations 98(3.2%) 411(0.2%) 586.0 
function declarations 1157(38.3%) 1929(0.9%) 13380.7 
assignment statements 1289( 42.6%) 42015(19.3%) 51.9 
function calls 527(17.4%) 2733(1.3%) 368.9 
method calls 561(18.6%) 2062(0.9%) 75.9 
object/array creations 29(1.0%) 212(0.1%) 41.3 
conditional statements 181(6.0%) 9371(4.3%) 519.1 
try-catch statements 1075(35.5%) 4127(1.9%) 51.7 
mixed statements 910(30.1%) 2555(1.2%) 6884.1 
Table 4.5: The 17 categories of eval-generated DJS instances. 
We can see that 0.05% of the DJS instances have parse error when AST trees are ex-
tracted, and 0.13% of the DJS instances have empty content. The majority (around 98.6%) 
of the eval-generated DJS instances are classified into the 14 categories from simple expres-
sian to try-catch statements. The DJS instances in these 14 categories all have specific use 
purposes in terms of programming language functionality. Only 1.2% of the DJS instances 
have mixed programming language functionalities, and they are classified into the last cat-
egory of mixed statements. The generated DJS instances in the last 15 categories are either 
various expressions (from simple expression to other expression) or various statements (from 
variable declarations to mixed statements). In general, a JavaScript expression is used only 
to produce a value, while a JavaScript statement normally has side effects and is often used 
to accomplish some tasks. 
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4.5.3.4 Safe Alternatives to eval() 
To further understand whether using eval() is necessary in these different categories, we 
randomly sampled and inspected both the content and the calling context of 700 DJS 
instances. We sampled 200 DJS instances from the simple expression category and 200 DJS 
instances from the assignment statements category. These two categories have the largest 
numbers of DJS instances, accounting for 61.8% and 19.3%, respectively, of all the eval-
generated DJS instances. The remaining 300 DJS instances are sampled from the other 15 
categories, with each of them contributing 20 instances. 
In at least 70% of the sampled cases, the eval() function is misused or abused while 
safe alternatives can be easily identified. Here we illustrate three representative sampled 
cases. The first one is: this.homePos = eval("O" + this.dirType + this.dim), in which a 
string simple expression "0-500" is generated. Indeed, such a kind of string concatenation 
directly generates a string value, and using eval() is redundant. The second one is: var 
ff_nav=eval("nav_"+tt[i][1]), in which a variable name "nav_20912" is dynamically accessed. 
A safe alternative is using the JavaScript window object to directly access the variable: var 
ff_nav=window["nav_"+tt[i][1]]. The third one is: var responses = eval(o.responseText), 
in which the response content of an XMLHttpRequest [192] is directly evaluated. This 
practice is used in many of our sampled cases to convert a responseText into a JSON 
object. However, since malicious JavaScript code could be injected into the responseText, 
it would be better to use a JSON parser rather than the eval() function to perform such 
a transformation [162]. The other 30% of the sampled cases usually have complex calling 
context, so we do not further identify their safe alternatives. 
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Technique Presence Number of Avg. Main usage 
and Type in Pages DJS instances length 
jscode 4000 26125 77 JS inclusion 
write eventhandler 1773 38650 39 function call 
jsprotocol 501 3190 45 function call 
jscode 120 503 262 JS inclusion 
innerHTML eventhandler 747 31267 60 function call 
jsprotocol 336 3573 33 function call 
DOM src 779 1866 - JS inclusion text 33 61 623 assignment 
Table 4.6: Structural analysis of DJS instances generated by the document. write() method, inner-
HTML property, and DOM methods. 
We suggest that eval() should be avoided if at all possible. In addition to the safe 
alternatives exemplified above, DOM methods can be generally used to generate and execute 
various JavaScript statements. 
4.5.3.5 Structural Analysis of Other Types of DJS 
As mentioned before, the DJS instances generated by the document.write method() and the 
innerHTML property are identified from three different sources. We use jscode to present 
a DJS instance identified between a pair of <script> and </script> tags, use eventhandler 
to represent a DJS instance identified in an event handler, and use jsprotocol to represent a 
DJS instance identified in a javascript: protocol URL. The DJS instances generated by 
the DOM methods are specified in either the src attribute or the text attribute of a script 
element. Table 4.6 gives the structural analysis results of the DJS instances generated by 
these three dynamic generation techniques. The main usage of each type of DJS instance 
is summarized in the last column of the Table 4.6. 
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4.5.3.6 Safe Alternatives to jscode Generation via document.write() and in-
nerHTML 
For the eventhandler and jsprotocol DJS instances generated by document. write() and in-
nerHTML, their usages are relatively safe. When new content is added to a document, event 
handlers are directly specified on various elements of the newly-added content to respond to 
various events. The j avascript: protocol scripts are often used on links to execute some 
statements without loading a new document. 
What we emphasize is that generating jscode using document.write() and innerHTML is 
not desirable. For document.write(), the generated jscode is immediately executed. Multiple 
document.write() calls can be used to construct a jscode, and document.write() calls can 
be nested. All these factors make the filtering of write-generated malicious JavaScript code 
a very challenging task [120]. However, our results show that 26,125 instances of write-
generated jscode are identified on a large number of 4,000 homepages. For innerHTML, 
the generated jscode is recognized by a browser, but it is not necessarily executed. For 
example, Firefox does not directly execute a jscode generated by innerHTML. In Internet 
Explorer, the defer attribute and some tricks need to be used to execute an innerHTML-
generated jscode, but this practice is also not recommended due to potential script-injection 
attacks [173]. Fortunately, only 503 instances of this practice are identified on 120 pages as 
shown in Table 4.6. 
The best practice is to use DOM methods to dynamically generate JavaScript code. 
Using DOM methods (such as createElement() and createTextNode()) to create JavaScript 
elements explicitly declares that the new elements are scripts. This practice can enable 
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potential Web content protection mechanisms such as those presented in [51, 88, 120] to 
accurately define security policies and weed out potential malicious JavaScript code. Un-
fortunately, only 1,927(1,866 plus 61) instances of this practice are identified. 
Our results show that the main usage of jscode generated by document.write() and 
innerHTML is for including other JavaScript files (denoted as JS inclusion in Table 4.6). 
Indeed, by specifying the src attribute of a script element, DOM methods fit well for 
such a usage. By specifying the text attribute of a script element, DOM methods can 
also be used to generate and execute various statements such as assignment statements or 
function calls, thus safely replacing the relatively insecure practices of jscode generation via 
document.write() and innerHTML. 
4.5.4 Event Handler Registration 
Our measurement results show that event handler registrations occurred on 6,451(94.9%) 
pages in the pre-onload phase, with an average of 108.2 registrations per page and a maxi-
mum of 5,074 registrations per page. Event handler registration occurred on 1,767(26.0%) 
pages in the post-onload phase, with an average of 61.4 registrations per page and a max-
imum of 2,229 registrations per page. These results include majority event types (e.g., 
event attributes of HTML tags, timer events, and XMLHttpRequest events) and event reg-
istration techniques supported in Firefox. The execution of event handlers may trigger 
further JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation, implying that our captured insecure 
JavaScript practices are likely conservative estimates. 
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4.6 Related Work 
To the best of our knowledge, there is no directly related work on characterizing the insecure 
practices of JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Therefore, we only briefly review 
some JavaScript related measurement studies. Krishnamurthy and Wills [60] measured the 
homepages of 1,158 unique sites selected from Alexa.com [136] to study the content delivery 
tradeoffs in Web access. The focus of their study is on the performance impact of extraneous 
content, and their results show that JavaScript is often used on popular webpages to retrieve 
extraneous content such as images and advertisements. 
In the investigation of malware, several execution-based measurement studies [79, 87, 
107] have been conducted to identify malicious webpages that contain code (in many cases, 
JavaScript code) for exploiting Web browser vulnerabilities and installing malware. Instead 
of targeting at malicious sites, our focus in this work is on legitimate websites' insecure 
JavaScript practices. 
4.7 Summary 
In this work, we presented the first measurement study on insecure practices of using 
JavaScript on the Web. We focused on investigating the severity and nature of insecure 
JavaScript inclusion and dynamic generation. Through an instrumented Mozilla Firefox 2 
Web browser, we visited the homepages of 6,805 popular websites in 15, different categories. 
We found that at least 66.4% of the measured websites have the insecure practices of includ-
ing JavaScript files from external domains into the top-level documents of their homepages. 
Our in-depth analysis on the domain name relationship between JavaScript file inclusion 
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sites and hosting sites further reveals the severity and nature of those insecure practices. 
Our measurement results on JavaScript dynamic generation show that the "evil" function 
eval() was called on 44.4% of the measured homepages, and the document.write() method 
and the innerHTML property were also used to generate JavaScript code. Our AST-based 
structural analysis on various DJS instances further uncovers their usages with respect to 
programming language functionality. Our analysis indicates that in common cases, safe 
alternatives do exist for both the insecure JavaScript inclusion and insecure JavaScript 
dynamic generation. Since Web-based attacks have become more common and damaging 
in recent years, we suggest website developers and administrators pay serious attention to 
these insecure JavaScript practices and use safe alternatives to avoid them. In the future, we 
will measure insecure JavaScript practices on more specific types of websites and webpages. 
We will also investigate whether other insecure J avaScript practices exist on the Web. 
Chapter 5 
Secure and Convenient Kiosk 
Browsing 
In this chapter, we present our work on secure and convenient kiosk browsing. Many 
people use public computers provided in kiosk environments to browse the Web. Unfor-
tunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own computers. 
We present a simple approach that enables an extended browser on a mobile device and 
a regular browser on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session. Using 
this approach, a user can securely perform sensitive interactions on the mobile device and 
conveniently perform other browsing interactions on the public computer. 
5.1 Motivation 
Web browsing has become such an integral part of our everyday lives that we use browsers 
to perform many important tasks such as banking, shopping, and bill-paying. To facilitate 
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ubiquitous Web access, many kiosk environments such as cafes, airport lounges, and hotel 
business centers provide people with Internet-connected public computers. These public 
computers often have high-speed network connections. They are also convenient to use 
since they normally have full-size keyboards and large displays. People who do not own a 
computer or carry a laptop with them frequently use these public computers to browse the 
Web. 
Unfortunately, public computers are usually far less trustworthy than peoples' own com-
puters. By "trustworthy", we mean that it is less likely that malware or spyware has been 
installed on a computer to log user input, steal account information, and even secretly 
hijack a secure (HTTPS) Web browsing session to make fraudulent transactions. Public 
computers are used by many people to run different applications and visit various websites; 
consequently, it is very likely for them to be infected with malware or spyware. Simply 
searching "public computer security" online, we can find numerous articles suggesting that 
people should not use public computers to perform sensitive activities. For example, Mi-
crosoft suggests that to be really safe, a user should not enter any sensitive information into 
a public computer [134]. 
To secure kiosk computing environments, researchers have proposed a number of so-
lutions [18, 29, 36, 49, 70, 71, 72, 83, 84, 92, 98, 99, 113]. Most of these solutions use a 
trusted mobile device such as a PDA (Personal Digital Assistant) or a mobile phone to 
enhance the security of kiosk computing environments, and we refer to them as FDA-based 
solutions. Mobile devices are favored by PDA-based solutions because (1) they are more 
portable than desktop and laptop computers, and (2) they are generally more trustworthy 
than public computers. Nevertheless, using small user interfaces on mobile handheld devices 
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is inherently difficult [108]. 
Many of these PDA-based solutions focus on specific objectives such as securing appli-
cation or data access [83, 99], securing user authentication or input [18, 70, 72, 84, 113], and 
verifying software integrity [36], so they cannot be easily adopted to secure an entire Web 
browsing session. Some solutions do have the objective of securing an entire kiosk browsing 
session [49, 71, 92, 98], but they suffer from a few drawbacks that limit their practical use. 
In this work, we propose SessionMagnifier, a simple approach to secure and convenient 
kiosk browsing. SessionMagnifier also relies on a trusted mobile device and is a PDA-
based solution. However, our position is that with the support of a trusted mobile device 
(referred to as FDA), a solution to the problem of securing Web browsing on an untrusted 
public computer (referred to as PC) should, in essence, strive to synthesize the usability 
advantages of a PC and the security advantages of a PDA. Otherwise, a user can simply 
take the security risks of only using a PC, or a user can simply tolerate the inconvenience 
of only using a PDA with its small keyboard and display. Note that we use the term PDA 
to represent either a mobile phone or a PDA in this chapter, and we expect people to 
eventually use our solution on mobile phones which are more popular than PDAs. 
SessionMagnifier is designed as a browser extension, and the key idea is to enable an 
extended browser on a PDA and a regular browser on a PC to collaboratively support a 
Web session. After a user types in the address of a website and initiates a Web session from 
the PDA, the extended browser on the PDA accurately synchronizes a modified copy of its 
latest webpage document to a regular browser on the PC. The copied webpage document 
is modified to achieve accurate webpage rendering on the PC browser, to track a user's 
interaction with the same webpage on the PC browser, and to prevent sensitive information 
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from leaking to the PC. 
This solution is simple and practical because a user only needs to carry a trusted mobile 
device and install a SessionMagnifier extension to the device's Web browser - no third-
party proxy is needed, no installation or configuration on an untrusted computer is needed, 
no Web server modification is needed, and no extra cryptographic key exchange is needed. 
SessionMagnifier provides a strong security guarantee because end-to-end security is directly 
established between a trusted mobile device and a remote Web server; meanwhile, simple 
and explicit communication interfaces are defined to enforce strong isolation between a 
PDA and a PC. SessionMagnifier enables a user to fully take advantage of the convenience 
of using a PC. This is because only very sensitive interactions such as entering username and 
password need to be directly performed from the PDA while all other browsing interactions 
can be conveniently performed from the PC. 
We implemented SessionMagnifier for Mozilla's Fennec mobile browser [171]. We in-
stalled Fennec and SessionMagnifier on a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet and conducted evalu-
ations on usability, performance, and feasibility. Our evaluation and analysis demonstrate 
that the proposed simple solution can be practically used to support secure and convenient 
Web browsing on untrusted public computers. 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.2 reviews related work. 
Section 5.3 details the design of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.4 describes the implementation 
of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.5 analyzes the security of SessionMagnifier. Section 5.6 
presents the usability, performance, and feasibility evaluation of SessionMagnifier. Finally, 
Section 5.7 summarizes this work. 
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5.2 Related Work 
Balfanz and Felten [5] introduced a splitting-trust paradigm to divide an application between 
a small trusted mobile device and a bigger, more powerful, but possibly untrusted computer. 
SessionMagnifier is inspired by this paradigm; however, we do not split a browser but instead 
enable an extended browser on a trusted mobile device and a regular browser on an untrusted 
computer to collaboratively support a Web session. The splitting-trust paradigm has also 
inspired many other kiosk computing solutions that rely on a trusted mobile device. We 
classify these solutions into four categories based on their different objectives. 
5.2.1 Securing Application or Data Access 
Oprea et al. [83] proposed a three-party secure remote terminal architecture to enable users 
to access their sensitive home computing environment via a trusted mobile device and an 
untrusted terminal. This three-party architecture is based on a thin-client VNC (Virtual 
Network Computing) remote display system [90], in which a VNC server can update the 
framebuffer displayed on a VNC client. Sharp et al. [99] proposed a VNC-based thin-client 
architecture to support secure access to unmodified applications. This architecture is similar 
to the three-party architecture [83], but it provides additional mechanisms to obfuscate 
the content displayed on an untrusted display. These VNC-based secure application or 
data access solutions work at the framebuffer level with high overhead, so they cannot be 
naturally adopted to support smooth Web interactions. In addition, trusted VNC servers 
must be deployed in these solutions. 
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5.2.2 Securing User Authentication or Input 
Parno et al. [84] built a Phoolproof phishing prevention system that uses a trusted mo-
bile device to perform mutual authentication between a user and a website. Mannan and 
Oorschot [70] proposed the MP-Auth protocol, in which a trusted mobile device turns a 
long-term password into a one-time password via the public key of an intended server; 
therefore, a user's long-term password will not be revealed to phishing sites or untrusted 
computers. McCune et al. [72] proposed a BitE framework that leverages the features 
of TPM (Trusted Platform Module) [187] to establish an encrypted input tunnel from a 
trusted mobile device to an application running on a TPM-equipped untrusted computer. 
Clarke et al. [18] and Wu et al. [113] designed protocols that rely on both a trusted third-
party proxy and a trusted mobile device to secure authentication on untrusted computers. 
In addition, Florencio and Herley [29] proposed approaches to secure password input on 
untrusted computers without using mobile devices. All these solutions focus on securing 
user authentication or input, so they are not directly applicable for securing Web browsing 
sessions. 
5.2.3 Verifying Software Integrity 
Garriss et al. [36] built a system that uses a mobile device to establish trust in a kiosk 
computing environment. This system employs both a TPM [187] module equipped on a 
kiosk computer and an integrity attestation server of the kiosk, and it focuses on verifying 
the identity and integrity of software loaded on a public computer before revealing sensi-
tive information to the computer. However, our SessionMagnifier focuses on securing Web 
browsing sessions on potentially untrusted public computers. 
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5.2.4 Securing Web Browsing Sessions 
A few kiosk computing solutions share the same objective with our SessionMagnifier: secur-
ing Web browsing sessions. Ross et al. [92] proposed a composable secure proxy architecture 
to provide secure multi-modal access to Web services from any device. A similar proxy-
based architecture called Delegate [49] was proposed to enable users to access Web services 
from untrusted computers. In these solutions, essentially it is the browser on an untrusted 
computer that accesses remote Web servers; meanwhile, secure proxies perform content and 
control filtering functionalities. Two main obstacles impede the adoption of these proxy-
based solutions. First, secure third-party proxies must be widely deployed, well managed, 
and fully trusted by users. Second, to secure Web browsing, a proxy must use very com-
plicated and comprehensive rules to validate requests, remove sensitive content, maintain 
user information, and manage session information such as HTTP cookies. 
Margolin et al. [71] introduced a Guardian framework that uses a PDA as a proxy for 
all interactions between an untrusted computer and remote Web servers. Guardian uses 
LWP::UserAgent Perl module to interact with remote servers, and uses the HTTP::Daemon::SSL 
module to interact with the untrusted public computer. This framework eliminates there-
quirement of using secure third-party proxies by moving their content and control filtering 
functionalities to a PDA. However, since it is still the browser on the untrusted computer 
that accesses remote Web servers, this solution does not reduce the inherent complexity of 
proxy-based solutions. Our SessionMagnifier directly uses the Web browser on a trusted 
mobile device to access remote Web servers, so it provides strong security assurances and 
greatly reduces the complexity of content and control filtering. 
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Recently, Sharp et al. [98] proposed a split-trust browsing architecture to explore split-
ting trust at the HTML level for Web applications. However, this architecture has three 
drawbacks that limit its practical application. First, its critical component the RDC (Re-
mote Device Communication) agent must be installed on an untrusted computer. Second, 
its end-to-end security between a trusted mobile device and a remote Web server depends on 
an extra authentication and key-exchange process coordinated by the RDC agent. Third, 
it assumes that either Web applications are explicitly written or secure HTML-rewriting 
proxies are used to support split-trust browsing. In contrast, our SessionMagnifier is much 
simpler and more practically applicable - nothing needs to be installed or configured on 
an untrusted computer, end-to-end security between a trusted mobile device and a remote 
Web server is ensured by existing HTTPS connections, no third-party proxy is needed, and 
no modification needs to be made to existing Web applications. 
5.3 Design 
In this section, we first use a motivating example to illustrate the use of SessionMagnifier in a 
kiosk browsing environment. We then define the threat model and assumptions under which 
SessionMagnifier operates. Finally, we present the architecture design of SessionMagnifier. 
5.3.1 A Motivating Example 
Alice goes on a trip without carrying her laptop, but she wants to bid an item at eBay.com. 
During the last hours of the bidding, she needs to check the latest bidding status and make 
appropriate adjustments as necessary. Alice takes a PDA (or a mobile phone) with her, but 
she feels uncomfortable to continuously use the small keyboard and display of the PDA. She 
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Figure 5.1: Kiosk browsing environment. 
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finds a public computer in an Internet cafe, but she has concerns about the security and 
privacy of using this public computer to log into her online accounts. Figure 5.1 illustrates 
such a kiosk browsing environment, and the problem here is how Alice can securely and 
conveniently sign into her online accounts and make transactions. 
Fortunately, Alice can use a simple SessionMagnifier extension installed on the PDA 
browser to solve the problem. Alice first uses the PDA to connect to the Internet and signs 
into her eBay account from the PDA browser. The Internet connection is established either 
directly via Wi-Fi or indirectly via a USB-based or Bluetooth-based virtual network adapter 
of the public computer. Next, Alice turns on the SessionMagnifier extension installed on 
the PDA browser. She then types a URL address displayed by SessionMagnifier into the 
address bar of a regular PC browser and enables the connection between the PDA browser 
and the PC browser. 
Starting from this point, SessionMagnifier synchronizes new webpage content from the 
PDA browser to the PC browser, and Alice can conveniently view and interact with the 
same webpage using the PC browser. Her interactions initiated from the PC browser will 
be sent back to SessionMagnifier and then securely sent out to eBay.com. Alice can verify 
and confirm any important interactions initiated from the PC browser, and she can also 
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use an "Auto On" toolbar button to bypass this verification and confirmation step for less 
important interactions. Meanwhile, using a "Sync On" toolbar button, Alice can switch on 
or off the synchronization on each specific web page so that she can input and view sensitive 
information only on the PDA browser. Alice may continue the bidding process until she 
wins or loses the auction. 
5.3.2 Threat Model and Assumptions 
In a kiosk browsing environment, attackers are interested in stealing a user's sensitive infor-
mation such as username and password to commit identity theft. They are also interested 
in hijacking a user's browsing session to generate fraudulent transactions [43]. More specif-
ically, attackers may use the following five types of attacks to achieve their goals. 
• input stealing - acquire sensitive input information by using software or hardware 
key loggers. 
• output stealing - acquire sensitive output information by using screen or window 
capture software. 
• session information stealing - acquire sensitive session information such as HTTP 
cookies and session IDs through malware or spyware. 
• session hijacking - (secretly) control a session and make fraudulent transactions 
through malware. 
• network attacks- perform the above stealing and hijacking attacks at the network-
level. 
We define the capabilities of an attacker at two different levels: host-level and network-
level. With host-level capabilities, an attacker can install malicious hardware and software 
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on a public computer and perform the first four types of attacks listed above. With network-
level capabilities, an attacker can eavesdrop or tamper with network messages to perform 
passive or active network attacks. 
We consider three typical types of Web sessions: pure HTTPS sessions, pure HTTP 
sessions, and hybrid sessions. In a pure HTTPS session, a Web server uses SSL/TLS 
cryptographic protocols to protect all important interactions with an authenticated user, 
and a user can also authenticate the Web server by inspecting its certificate. In a pure 
HTTP session, a Web server does not provide any transport layer security protection. In 
a hybrid session, a Web server uses SSL/TLS cryptographic protocols to protect the user 
authentication process, but it uses both HTTP and HTTPS to serve an authenticated user. 
Pure HTTPS sessions are supported by high-security institutions such as banks and credit 
card companies. Hybrid sessions are used by service providers such as Yahoo Mail. Pure 
HTTP sessions are used by websites that provide less sensitive services. For pure HTTPS 
sessions, we grant an attacker both the host-level and network-level capabilities. For hybrid 
and pure HTTP sessions, we only grant an attacker the host-level capabilities. Recently, 
solutions such as SessionLock [2] and ForceHTTPS [42] have been proposed to enhance the 
security of hybrid sessions in potentially hostile network environments. For hybrid sessions, 
assuming the success of these solutions, we may further grant an attacker the network-level 
capabilities. 
Like previous studies, we assume that a user's mobile device is a priori secure. In our 
design, the simple and explicit communication interfaces between a PDA and a PC further 
protect the security of the PDA. Given the prevalence of phishing attacks [20, 25], we also 
assume that a user is security conscious and is able to discern phishing through, for example, 
146 
Extended PDA Browser Regular PC Browser 
SessionMagnifier Initial Webpage 
-1 Request Processing J head 
Regular f Webpage 
J Request Authentication! HTTP Requests r ~ Ajax-Snippet ~ ~. ~~~ ·------------------------------------------· L+ i B HTIP Responses • Control 
I I 
....___.,--.... i body 
+ TCP Connection 
-+j Response Generation J ~
Figure 5.2: SessionMagnifier high-level architecture. 
inspecting a Web server's certificate validated by the PDA browser. 
5.3.3 Architecture Design 
Figure 5.2 illustrates the high-level architecture of SessionMagnifier. A user simply installs 
the SessionMagnifier extension on a PDA browser; nothing needs to be installed or config-
ured on a regular PC browser, and no third-party proxy is required. At the network layer, 
the PC can access the PDA via TCP connections. At the application layer, the regular 
PC browser communicates with the extended PDA browser using the HTTP protocol. A 
user directly uses the PDA browser to establish a Web session with a remote Web server. 
The SessionMagnifier extension is responsible for synchronizing the latest HTML webpage 
document from the PDA browser to the PC browser, and it is also responsible for accepting 
interactions initiated from the PC browser and securely performing these interactions on 
the PDA browser. 
The simple architecture of SessionMagnifier leverages two important features of mod-
ern Web browsers: end-user extensibility [147, 157] and Ajax (Asynchronous JavaScript 
147 
and XML) technology [135]. End-user extensibility allows the SessionMagnifier browser 
extension to maximize its capabilities and seamlessly integrate its functionalities with mod-
ern browsers. Ajax technology enables a regular PC browser to periodically send HTTP 
requests to SessionMagnifier and maintain the communication with the PDA browser. End-
user extensibility is well supported by popular browsers such as Firefox [147] and Internet 
Explorer [157], and Ajax technology has received wide acceptance among all popular Web 
browsers [135]. Therefore, SessionMagnifier can be practically implemented and deployed 
on popular Web browsers. 
In a kiosk browsing environment, establishing TCP connections between a PDA and a 
PC is feasible, and having Internet access for a PDA is also feasible. Using Wi-Fi, a user 
can easily establish both types of network connections. If Wi-Fi is not available, a user 
can use USB or Bluetooth to enable TCP connections between a PDA and a PC; mean-
while, using various Internet access over USB or Internet access over Bluetooth techniques 
(e.g., Microsoft ActiveSync [168]), a user can also easily obtain Internet access for a PDA. 
Therefore, SessionMagnifier can be practically used in kiosks. 
The SessionMagnifier extension consists of four main components: connection control, 
request authentication, request processing, and response generation. In addition, it also 
contains an initial webpage, which is an HTML file to be sent to a regular PC browser. We 
still use the previous motivating example to describe the roles played by the four components 
and the initial webpage in a kiosk browsing session. 
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5.3.3.1 Connection Control 
When Alice turns on the SessionMagnifier extension installed on the PDA browser, the 
connection control component starts to work. This component uses a server socket to 
listen for new incoming connections from a PC. The server socket is TCP-based so that 
connections can be directly made from a regular PC browser. After the server socket binds 
to the IP address (e.g., 192.168.1.3, assigned by the kiosk LAN network) and a TCP port 
(e.g., 3000) of the PDA, the connection control component will display the URL address of 
SessionMagnifier (e.g., http:/ /192.168.1.3:3000) to Alice. 
Establishing the connection from a PC browser to the PDA browser is just like visiting 
a regular website. Alice simply types the URL address of SessionMagnifier into the address 
bar of the regular PC browser and sends out an initial HTTP request. When the connection 
control component of SessionMagnifier receives this initial HTTP request, it displays the 
source IP address of the request in a dialog box and asks Alice to confirm this connection. 
This confirmation dialog box is employed to help Alice make sure that the initial connection 
request does come from her PC. 
If Alice accepts this initial connection request, the connection control component will 
read the initial webpage and send it to the PC browser. In an analogy, the initial webpage 
of SessionMagnifier is like the homepage of a regular website. The body of the initial 
webpage is very simple. It provides a simple form to ask Alice to submit a one-time 
password. The head of the initial page mainly contains Ajax-Snippet, which is a set of 
XHR (XMLHttpRequest) [135] related objects and functions. After the initial webpage 
is loaded on the PC browser, Ajax-Snippet will periodically send out "POST" type XHR 
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polling requests to the connection control component of SessionMagnifier. Ajax-Snippet 
sends an XHR polling request and the connection control component returns a response; 
therefore, all further communication between the PC browser and the PDA browser can be 
automatically carried out. 
If Ajax-Snippet receives a response message that contains a new webpage document, 
it will smoothly update the head and body of the initial webpage to keep the webpage 
content on the PC browser synchronized with that on the PDA browser. Meanwhile, Ajax-
Snippet always resides in the head of the current webpage on the PC browser to maintain 
the communication with the PDA browser. Ajax-Snippet uses "POST" type XHR polling 
requests so that any interaction information such as link clicking or form filling on the PC 
browser can be directly piggybacked onto an XHR polling request and sent to the PDA 
browser. 
5.3.3.2 Request Authentication 
The one-time password mentioned above is generated and stored by SessionMagnifier on 
the PDA browser. On the PC browser, the same password submitted by Alice will not 
be transmitted to the PDA; it is just stored and used by Ajax-Snippet to compute the 
HMAC (keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code) [153] for each XHR polling request. 
Before sending an XHR polling request, Ajax-Snippet computes an HMAC for the header 
and content of the request and appends the HMAC as an additional parameter of the 
request-URI [27]. 
When the connection control component of SessionMagnifier receives an XHR polling 
request, it will forward the request to the request authentication component. The request 
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authentication component will then compute a new HMAC for the received request (discard-
ing the additional HMAC parameter) and compare the computed HMAC with the HMAC 
embedded in the request-URI. If the two HMACs are identical, the XHR polling request is 
regarded as valid and is further forwarded to the request processing component. We use 
such a request authentication mechanism to protect the browsing session on the PDA and 
to ensure that SessionMagnifier only processes the requests sent from Alice's PC browser. 
5.3.3.3 Request Processing 
When the request processing component receives a valid X:ijR polling request, it will perform 
two tasks: new content checking and interaction information merging. The former is to 
check whether new webpage document on the PDA browser needs to be synchronized to 
the PC browser. The later is to check whether a user's interaction information on the PC 
browser needs to be merged to the PDA browser. 
SessionMagnifier keeps a timestamp for the latest webpage document on the PDA 
browser. A timestamp used by SessionMagnifier is the number of milliseconds since mid-
night of January 1st, 1970. Whenever a new webpage document is synchronized to the 
PC browser, the timestamp of the document is also sent to Ajax-Snippet using the same 
response message. Whenever Ajax-Snippet sends an XHR polling request to SessionMag-
nifier, it carries back the timestamp of the current webpage document on the PC browser 
using the same request message. 
The request processing component compares the two timestamp values to determine 
whether the webpage document on the PC browser is outdated. If the timestamp of the 
webpage document on the PC browser is older than that on the PDA browser, the request 
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processing component informs the response generation component to synchronize the new 
webpage document on the PDA browser to the PC browser. Otherwise, it simply informs the 
response generation component to send back an empty response message to Ajax-Snippet. 
The request processing component also examines the content of this "POST " type 
XHR polling request to see whether any interaction information is carried back from the 
PC browser. If new interaction information is carried in the XHR polling request, the 
request processing component will further execute the following four steps to merge the 
interaction information to the PDA browser. First, it will accurately reflect the interaction 
information (e.g., form filling information) to the corresponding webpage elements on the 
PDA browser. Second, it will highlight these webpage elements and scroll them into the 
view window of the PDA browser. Third, it will display a modal dialog box to ask Alice 
to verify the highlighted webpage elements. Finally, if Alice confirms that the interaction 
information reflected on the PDA browser is what she did on the PC browser, the request 
processing component will actually perform the interaction (e.g., submitting a form) on the 
PDA browser; otherwise, the request processing component will undo the changes made 
in the first two steps and ignore the interaction information carried in this XHR polling 
request. By only performing confirmed interaction information on the PDA browser, the 
request processing component assures a user that important interaction information is not 
tampered with or injected by attackers. 
5.3.3.4 Response Generation 
The response generation component is the most critical component of SessionMagnifier, and 
it poses three main design challenges: (1) how to enable high-quality webpage document 
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Figure 5.3: Response generation procedure. 
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synchronization from the PDA browser to the PC browser, (2) how to enable accurate 
user interaction on the PC browser, and (3) how to prevent sensitive information from 
leaking out of the PDA. When a new webpage document is loaded on the PDA browser, 
the response generation component uses the procedure shown in Figure 5.3 to generate a 
response message for the PC browser. This procedure consists of four main steps: tagging, 
cloning, modifying, and generating. We now detail these four steps to explain how we 
addressed the design challenges of the response generation component. 
(1} Tagging: In the tagging step, the response generation component adds id at-
tributes [154] to the interested actionable elements of the latest webpage document on the 
PDA browser. We define interested actionable elements as the elements on which keyboard 
or mouse interactions will trigger the loading of a new webpage document. For example, 
links, forms, and clickable input elements outside of the forms are all regarded as interested 
actionable elements. 
Tagging allows SessionMagnifier to simply use unique element identifiers to accurately 
track interested actionable elements on both the PC browser and the PDA browser. By 
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directly tagging the web page document on the PDA browser, the response generation com-
ponent saves memory space and avoids the complexity of using any additional mapping 
mechanisms. Note that the response generation component only tags those interested ac-
tionable elements that do not have an id attribute, so it will not affect the behavior of the 
webpage document on the PDA browser. 
(2) Cloning: In the cloning step, the response generation component uses the standard 
cloneNode DOM (Document Object Model) [191] method to clone a complete copy of the 
above tagged webpage document. Using a cloned webpage document has two advantages. 
One is that standard DOM methods can still be handily used to modify the webpage. The 
other is that any further modification is only made to this cloned copy without polluting 
the web page document on the PDA browser. 
(3) Modifying: In the modifying step, the response generation component makes three 
main modifications to the cloned webpage document: URL address modification, event 
handler modification, and sensitive information filtering. 
In general, each HTML webpage document has a set of associated supplementary objects 
such as stylesheets, images, and scripts. After loading a webpage document synchronized 
from the PDA browser, the PC browser must also download the associated supplementary 
objects in order to accurately render the webpage. To support the downloading of supple-
mentary objects, the response generation component changes all the relative URL addresses 
contained in the cloned webpage document to the absolute URL addresses of the original 
Web servers. Without such a modification, the PC browser will send all relative URL 
requests to the PDA browser because it actually always connects to the SessionMagnifier 
browser extension on the PDA browser. 
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To track Alice's interaction with the same web page on the PC browser, the response gen-
eration component must change the event handlers of those interested actionable elements. 
For form elements, the response generation component changes their onsubmit event han-
dlers by adding a call to a specific JavaScript function residing in Ajax-Snippet. Therefore, 
later on when Alice submits a form on the PC browser, the id attribute value and element 
values of the form will be passed to Ajax-Snippet and then sent back to SessionMagnifier 
via an XHR polling request. In a similar way, the response generation component changes 
onclick event handlers of links and other clickable input elements outside of the forms to 
track click interactions performed on the PC browser. 
Filtering sensitive information is much simpler in SessionMagnifier than in existing solu-
tions [49, 71, 92, 98]. The main reason is that SessionMagnifier only synchronizes webpage 
documents to the PC browser, and no session control information such as HTTP cookies 
will be leaked to the PC. Therefore, the response generation component only needs to filter 
out sensitive information contained in a webpage document itself. To achieve this goal, the 
response generation component mainly uses the following two strategies. 
One is to remove any possibly sensitive information that is useless to the interaction and 
display of the webpage on the PC browser. For example, webpages often contain sensitive 
information such as session IDs in their URL links and form action attributes. The response 
generation component simply sets all form action attribute values to empty, and it also sets 
all link href attribute values to empty. Note that tracking form submitting and link clicking 
is enabled by the above event handler modifications; therefore, the original action and href 
attribute values are useless to the interaction of a webpage on the PC browser. 
The second strategy is to obfuscate personalized sensitive information. The basic idea 
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is to replace user-specified sensitive information with information that is meaningless to 
attackers. For example, many websites display username information on their webpages 
for a logged-in user. Preventing the leakage of username information is important for 
protecting against attacks such as invasive advertising, password guessing, and even denial-
of-service [12, 32]. SessionMagnifier maintains a rule table, in which simple filtering rules 
are defined by a user to specify which information should be obfuscated for each specific 
website. These rules could be defined for stable values (e.g., username), and they could also 
be defined for dynamic values (e.g., online banking balance) if the corresponding HTML 
elements of those values have stable IDs. The response generation component simply applies 
the rules to remove sensitive information contained in the cloned webpage document. 
(4) Generating: In the last step, the response generation component extracts informa-
tion from the modified webpage document and generates an XML-format response message. 
The response message is in XML-format so that later Ajax-Snippet can accurately extract 
structured response information from the responseXML attribute of an XHR object. The 
modified webpage document is an HTML document, but an XHR object expects to receive 
a valid XML document. Since HTML webpages are often malformed, directly sending a 
modified webpage document to Ajax-Snippet will often result in parsing errors. Therefore, 
the response generation component will extract essential head and body information from 
a modified webpage document, encapsulate the extracted information in an XML-format 
response message, and finally send out the response message to Ajax-Snippet. 
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5.3.3.5 Initial Webpage 
We mentioned that after the initial webpage is loaded on the PC browser, Ajax-Snippet will 
always keep itself within the head of the current web page on the PC browser and periodically 
send out "POST" type XHR polling requests to communicate with SessionMagnifier. 
Whenever Ajax-Snippet receives an XML-format response message that contains a new 
webpage document, it will first use the head information contained in the response message 
to replace the head of the current webpage on the PC browser. To support proper rendering 
on different browsers such as Internet Explorer and Firefox, Ajax-Snippet detects the type of 
the PC browser and performs this replacement for each top-level child of the head element. 
Ajax-Snippet will then use the body information contained in the response message to 
replace the body of the current webpage on the PC browser. By combining the structural 
advantages of using DOM methods and the simplicity advantages of using the innerHTML 
property of HTML elements, Ajax-Snippet can smoothly and accurately keep the webpage 
content on the PC browser synchronized with that on the PDA browser. 
Meanwhile, whenever Alice interacts with an interested actionable element of the syn-
chronized webpage on the PC browser, a call to a specific JavaScript function is made to 
extract the interaction information. The extracted information will be carried in the content 
of the next XHR polling request and synchronized to SessionMagnifier. 
5.4 Implementation 
The SessionMagnifier browser extension is designed to be implementable on different Web 
browsers. Indeed, only the connection control component is browser-specific; the request 
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authentication, request processing, and response generation components and the initial 
webpage can all be implemented using standard JavaScript and HTML that are supported 
by modern Web browsers. 
We implemented a full-fledged SessionMagnifier browser extension for Mozilla's Fennec 
browser [171], which is the mobile version of Firefox and is currently in alpha release. 
Similar to Firefox, Fennec provides full support for add-ons and rich Internet applications. 
Our SessionMagnifier extension for Fennec is purely written in JavaScript and HTML. Due 
to the space limit, we only briefly describe the implementation of the connection control 
component that is specific to Fennec, and delineate the webpage content and interaction 
synchronization capabilities of SessionMagnifier in our current implementation. 
We implemented the connection control component of SessionMagnifier as a server socket 
object of Mozilla's nsiServerSocket interface [172]. For this server socket object, we created a 
socket listener object of Mozilla's nsiServerSocketListener interface [172] to asynchronously 
accept incoming TCP connections, and we also associated a data listener object of Mozilla's 
nsiStreamListener interface [172] to a connected socket transport to asynchronously accept 
HTTP requests. In a Fennec browser extension, these objects can be easily created and 
manipulated using JavaScript code to realize the functionality of the connection control 
component. Our preliminary investigation indicates that Internet Explorer also supports 
the creation of a server socket through its BHO (Browser Helper Object) extension mech-
anism [157]. 
For webpage content synchronization, SessionMagnifier supports various webpages in-
cluding dynamic webpages (e.g., Google Maps) that use Ajax, CSS, or other DHTML 
techniques. SessionMagnifier detects dynamic webpage changes on a PDA browser and 
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synchronizes the new content to a PC browser. In principle, any type of webpage content 
could be synchronized by SessionMagnifier. However, the current version of SessionMag-
nifier cannot properly synchronize some webpages such as Gmail webpages due to the un-
finished implementation on iframe elements. For interaction synchronization, our current 
implementation supports interactions on those interested actionable elements as defined in 
our design. However, SessionMagnifier can also easily synchronize any other interactions 
(e.g., those altering document elements without calling for new data) as long as their cor-
responding HTML elements support event handlers (which could be onsubmit, onclick, or 
any other handlers). We will provide support for other necessary interactions in our future 
implementation. 
5.5 Security Analysis 
The security assurances provided by SessionMagnifier can be attributed to three factors: 
using a trusted PDA, accessing a remote Web server directly from a PDA browser, and 
enforcing strong isolation between a PDA and a PC. We now analyze the security of Ses-
sionMagnifier based on the threat model and assumptions defined in our design. We must 
emphasize that SessionMagnifier aims to enhance the security of using an untrusted public 
computer for Web browsing, but it does not attempt to secure a kiosk environment itself. 
In other words, the security upper-bound of using SessionMagnifier is equivalent to that of 
using a user's own laptop computer in a kiosk environment. 
Using a trusted PDA, SessionMagnifier is robust against input stealing attacks and 
output stealing attacks. A user simply enters sensitive information such as username and 
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password on the PDA browser, so the keyloggers installed on the PC cannot acquire sensi-
tive input information. Meanwhile, user-specified information is obfuscated by the response 
generation component of SessionMagnifier, so it is very hard for screen or window capture 
software installed on the PC to acquire sensitive output information. The ability of Ses-
sionMagnifier to provide these two types of security assurances is the same as that of other 
solutions to securing kiosk browsing sessions [49, 71, 92, 98]. 
Accessing a remote Web server directly from the PDA browser is a unique feature of 
SessionMagnifier because other solutions [49, 71, 92, 98] all use the browser on an untrusted 
computer to establish a Web session with a remote Web server. Besides, SessionMagnifier 
enforces a strong isolation between a PDA and a PC by only allowing HTTP communica-
tions. Combining these two factors, SessionMagnifier provides high security assurances to 
protect against other three types of attacks: session information stealing attacks, session 
hijacking attacks, and network attacks. 
SessionMagnifier is robust against session information stealing attacks. Since Session-
Magnifier only synchronizes the content of a modified HTML document from the PDA 
browser to the PC browser, session information such as HTTP cookies will never be leaked 
to the PC. Meanwhile, since all useless values such as form action attribute values and 
link href attribute values are simply set to empty by the response generation component 
of SessionMagnifier, no session IDs contained in these values will be revealed to the PC. 
Preventing the leakage of HTTP cookies and session IDs is important because an attacker 
can use them to further steal other sensitive user data or hijack browsing sessions. Un-
fortunately, this type of security assurance is not considered in [98], and it is considered 
in [49, 71, 92] by employing very complex filtering rules and mapping mechanisms. 
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SessionMagnifier is robust against session hijacking attacks. Since a Web session is 
established between the PDA browser and a remote Web server, malware installed on the 
PC cannot directly seize the control of a session to make fraudulent transactions. The 
only possible way for an attacker to hijack a session is to tamper with or inject interaction 
information in an XHR polling request. SessionMagnifier defends against such attacks by 
using its request processing component to accurately reflect interaction information on the 
PDA browser and only perform user-confirmed interactions. Protection against session 
hijacking is also considered in [49, 71, 92, 98]. However, because these solutions use the 
PC browser to establish a Web session with a remote Web server, they must perform 
very complex request validations but still cannot achieve the same security level as that of 
SessionMagnifier. 
In terms of network attacks, SessionMagnifier ensures end-to-end security between a 
trusted mobile device and a remote Web server by directly using existing HTTPS connec-
tions. For pure HTTPS sessions, SessionMagnifier is robust against network attacks. For 
hybrid sessions, SessionMagnifier is robust against network attacks for HTTPS webpages. 
For pure HTTP sessions, there is no strong incentive to defend against network attacks be-
cause in general Web servers that do not use SSL/TLS only provide less sensitive services. 
Existing solutions [49, 71, 92, 98] provide similar security guarantees against network attacks 
as provided by SessionMagnifier; however, they often necessitate an additional SSL/TLS 
connection or encryption channel still mainly because they use the PC browser to establish 
a Web session with a remote Web server. 
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5.6 Evaluation 
In this section, we focus on evaluating the usability of SessionMagnifier. We also briefly 
present the performance and feasibility evaluation results. 
5.6.1 Usability Evaluation 
Our primary goal is to measure whether using SessionMagnifier is more convenient than 
merely using a PDA browser. To achieve this goal, we conducted a usability study based 
on a real eBay bidding scenario. 
5.6.1.1 Participants 
Twenty-two adults, 11 females and 11 males, participated in this study. Nineteen partici-
pants were between ages of 18 and 30, and three participants were over 30 years old. We 
did not screen participants based on experiences using different Web browsers, using mobile 
devices, or using eBay services. 
5.6.1.2 Scenario and Procedure 
We presented such a scenario to each participant: "Suppose you want to bid a book titled 
'Xbox 360 games in a nutshell' at eBay.com. You visit www.ebay.com and sign into an 
eBay testing account. You search the book using its title and find the item. You place a 
higher bid by adding one dollar and get confirmation that you are currently the highest 
bidder. Finally you sign out of the eBay website.". Note that the book item was added to 
eBay using a seller's account created by us, and the eBay testing account was also created 
by us. 
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TAl: On PDA, type the address www.ebay.com into the address bar of Fennec 
TA2: On the "homepage" of eBay, click on the "Sign in" link 
TA3: On the "welcome page" of eBay, sign into the testing account 
TA4: On the "logined page", type "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find" input 
field 
TA5: On the "logined page", click on the "Search" button 
TA6: On the "search result page", click on the link item "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" 
TA7: On the "item page", type a higher amount into the "Your maximum bid" input field 
TA8: On the "item page", click on the "Place Bid" button 
TA9: On the "review and confirm bid page", click on the "Confirm Bid" button 
TAIO: On the "bid confirmation page", click on the "Sign out" link 
Table 5.1: The 10 tasks in procedure A. 
We asked each participant to perform this eBay bidding scenario using two procedures 
A and B. In procedure A, a participant only uses a PDA; in procedure B, a participant 
uses both a PDA and a PC. We used a Nokia N810 Internet Tablet as the PDA, and 
we pre-installed a Fennec browser [171 J and our SessionMagnifier browser extension on it. 
In procedure A, each participant used the Fennec browser (with SessionMagnifier turned 
off) on the PDA to perform the bidding scenario. In procedure B, each participant used 
the Fennec browser (with SessionMagnifier turned on) on the PDA and a regular browser 
on a PC to perform the bidding scenario. We randomly assigned 11 participants to first 
perform procedure A and the other 11 participants to first perform procedure B. Before a 
test, we trained each participant on the use of the PDA and the Fennec browser. We also 
explained the purpose of SessionMagnifier, and it seems that all the participants understood 
the threats addressed by SessionMagnifier. 
The step-by-step tasks for the two procedures are listed in Tables 5.1 and 5.2, respec-
tively, and we presented these two task lists to each participant. Procedure A has 10 tasks 
and procedure B has 18 tasks. Each task is a specific browsing action such as clicking on 
the "Sign in" link or typing "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find" input field. 
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TB1: On PDA, type the address www.ebay.com into the address bar of Fennec 
TB2: On PDA, on the "homepage" of eBay, click on the "Sign in" link 
TB3: On PDA, on the "welcome page" of eBay, sign into the testing account 
TB4: On PDA, click on the "Sync On" toolbar button 
TB5: On PC, type the address http:f/192.168.1.3:3000 into the address bar of a browser 
TB6: On PC, submit the one-time password to synchronize browsers 
TB7: On PC, on the "logined page", type "Xbox 360 games in a nutshell" into the "Find" 
input field 
TB8: On PC, on the "logined page", click on the "Search" button 
TB9: On PDA, verify the highlighted form on the "logined page" and confirm the form 
submission action 
TB10: On PC, on the "search result page", click on the link item "Xbox 360 games in a 
nutshell" 
TB11: On PDA, verify the highlighted link on the "search result page" and confirm the 
click action 
TB12: On PC, on the "item page", type a higher amount into the "Your maximum bid" 
input field 
TB13: On PC, on the "item page", click on the "Place Bid" button 
TB14: On PDA, verify the highlighted input field on the "item page" and confirm the input 
action 
TB15: On PC, on the "review and confirm bid page", click on the "Confirm Bid" button 
TB16: On PDA, verify the highlighted button on the "review and confirm bid page" and 
confirm the click action 
TB17: On PC, on the "bid confirmation page", click on the "Sign out" link 
TB18: On PDA, verify the highlighted link on the "bid confirmation page" and confirm the 
click action 
Table 5.2: The 18 tasks in procedure B. 
Procedure B has more tasks because we asked each participant to verify and confirm all 
the interaction information sent back to the PDA browser. For example, Figure 5.4 shows 
a picture of performing the task TB9 on Fennec. After the search of "Xbox 360 games in a 
nutshell'' performed on the PC browser is reflected on Fennec, SessionMagnifier highlights 
the border of the search form with red color and displays a modal dialog box on the PDA. 
Using this dialog box, a participant can either confirm this form submission by clicking on 
the "OK" button or ignore this form submission by clicking on the "Cancel" button. 
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Figure 5.4: Performing the task TB9 on Fennec. 
5.6.1.3 Data Collection 
We collected data through observation and obtaining feedback from participants. When 
a participant was performing the two procedures, we observed the progress of the tasks. 
After a participant finished the two procedures, we asked the participant to answer 16 
close-ended five-point Likert-scale (Strongly disagree, Disagree, Neither agree nor disagree, 
Agree, Strongly Agree) [166] questions. These 16 questions are listed in Table 5.3 (Q1 to 
Q6 were asked for both procedures). We also asked participants to write down open-ended 
comments on using SessionMagnifier. 
5.6.1.4 Results and Analysis 
We observed that all the 22 participants successfully finished the two procedures. We con-
verted the responses to the Likert-scale questions to numeric values (1=Strongly disagree, 
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The six questions common to both procedures A and B 
(replacing the 'X' in the questions with 'A' or 'B') 
Ql: Typing into input fields of a webpage in procedure X is easy 
Q2: Clicking links of a webpage in procedure X is easy 
Q3: Clicking buttons of a webpage in procedure X is easy 
Q4: Scrolling a webpage in procedure X is easy 
Q5: Viewing webpage content in procedure X is easy 
Q6: Overall, performing procedure X is easy 
The four questions specific to procedure B 
QB1: Typing the URL address http:f/192.168.1.3:3000 of SessionMagnifier into the address 
bar of a PC browser in procedure B is easy 
QB2: Clicking the "Sync On" toolbar button in procedure B is easy 
QB3: Verifying a highlighted element (form, link, button) in procedure B is easy 
QB4: Confirming an action (form, link, button) using the dialog box in procedure B is easy 
Table 5.3: The 16 close-ended questions. 
2=Disagree, 3=Neither agree nor disagree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly Agree) and compared the 
responses to procedures A and B using t-tests. Strictly speaking, since the responses are 
ordinal data, they do not necessarily have interval scales. However, in practice this type of 
analysis is acceptable [16]. 
Figure 5.5 illustrates the mean ratings to questions Q1 to Q6 for the two procedures. 
We can see that for all the six questions the mean ratings to procedure B are much higher 
than those to procedure A. The t-tests (with 95% confidence interval) further reveal that 
the mean rating differences between the two procedures are significant for each of the six 
questions. These results clearly indicate that SessionMagnifier enables users to exploit the 
usability advantages of using the large keyboard and display of a PC. 
Using a similar method, we analyzed the responses to the four questions specific to 
procedure B. The mean ratings to questions QB1 to QB4 are: 3.96, 4.09, 3.64, and 3.86, 
respectively. One-sample t-test (with 95% confidence interval) against the test value of 
three shows that the mean ratings to these questions are higher than three with statistical 
significance. These results indicate that performing the specific interactions introduced in 
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Figure 5.5: Mean ratings to questions Ql to Q6. 
procedure B is not difficult to users. 
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We further analyzed participants' open-ended comments on using SessionMagnifier. We 
found that 14 participants clearly mentioned that typing into input fields and viewing web-
pages are very convenient in procedure B. We also found that nine participants mentioned 
that it would be better if the number of verifying and confirming steps could be reduced. 
We should note that verification and confirmation are necessary steps for important in-
teractions, and they were or should be considered in other splitting-trust based solutions. 
Moreover, SessionMagnifier allows a user to bypass this verification and confirmation step 
using the "Auto On" toolbar button. In procedure B, we disabled the "Auto On" feature 
to measure the worst case usability, but we believe that a user can actually be trained to 
use this feature to confidently bypass less important interactions. 
5.6.2 Performance and Feasibility Evaluation 
In our performance evaluation, we mainly measured the speed of SessionMagnifier in re-
sponse generation (i.e., the procedure illustrated in Figure 5.3) and response transmission. 
We used Fennec to visit five homepages. The page size and response generation time (av-
erage of five runs) of these homepages are listed in Table 5.4. We can see that the larger 
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Site Name Page Size (KB) Generation Time (second) 
google.com 8.9 0.36 
ebay.com 49.5 1.37 
bestbuy.com 80.2 2.64 
weather.com 148.7 2.71 
amazon.com 201.1 3.03 
Table 5.4: Page size and response generation time of five homepages. 
and more complex the HTML page is, the more generation time is needed. Response gen-
eration is not very efficient for large webpages, but we believe that the main reason is the 
poor memory management in the current alpha release of Fennec. Using the Linux top 
command, we observed that even without SessionMagnifier, Fennec requires over 107% of 
memory (128MB RAM) on Nokia N810 Internet Tablet by just loading the google.com 
homepage; however, the built-in browser on Nokia N810 only requires less than 78% of 
memory even when loading the amazon.com homepage. We believe that increasing memory 
or an improved Fennec can help reduce the response generation time of SessionMagnifier. 
In terms of the response transmission speed, since the PDA and the PC are located in the 
same LAN, the generated response message can normally be transmitted from the PDA to 
the PC within a second. 
In our feasibility evaluation, we mainly tested whether TCP connections between a PDA 
and a PC can be established via Wi-Fi in kiosk environments. We conducted experiments 
at 20 public places (seven hotels, seven restaurants, three libraries, two gyms, and one 
coffee shop) that offer free Wi-Fi Internet access. Since some places do not provide public 
computers, we used a laptop to act as a public PC. At each place, we did not do any 
special configuration on either the PDA (the Nokia N810 Internet Tablet) or the PC, but 
just connected them to the same Wi-Fi access point to acquire IP addresses. We observed 
that TCP connections between the PDA and the PC are blocked (perhaps due to strict 
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security restrictions) at three hotels and two restaurants. At the other fifteen places, the 
PC can connect to the PDA using a TCP port (e.g. 3000), and we successfully performed 
Web browsing using SessionMagnifier. These results indicate that it is practical to use 
SessionMagnifier at many free Wi-Fi hotspots. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the design 
section, a kiosk environment that plans to enable SessionMagnifier can also use USB or 
Bluetooth, in addition to Wi-Fi. 
5.7 Summary 
We presented SessionMagnifier, a simple approach to secure and convenient kiosk brows-
ing. Leveraging the end-user extensibility and Ajax technology of modern Web browsers, 
SessionMagnifier enables an extended browser on a mobile device and a regular browser 
on a public computer to collaboratively support a Web session. SessionMagnifier strives to 
synthesize the usability advantages of a public computer and the security advantages of a 
mobile device. Since a Web session is directly established between the PDA browser and a 
remote Web server, SessionMagnifier provides a strong end-to-end security guarantee and 
greatly reduces the complexity of content and control filtering. Since a user can perform the 
majority of browsing interactions from the PC and only perform very sensitive interactions 
from the PDA, SessionMagnifier enables a user to fully take advantage of the convenience 
of using a PC. We presented the design of SessionMagnifier in detail and analyzed the secu-
rity of SessionMagnifier using a rigorous threat model. We implemented SessionMagnifier 
for Mozilla's Fennec browser and evaluated its usability, performance, and feasibility. Our 
evaluation and analysis demonstrate that SessionMagnifier is simple, secure, and usable. 
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In future work, we will enhance the implementation and evaluation of SessionMagnifier. 
In particular, we will improve our usability evaluation, for example, by gathering informa-
tion about participants' experience with mobile devices, by allowing participants to use our 
tool with only basic instead of step-by-step instructions, by collecting data illustrating par-
ticipants' thoughts on security aspects of using our tool, and by incorporating some security 
attack scenarios. 
Chapter 6 
Conclusions and Future Work 
In the previous chapters, we have introduced this dissertation and detailed its four 
main contributions in enhancing Web browsing security. In this final chapter, we make 
conclusions and outline the future work. 
6.1 Conclusions 
Traditionally, attackers mainly focused on directly breaking into Web servers to acquire 
sensitive information or damage the systems. However, in recent years, Web browsers have 
gained increasing popularity as new attack vectors for launching various severe attacks such 
as drive-by download, cross-site scripting, phishing, privacy, and even large-scale denial 
of service attacks. Browser-based attacks are rampant over the Internet and have caused 
substantial damage to both Web users and service providers. Enhancing Web browsing 
security is therefore of great need and importance, and it has also become much more 
challenging than before. 
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This dissertation concentrates on enhancing the Web browsing security through explor-
ing and experimenting with new approaches and software systems. Specifically, we have 
systematically studied four challenging Web browsing security problems: HTTP cookie 
management, phishing, insecure JavaScript practices, and browsing on untrusted public 
computers. We have proposed new approaches to address these problems, and built unique 
systems to validate our approaches. Our contributions include an automatic HTTP cookie 
management system, a transparent phishing protection system, a large-scale measurement 
of insecure JavaScript practices on the Web, and a simple approach to secure and convenient 
kiosk browsing. The four Web browsing security problems studied in this dissertation are 
real-world important problems, and our solutions presented in this dissertation are unique, 
meaningful, and useful. 
6.2 Future Work 
As malicious activities have increasingly become Web-based and as attackers have become 
more and more economically motivated and adaptable, enhancing Web browsing security 
will continue to be of critical importance. In the near future, I will keep the focus of my re-
search on security, especially Web browsing security. For one example, based on the insecure 
JavaScript practice characterization work presented in Chapter 4, I will study JavaScript ob-
fuscation and de-obfuscation activities to build browser-based anomaly intrusion detection 
systems. For another example, based on my experience in building CookiePicker (Chap-
ter 2), BogusBiter (Chapter 3), and SessionMagnifier (Chapter 5), I will propose other 
new approaches to protect users' username and password credentials against various iden-
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tity theft malware. In addition to enhancing Web browsing security, I will continue to do 
research on collaborative browsing and mobile browsing, and I also plan to study cloud 
computing. Web browsers have increasingly become the dominant platform for both cur-
rent and future end-user applications, and I believe that there are many interesting Web 
browsing research problems worth investigating in the future. 
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